| Security | Apr. 30 close | Recent bottom close | Bottom vs. Apr. 30 | Intraday trough vs. Apr. 30 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SK Hynix — Korