An Update On Jumia: A New Business

Continuing on the last post, I said although some earnings number are not pretty, Jumia has become a different firm in two year.

It was relying heavily on first-party sales (“resell” model like JD.com) which accounted for over 70% of its revenue in 2018Q1. That number decreased overtime to 34% in 2020Q1 (halved), partially due to the coronavirus disruption from Jumia’s own suppliers.

Another way to look at this is on the GMV level. 1st party revenue as % of GMV decreases overtime as well – what is more, the take-rate on the rest of the GMV, where marketplace revenues come from, is improving.

I do believe marketplace revenues (like Alibaba) are more valuable. Thus, Jumia’s has grown its higher-quality revenue overtime. The third-party business has shaped Jumia into a different company (with more valuable revenues).

As JumiaPay keeps growing, it will deliver value just like Alipay.

Another important matrix that is improving significantly is gross profit after fulfillment expense. This value could be used as “gross profit” or even “revenue” to better track the long-term profitability.

Fulfillment expense is not trivial and grows with the GMV as both 1st-party and 3rd-party sales uses Jumia’s delivery network.

And as mentioned in the previous post, African nations are now more willing to use mobile payments due to coronavirus. The improvement in adoption will give Jumia a boost in monetization overtime.


To sum up, three reasons that I believe Jumia is a different company:

    1. higher-quality marketplace revenues are now driving the growth
    2. gross profitability after fulfillment improves meaningfully
    3. pandemic-shaped population will adopt mobile payments & fintech solutions much more easily – trust is forced to build.