Tag: Business

From capex to backlog

For the past few quarter, capex figures and related comments from hyperscalers are the key metrics to watch, especially for gauging future demand for semiconductor companies.

The higher the capex number, the higher the revenue estimates.

This worked but became less useful lately.

Investors don’t like it if only the capex is growing, which pushes hyperscalers free cash flows to negative territory.

Investors want to see higher demand signal, which can justify these higher capex numbers.

Thus, backlogs or RPOs (emaining performance obligations) are more important now.

 

Quarter AWS backlog Microsoft commercial RPO Google Cloud backlog Oracle total RPO
1Q25 189 315 90 130
2Q25 195 368 106 138
3Q25 200 392 155 455
4Q25 244 625 240 523
1Q26 364 627 462 553
2Q26 496 678 514 638

Another thing to watch is the weighted-average backlog duration of these backlogs – within how many years will backlog become revenue?

Microsoft explicitly commented about 2.3 years.

RPO, including OpenAI, has a weighted average duration of 2.3 years. And roughly 30% will be recognized in revenue in the next 12 months, up 37% year-over-year. The remaining portion recognized beyond the next 12 months increased 112%.

– MSFT FY4q26 earnings call

In addition, utilization is also an indicator.

Amazon said “lion’s share” of AWS compute capacity for 2027 had ⁠already been reserved during 2q26 earning call, which is very good to hear.

Hefei leaders during CXMT’s first 10 years

Changxin Technology Group got listed on Monday.

It’s such a big event – it becomes mainland China’s most valuable listed company.

Here is a list of 合肥市委书记 (Hefei Party secretaries) in those years.

 

Taking 2016, when CXMT was established in Hefei, as the starting point, five Hefei Party secretaries are relevant to the company’s development:

Hefei Party Secretary Term CXMT Development Stage Subsequent Career and Current Status
Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) Sep. 2011–Nov. 2016 Project incubation and establishment Later served as Executive Vice Governor of Anhui, Executive Vice Mayor and Deputy Party Secretary of Chongqing, Vice Chairman of the Chongqing People’s Congress, and Chairman of the Shanxi CPPCC. Investigated in December 2024 and sentenced at first instance in March 2026 to life imprisonment for accepting more than RMB 127 million in bribes.
Song Guoquan (宋国权) Nov. 2016–May 2020 Fab construction, technology introduction, and initial mass production Later became Vice Chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. Retired after the 2023 leadership transition and now mainly serves as President of the Anhui Intangible Cultural Heritage Research Association. He continues to appear at public events.
Yu Aihua (虞爱华) May 2020–Mar. 2024 Capacity expansion and development of the surrounding semiconductor ecosystem Subsequently promoted to Deputy Party Secretary of Anhui and Secretary of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In 2025, he moved to the Anhui CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice Chairman. He continues to perform public duties.
Zhang Hongwen (张红文) Mar. 2024–Mar. 2025 Mature expansion and IPO preparation Disappeared from public view after December 2024, left his positions without receiving a new appointment, and was later removed as an Anhui Provincial People’s Congress delegate. His status is highly unusual, although no formal disciplinary investigation has been publicly announced.
Fei Gaoyun (费高云) Apr. 2025–May 2026 Final IPO preparation stage Placed under disciplinary and supervisory investigation on May 6, 2026. As of the latest public information, no subsequent announcement of expulsion from the Party, prosecution, or sentencing had been made.

1. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣): Involved at the Project’s Starting Point, but Not Its Principal Builder

CXMT and the first phase of its Hefei DRAM manufacturing project were established in 2016. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) remained Hefei Party secretary until November of that year, meaning the project’s initial planning, government investment framework, and decision to locate in Hefei were likely developed during the final period of his tenure.

However, the construction of the fabs and the transition into commercial production mainly occurred under his successor, Song Guoquan (宋国权).

After leaving Hefei, Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) continued to rise through the political system and eventually became Chairman of the Shanxi CPPCC. A court later found that he had accepted more than RMB 127 million in bribes between 2006 and 2024 while holding various government positions, including those of Hefei mayor and Hefei Party secretary.

Public court documents have not specifically linked his bribery case to CXMT. It would therefore be inappropriate to claim that his criminal case involved the CXMT project.

Assessment: Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) was the Party secretary during CXMT’s project-establishment phase, but not the principal official responsible for its construction and commercialization.

2. Song Guoquan (宋国权): The Most Important Party Secretary for CXMT’s Early Development

Song Guoquan’s (宋国权) tenure covered CXMT’s most difficult transition: moving from plans and capital commitments to a functioning fab and commercially viable DRAM production.

Key milestones during his tenure included:

  • Construction of the first Hefei fab beginning in March 2017.
  • Completion of the main fab building in January 2018.
  • Initial wafer runs for 8Gb DDR4 in July 2018.
  • Announcement of mass production in September 2019.
  • Initial commercial orders and sales beginning in November 2019.

Among the five officials, Song Guoquan (宋国权) therefore had the most direct association with CXMT’s successful execution. During his tenure, the company had already committed substantial capital but had not yet proven its technology or manufacturing capability. The core task was to complete the facility, establish a production process, achieve acceptable yields, and begin commercial shipments.

After leaving the Hefei Party secretary position, Song Guoquan (宋国权) became Vice Chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. He subsequently retired from full-time government office and has remained publicly active through cultural and intangible-heritage organizations. There have been no public reports of investigations or disciplinary action against him.

Assessment: Song Guoquan (宋国权) was CXMT’s “construction and mass-production Party secretary.” His tenure was the most important for turning the company from a government-backed project into an operating DRAM manufacturer.

3. Yu Aihua (虞爱华): Transforming CXMT from a Single Project into an Industrial Cluster

Yu Aihua (虞爱华) took office in May 2020, after CXMT had already achieved initial DDR4 mass production. The company’s strategic focus had therefore shifted from proving the viability of one fab to expanding capacity, upgrading technology, and developing a broader local semiconductor supply chain.

During his tenure:

  • The Fab C project was initiated in June 2020.
  • Construction of the C2 module began in December 2021.
  • The Hefei A2 fab building was completed in June 2022.
  • Hefei continued to attract semiconductor equipment, materials, packaging, design, and supporting companies.

Yu Aihua (虞爱华) frequently described Hefei’s model as “industrial investment” rather than ordinary venture capital. Under this approach, the local government combined equity investment, land, infrastructure, financing, supply-chain development, and customer-market support to build strategic industries.

In 2024, Yu Aihua (虞爱华) was promoted to Deputy Party Secretary of Anhui and also served as Secretary of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In 2025, he moved to the Anhui CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice Chairman.

This represented a clear reduction in executive authority and effectively ended his upward political trajectory. However, he has continued to participate in public meetings and official activities, and there has been no public indication that he is under investigation.

Assessment: Yu Aihua (虞爱华) was CXMT’s “capacity-expansion and industrial-ecosystem Party secretary.” He helped develop CXMT from a standalone manufacturing project into the center of a larger Hefei semiconductor cluster.

4. Zhang Hongwen (张红文): A Short Tenure and a Highly Unclear Political Status

Zhang Hongwen (张红文) became Hefei Party secretary in March 2024 and remained in the position for roughly one year.

By this point, CXMT was already an established DRAM producer. Zhang Hongwen’s (张红文) tenure therefore corresponded more closely to advanced-product expansion, corporate restructuring, financing, and preparation for a potential public listing than to the company’s original establishment or manufacturing ramp.

His departure was highly unusual:

  • He stopped appearing publicly after December 10, 2024.
  • In March 2025, it was confirmed that he was no longer an Anhui Provincial Party Committee member or Hefei Party secretary.
  • No new position was announced.
  • In December 2025, he was removed as a delegate to the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress.

This combination of events commonly suggests serious internal disciplinary action, organizational investigation, or another form of political handling. However, no formal announcement by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has publicly confirmed that Zhang Hongwen (张红文) is under investigation.

There is also no authoritative public evidence linking his disappearance or removal to CXMT.

Assessment: Zhang Hongwen (张红文) was CXMT’s “mature expansion and capital-markets preparation Party secretary.” He appears likely to have encountered serious political trouble, but the specific cause remains undisclosed.

5. Fei Gaoyun (费高云): Investigated During CXMT’s Final IPO Preparation Stage

Fei Gaoyun (费高云) became Hefei Party secretary in April 2025 and served for approximately one year.

His tenure covered the final stages of CXMT’s listing preparation and continued capacity expansion. On May 6, 2026, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was under investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline and law.

CXMT subsequently completed its public listing in July 2026, meaning Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was investigated before the company formally entered the public market.

As of the latest information included in the original summary, there had been no public announcement that Fei Gaoyun (费高云) had been expelled from the Party, transferred for prosecution, or sentenced. The investigation remained ongoing.

There is no authoritative evidence that his case is connected to CXMT.

Assessment: Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was CXMT’s “IPO preparation Party secretary.” His long-term contribution to the company is difficult to evaluate because his tenure was brief and ended with a formal investigation.

Overall Assessment

The political outcomes of the five Hefei Party secretaries associated with CXMT’s development have varied substantially:

  • Formally investigated and sentenced: Wu Cunrong (吴存荣).
  • Formally placed under investigation: Fei Gaoyun (费高云).
  • Highly abnormal departure, but no public investigation announcement: Zhang Hongwen (张红文).
  • Normal retirement: Song Guoquan (宋国权).
  • Transferred to the CPPCC and continuing normal public duties: Yu Aihua (虞爱华).

In terms of their direct importance to CXMT’s development, a reasonable ranking would be:

Song Guoquan (宋国权) > Yu Aihua (虞爱华) > Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) > Zhang Hongwen (张红文) ≈ Fei Gaoyun (费高云)

Song Guoquan (宋国权) ranks first because his tenure covered construction, technology validation, and the beginning of commercial production. Yu Aihua (虞爱华) ranks second because his tenure covered large-scale expansion and the development of Hefei’s broader semiconductor ecosystem. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) was relevant to the project’s initial formation, while Zhang Hongwen (张红文) and Fei Gaoyun (费高云) served during later, relatively short periods.

It is important not to infer that CXMT itself was involved in corruption merely because several former Hefei Party secretaries later encountered political or legal problems. Public information concerning Wu Cunrong (吴存荣), Zhang Hongwen (张红文), and Fei Gaoyun (费高云) has not established a direct connection between their cases and CXMT.

CXMT’s development was the result of several factors working together over multiple political administrations: local-government industrial investment, national semiconductor policy, the work of the company’s management and engineering teams, and sustained access to capital and manufacturing resources.

Here is the list of relevant Hefei mayor

 

Hefei mayor Term CXMT stage Subsequent career and current status
Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) Jan. 2012–Aug. 2016 Project incubation and initial approval Investigated in July 2016 and expelled from the Party and public office in December 2016. I found no authoritative public announcement of a subsequent prosecution or sentence.
Ling Yun (凌云) Aug. 2016–Apr. 2021 Fab construction, technology validation and first commercial production Became Huangshan Party secretary in 2021. Since January 2025, she has served as director of the Anhui CPPCC Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Affairs Committee.
Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) Apr. 2021–Jan. 2026 Capacity expansion, product upgrading and IPO preparation Resigned as mayor in January 2026 and became Party-group secretary of the Anhui CPPCC Economic Committee. This appears to be a normal retirement-transition appointment.
Zhang Quan (张泉) Jan. 2026–present IPO completion and post-listing expansion Current Hefei mayor. He had already served as Hefei executive vice mayor from 2023, so his involvement with CXMT began before becoming mayor.

 

1. Zhang Qingjun (张庆军): The project-incubation mayor

Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) was mayor when the CXMT project was conceived and initially established in 2016. Because the publicly available CXMT timeline does not identify individual officials responsible for the decision, it is safest to say that he was part of the municipal leadership during the project’s formation—not that he personally created or controlled the project.

His overlap with CXMT was brief. He was placed under investigation on July 30, 2016, and formally resigned as mayor the following month. In December 2016, he was expelled from the Party and dismissed from public office for serious disciplinary violations, including using his position for private benefit.

I have not found an authoritative court or procuratorate announcement showing that Zhang was subsequently prosecuted or sentenced. Therefore, his latest clearly documented public status remains the 2016 dual expulsion, rather than a confirmed criminal conviction.

Assessment: Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) was CXMT’s project-incubation mayor, but he left before construction began and was not responsible for the execution or production ramp.

2. Ling Yun (凌云): The most important mayor in CXMT’s history

Ling Yun (凌云) became acting mayor in August 2016 and was formally elected in October. Her term covered essentially the entire zero-to-one process:

  • Fab construction beginning in March 2017.
  • Completion of the first factory building and equipment move-in in January 2018.
  • Trial production in July 2018.
  • DDR4 mass-production announcement in September 2019.
  • First commercial orders in November 2019.

Her direct public association with CXMT is also well documented. At the September 2019 signing of the broader Hefei ChangXin integrated-circuit manufacturing base, Ling described a planned industrial complex centred on CXMT, including the wafer fab, a supporting IC industrial park and an integrated residential area. The overall project was presented as a more-than-RMB 220 billion development, with CXMT’s wafer-manufacturing base representing the largest component.

This means that, on the government side, Ling was not merely present at the time. Her administration had to execute the difficult work of:

  • Deploying municipal and district-level capital.
  • Constructing fab-related utilities and infrastructure.
  • Coordinating equipment installation and recruitment.
  • Helping the company obtain technology and intellectual-property access.
  • Supporting CXMT until it produced commercially saleable DRAM.

After leaving Hefei, Ling became Huangshan Party secretary. She stepped down from that position in December 2024 and was appointed in January 2025 to lead an Anhui CPPCC committee. She remains in normal public service and has not been publicly associated with a disciplinary investigation.

Assessment: Ling Yun (凌云) was CXMT’s construction, technology-validation and mass-production mayor. Among the mayors, she had the greatest direct importance to CXMT’s success.

3. Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰): The expansion and industrialisation mayor

Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) became mayor in April 2021, but his involvement with Hefei’s industrial projects began earlier: he had served as executive vice mayor from 2018 and as deputy Party secretary from late 2020. He therefore overlapped with the latter part of CXMT’s initial production ramp even before becoming mayor.

His mayoral term covered CXMT’s transition from a newly producing fab into a much larger DRAM platform:

  • Construction and completion of the Hefei second-phase main fab.
  • Continued capacity expansion.
  • Development of LPDDR5, DDR5 and LPDDR5X products.
  • Expansion of the local semiconductor materials, equipment, packaging and design ecosystem.
  • Corporate restructuring, fundraising and IPO preparation.

CXMT’s official timeline records that the Hefei second-phase main fab was topped out in June 2022. Luo also repeatedly highlighted CXMT in Hefei’s industrial strategy; his 2022 government report stated that CXMT’s 2021 revenue had grown approximately fivefold.

Luo remained mayor until January 2026, when Zhang Quan (张泉) replaced him. Later that month, Luo was appointed Party-group secretary of the Anhui CPPCC Economic Committee. Given his age—born in January 1966—and the absence of adverse announcements, this looks like a standard transition away from executive government office rather than a disciplinary removal.

Assessment: Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) was CXMT’s scale-expansion, product-upgrade and capital-markets mayor. He ranks second only to Ling because he covered both the late initial ramp and most of the large expansion cycle.

4. Zhang Quan (张泉): The IPO and post-listing mayor

Zhang Quan (张泉) became acting mayor on January 13, 2026 and was formally elected on January 24. He is the current Hefei mayor.

Although his mayoral tenure is still short, he was already Hefei’s executive vice mayor from 2023, meaning he likely participated in the government-side work surrounding CXMT’s later fundraising, expansion and listing preparation. That involvement is more relevant than his short formal mayoral term alone would suggest.

CXMT listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s STAR Market on July 27, 2026 under ticker 688825, so Zhang’s period as mayor begins with CXMT’s transition from a predominantly government-backed strategic project into a major publicly listed semiconductor company.

His future role will likely focus less on proving that CXMT can manufacture DRAM and more on:

  • Supporting additional capacity and technology upgrades.
  • Building equipment and materials suppliers around CXMT.
  • Managing the relationship between municipal state capital and public shareholders.
  • Extending the economic benefits of CXMT across Hefei’s semiconductor cluster.

Assessment: Zhang Quan (张泉) is CXMT’s IPO-completion and post-listing mayor, but it is too early to judge his ultimate importance.

Overall ranking

Based on direct importance to CXMT’s development to date:

Ling Yun (凌云) > Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) > Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) ≈ Zhang Quan (张泉)

The ranking differs somewhat from that of the Party secretaries:

  • Ling Yun (凌云) was probably the single most important municipal executive during CXMT’s zero-to-one phase.
  • Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) had the longest combined exposure when his executive-vice-mayor period is included.
  • Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) was involved only at the project’s birth.
  • Zhang Quan (张泉) may eventually become important, but his mayoral record is still too short.

The striking contrast is that the mayoral sequence has been more stable than the Party-secretary sequence: one mayor was formally disciplined, while the subsequent three have either moved normally to other positions or remain in office. There is still no public evidence establishing that the disciplinary problems of Zhang Qingjun (张庆军), or any of the former Hefei Party secretaries, were connected to CXMT itself.

Summartized and written by ChatGPT.

US data center transaction valuation

 

Transaction date Assets Buyer / capital partner Seller / contributor Stake acquired Transaction value Capacity Implied price per GW
Jun. 29, 2026 Three Northern Virginia hyperscale facilities: two in Manassas and one in Sterling Digital Realty Blackstone-affiliated funds Blended 64%: 80% of two sites and 50% of one US$3.5bn equity consideration; US$7.8bn 100% gross asset value, including assumed debt and remaining capex 0.288GW US$27.1bn/GW on gross asset value
Jul. 28, 2026 Meta El Paso campus, Texas BlackRock/GIP/HPS funds Meta contributes land and construction in progress BlackRock 80%; Meta retains 20% US$14bn total fitted-infrastructure development cost; Meta contributed US$2.3bn of assets and BlackRock contributed US$4.9bn cash at closing 1.0GW US$14.0bn/GW
Oct. 21, 2025 Meta Hyperion initial campus development, Louisiana Blue Owl-managed funds Meta contributes land and construction in progress Blue Owl 80%; Meta retains 20% US$27bn total development cost; Blue Owl initially contributed about US$7bn cash and Meta received a US$3bn distribution ~2.0GW initial phase ~US$13.5bn/GW
Oct. 1, 2024 New Equinix xScale campuses across the U.S. GIC and CPP Investments New-build JV with Equinix; no conventional seller GIC 37.5%; CPP 37.5%; Equinix 25% More than US$15bn of total investable capital, including future debt More than 1.5GW ~US$10bn/GW, based on headline figures
Apr. 15, 2024 Equinix SV12x, San Jose, California PGIM Real Estate Equinix contributes/develops project PGIM 80%; Equinix retains 20% US$600m JV/project capitalization >0.028GW <US$21.4bn/GW
Oct. 15, 2025 Aligned Data Centers platform across North and South America AIP, MGX and BlackRock’s GIP Macquarie-managed funds and co-investors 100% equity US$40bn enterprise value ~5GW operational and planned ~US$8.0bn/GW

Model pricing comparison

Meta’s pricing is amazing – it targets eliminate Claude’s gross profit if Muse Spark capability can catch up.

Model Input ($/1M tokens) Output ($/1M tokens)
Meta Muse Spark 1.1 $1.25 $4.25
Claude Sonnet ~$3 ~$15
Claude Opus ~$5 ~$25

With cached input.

Model Input ($/1M) Cached Input ($/1M) Output ($/1M) Cached discount
Meta Muse Spark 1.1 $1.25 $0.15 $4.25 88%
Claude Sonnet $3.00 $0.30 $15.00 90%
Claude Opus $5.00 $0.50 $25.00 90%

However, compare that with DeepSeek.

Model Input / 1M Cached input / 1M Output / 1M
DeepSeek V4 Flash RMB 1 / $0.15 RMB 0.02 / $0.003  RMB 2 / $0.3
DeepSeek V4 Pro  RMB 3 / $0.44 RMB 0.025 / $0.0037 RMB 6 / $0.89

Zhipu could see some trouble…

 

Model Input / 1M Cached input / 1M Output / 1M
Zhipu GLM-5.2 RMB 8 / $1.18 RMB 2 / $0.3 RMB 28 / $4.13
Meta Muse Spark 1.1 $1.25 $0.15 $4.25
DeepSeek V4 Pro  RMB 3 RMB 0.025 RMB 6

Also recall that I was mentioning the bifurcation in AI models and AI infra.

Which Buffett stock performed well during doc-com bubble?

1/ Washington Post

In 2000, the company spent about $125 million developing Kaplan, online education and Washingtonpost.com.

Kaplan became a success.

Kaplan revenue grew roughly 76% in two years, while it swung from a meaningful loss to profitability. Test preparation benefited as the weak job market sent more people back to graduate school, while Kaplan Higher Education produced record enrollment, revenue and operating income.

 

2/ H&R Block

Core tax business is a recurring, mostly cash-paid service that was largely insensitive to technology spending or stock-market valuations.

H&R Block owned Option One, a large non-prime mortgage originator. As the Federal Reserve cut rates following the dot-com collapse, refinancing activity surged. << an early subprime-housing trade

 

3/ Wells Fargo

Wells Fargo surged in 2000 as money rotated away from expensive technology stocks toward reasonably valued, profitable financial companies. Even after its 20% decline in 2001, an investor entering at the end of 1999 still made roughly 24% through 2002, versus a 38% loss for the S&P 500.

Its underlying banking businesses also remained healthy: Wells Fargo reported growing net interest income and improving earnings in parts of its business during 2002.

The AI death, zoombies, and unsustainables

Some of the notable AI services have been sunset, both in the US and in China.

In March 2026, Sora shutdown was officially announced. The consumer web and app experiences were shut down on April 26, 2026, while the developer API will end on September 24, 2026.

In Sep 2025, 秒鸭相机 (owned by Alibaba) has dissolved the team and news broke out in May 2026.

Baidu’s 文心一言 / Yiyan / Ernie Bot commercialization (membership-based) has not worked; Baidu announced the sunset of paid membership in Feb 2025 and began refund in Apr 2025. The chat function of frontier LLMs in China is basically free for all, but the paid subscription had previously cost about RMB 59.9 per month.

 

Yiyan service itself has been moved/remade/rebranded.

 

There are many more.

e.g. in China

Product Company Type Date/status What happened
Glow MiniMax AI companion March 2023 Removed following complaints involving sensitive content and privacy. It never returned under the Glow name; MiniMax later launched 星野. (21 Economic Net)
Trik AI Xiaohongshu AI image generation Late 2023 Shut after controversy and litigation over artists’ work; Xiaohongshu subsequently launched 奇域AI. (36Kr)
未伴 Tencent Music/QQ Music AI companion and social app June 2024 Removed amid regulatory scrutiny of AI-companion content. Mainland services were discontinued rather than merely renamed. (21 Economic Net)
腾讯翻译君 Tencent AI translation March 13, 2025 Web, app and mini-program all ceased operating. Translation functionality increasingly became part of 元宝 and Tencent’s larger products. (36Kr)
万物追踪 MiniMax AI information monitoring Around April 2025 Entered public testing in January 2025 and was comprehensively delisted less than three months later. (36Kr)
鹿班智能设计 Alibaba Automated advertising/design June 30, 2025 All services ended after Alibaba had already stopped purchases and renewals. (36Kr)
奇域AI Xiaohongshu Chinese-style AI images June 30, 2025 Standalone service closed; some functionality was transferred to Xiaohongshu’s 镜构 mini-program. (36Kr)
腾讯智影 Tencent AI video and digital humans June 30, 2025 Officially described as a platform “renovation,” but login ended, user data was cleared and its official account was later cancelled. This is best treated as an effective indefinite closure. (36Kr)
异世界回响 Soul AI character companion Around September 2025 Reported withdrawn/stopped as Soul reduced its standalone AI-companion experiments. The exact final server date was not clearly published. (36Kr)
狸谱 Independent startup AIGC anime and fan-art community October 31, 2025 Officially ceased operation despite reportedly reaching around one million monthly active users during its peak. (36Kr)
冒泡鸭 StepFun/阶跃星辰 AI role-play companion November 5, 2025 Formally stopped operating after exceeding six million cumulative downloads, according to third-party app data cited by Chinese media. (36Kr)
讯飞写作 iFlytek AI writing November 30, 2025 Officially terminated; users were instructed to export their content before closure. (36Kr)
XEVA / X Eva Xiaoice/小冰 AI clones and companionship November 30, 2025 Ended all operating services. (36Kr)
Wow AI Meituan AI friend and character chat December 18, 2025 Servers closed and users could no longer access their accounts. (36Kr)
纸飞机AI ModelBest/面壁智能 AI companion Reported exited in 2025 Included in the 2025 shutdown census, although no precise public server-closure date was located. (36Kr)
momoAI 清杉信息 AI companion Reported exited in 2025 Listed among discontinued or withdrawn AI-companion products; detailed closure documentation is limited. (36Kr)
我在AI 有零科技 AI companion Reported exited in 2025 Reported as withdrawn or no longer maintained; no clear public final-service notice was found. (36Kr)
AiU 爱哟 Zhipu AI/智谱 AI companion Reported exited in H2 2025 Standalone companion experiment was withdrawn as Zhipu concentrated resources elsewhere. Exact date is unclear. (36Kr)
Lumi 噜米 禹幻科技 AI emotional companion Reported exited in H2 2025 Included in the companion-app withdrawal wave, but its final backend-shutdown date was not publicly documented. (36Kr)
梯子AI Baidu AI search March 4, 2026 Shut after operating for roughly six months; its site and app-store listings disappeared and functions moved into the 文心 app. (Sina Finance)

Some have become “zombies”.

Product Company Condition as of June 30, 2026
胃之书 Independent team Had gone at least five months without an update by late 2025; user-feedback groups were reportedly nonfunctional or muted. No formal shutdown announcement, but it appeared close to natural abandonment. (36Kr)
AskXBOT 澜码科技 The company experienced unpaid wages, staff reductions and severe financing problems. AskXBOT appeared stalled, although the company website remained accessible, so it cannot be called a clean server shutdown. (Sina Finance)
Vega AI Independent team Included in the Chinese-media census of delisted or long-unmaintained AI applications. I found no reliable official closure notice or exact date. (36Kr)
开搜AI 快搜-related team Listed as delisted or long-term unmaintained, but public evidence is insufficient to establish a precise final shutdown date. (36Kr)
晓象 Startup project Reportedly encountered major operating and financing problems. Its product activity appears substantially stalled, but evidence does not support a precise “servers shut on X date” claim. (36Kr)
小星星AI陪练 星星趣弹 Included in the 2025 inactive-app census, but third-party download pages continued to appear. I would label it unconfirmed/inactive, rather than fully closed. (36Kr)

Many can be found in the US.

Product What it did Shutdown date What happened
Huxe Turned emails, calendars, webpages and prompts into personalized AI audio briefings/podcasts May 28, 2026 Removed from the app stores and stopped functioning. The founders said the team was moving on and would discontinue the product. (TechCrunch)
Rewind Mac app that continuously recorded and made users’ screen and audio history searchable December 19, 2025 Following Meta’s acquisition of Limitless, the Rewind app’s screen and audio capture was disabled. Limitless’s Pendant service continued for existing users in supported regions, so only Rewind and other non-Pendant functionality were sunset. (Limitless)
Yara AI AI mental-wellness and therapy-style chatbot By November 2025 The founder voluntarily wound down the service, citing concerns that AI chatbots were not safe enough for people experiencing serious mental-health situations. Its website now carries a farewell notice and directs users to other resources. (Yara AI)
Dot by New Computer Personalized AI friend, confidante and companion October 5, 2025 New Computer sunset Dot after its co-founders decided to pursue different directions. Users were given one month to export their conversations and other data. (TechCrunch)
Woebot consumer app CBT-based mental-health chatbot June 30, 2025 The direct-to-consumer Woebot app was retired; existing accounts became inaccessible. Woebot Health itself did not entirely disappear and continued working on institutional and provider-oriented applications. (Woebot Health)
Builder.ai Claimed to use AI to make developing apps and websites easier Operations collapsed in May 2025 The Microsoft-backed company entered insolvency after financial problems, debt defaults and frozen or seized cash left it unable to continue operating normally. Its main U.S. entity subsequently filed for bankruptcy in June. (Financial Times)
Humane Ai Pin services Screenless wearable assistant for AI queries, calls, messages and cloud-stored content February 28, 2025 Humane sold key assets to HP and switched off its servers. Calling, messaging, AI responses and cloud access stopped working, leaving most Pins substantially unusable. (The Verge)
Coqui AI commercial operations AI voice generation, speech synthesis and voice cloning January 2024 The startup and its hosted commercial services shut down amid funding and monetization difficulties. The underlying open-source TTS code survived through community forks, so the technology itself did not vanish. (GitHub)
Artifact AI-personalized news reader created by Instagram’s co-founders Wound down during 2024 Artifact announced that its market opportunity was insufficient and began winding down its app. Its core news reader remained alive longer than originally planned, before Yahoo acquired its technology and incorporated elements into Yahoo News. (Medium)
OpenAI AI Text Classifier Website that attempted to identify whether text was written by AI July 20, 2023 OpenAI withdrew it because of its low accuracy rate. It was a particularly clean example of a product being shut down because the underlying AI simply did not work reliably enough. (OpenAI)
Neeva consumer search Subscription-based, ad-free search engine that added generative-AI answers and citations June 2, 2023 Neeva could not attract enough users to make the consumer search business sustainable. The search website closed, user data was deleted and the company’s technology and team subsequently moved to Snowflake. (Search Engine Land)

 

Bifurcation in AI models and AI infra

Bifurcation is coming.

SOTA (State-of-the-Art) models will collaborate / use the best hardware, i.e. latest GPU from Nvidia, HBM from SK Hynix, etc.

SOTA model war is between OpenAI and Anthropics, plus Google.

Meanwhile, Microsoft and Meta will be another group.

This group will prioritize TCO (Total Cost of Ownership) and use another group of hardware suppliers, like those offered by Qualcomm, announced in Qualcomm Investor Day.

置身钉内？

一个方向看似正确的 AI 办公产品，如何在组织目标、商业压力、产品基因和真实用户需求的拉扯中走偏？

ONE 想做“让事找人”的 AI 工作入口，但最终被做成了“让组织更容易看见、追踪、管控人”的工具；它失败的关键不在 AI 技术本身，而在产品定位、组织机制和用户立场错了。

核心观点：
// 产品发心过载
ONE 同时想服务用户、证明钉钉 AI 化、承载无招回归后的战略战役、消化商业化和集团指标。目标太多，导致产品无法保持一个清晰主线。

// To B 的根本矛盾没有解开
钉钉的付费方是老板/管理者，真实高频使用者却是员工。老板要“可控、可视、确定性”，员工要“边界、缓冲、自由度”。ONE 试图同时满足两边，最后实际更偏向管理者。

// AI 放大了钉钉原有的强管控基因
钉钉早期成功依赖“已读未读、强触达、组织确定性”。ONE 把这些能力 AI 化后，用户感受到的不是效率提升，而是更细颗粒度的监控。

// 用户真实反馈被误判
内测和大客户灰度阶段，管理层反馈很好，但基层员工强烈抵触。团队一度把这种抵触理解成“不适应新工具”，而不是产品方向本身有问题，这是文章认为最致命的误判。

// “信息收敛”变成了“信息轰炸”
ONE 原本想用卡片减少消息混乱，但各业务线都往 ONE 接入内容，最后变成“原有钉钉消息 + ONE 卡片”的双重轰炸。

// 发布会倒排工期摧毁了敏捷迭代
项目不是从 MVP、小范围验证、真实数据纠偏开始，而是围绕固定发布会日期高举高打。负面数据出现后，也没有真正修正顶层定位。

// 组织结构让问题被持续放大
产品、设计、研发、商业化、各业务线之间权责不清；业务线为了 AI 指标纷纷接入；一线用户反馈向上传递时被淡化，最终形成“上层看到正反馈，一线承受真实反噬”的断层。

// 它也并非毫无价值
文章承认 ONE 的方向踩中了办公 AI 的趋势：主动式信息流、AI 进入工作流、基于组织上下文做服务，这些都可能是未来方向。失败的是落地方式和用户立场。

无独有偶，硅谷也在反复证明同一个结论：当企业试图用数据和 AI 把人的工作过程彻底量化，最后得到的往往不是效率，而是反感、抵触和讽刺性的“表演生产力”。

Microsoft 的 Productivity Score 是一个很典型的例子。它原本想帮企业理解员工如何使用 Microsoft 365、Teams、Outlook 等工具，提高组织协作效率。但因为它能暴露个人层面的使用数据，很快被外界批评为“员工监控工具”。最后微软不得不调整产品，弱化个人级别可识别数据，改成更聚合的组织洞察。这个案例说明了一件事：员工并不是天然反对效率工具，但他们不接受被这样管理。

Amazon 内部统计 AI 使用量的做法也很讽刺。公司想推动员工使用 AI，于是开始看谁用得多、谁 token 消耗高、谁更积极拥抱新工具。但指标一旦被看见，就会被表演。有人开始为了显得自己更 AI-native 而刷 token、制造调用量。最后据报道，Amazon 撤掉了内部 AI 使用排行榜。企业以为自己在衡量生产力，实际衡量到的是员工表演生产力的能力。

Meta 的鼠标和键盘追踪则更直接。据报道，Meta 的内部项目会在员工工作电脑上记录鼠标移动、点击、键盘操作，甚至偶尔截图，用来训练 AI agent 理解真实办公行为。员工反应很强烈：内部帖子的高赞评论是“这让我非常不舒服，怎么退出？”；公告下最常见反应是愤怒表情。Meta 最初明确表示工作电脑无法 opt out，后来在压力下只开放了非常有限的临时暂停机制。它没有真正取消，但已经暴露出一个事实：当公司把员工的工作过程本身变成训练数据，员工首先感受到的不是效率，而是被采集、被观察、被占有。

这些案例和《置身钉内》里的钉钉 ONE 放在一起看，重点就很清楚了：这套逻辑正在失败。

钉钉 ONE 看见了未读、待办、遗漏和事项流转，却没看见员工需要缓冲和边界。

Microsoft 看见了工具使用行为，却撞上了隐私反弹。

Amazon 看见了 AI 使用量，却催生了刷指标。

Meta 想看见鼠标和键盘背后的工作过程，却激起了员工对数据采集的愤怒。

它们共同说明：工作不是越透明越高效，人也不是越可测量越好管理。一旦企业把“过程数据”误当成“真实贡献”，员工就会开始保护自己：要么关闭入口，要么消极抵抗，要么表演指标，要么彻底不信任系统。

所以，钉钉 ONE 的教训并不孤立。它只是更完整地呈现了一个趋势的终局：当 AI 办公产品从“帮人工作”滑向“帮组织看人”，失败几乎是迟早的事。

隐私不是效率的敌人，自由也不是管理的漏洞。很多时候，它们恰恰是一个工具能否被长期信任、长期使用的前提。

How Nvidia stock is like Apple and what may come next

1/ Both companies have a history before becoming the center of the world.

Apple: 1980

Nvidia: 1999

2/ Right before the new era, world is experiencing shocks.

Apple/Great Financial Crisis: iPhone was introduced in 2007; iPhone 3G was introduced in 2008

Nvidia/Russia-Ukraine war: H100 was revealed in Apr 2022

3/ Both become largest company in first few years of key product launch

Apple: 2011, 3 years after iPhone 3G

Nvidia: 2024,  2 years after H100

What comes next for Apple?

  • Samsung competition
  • iPhone 5 disappoint
  • China 2013 315 boycott
  • iPhone shipment peaks
  • innovation capability questioned
  • new business lines (watch) considered disappointment at first

Storms might be coming for Nvidia.

..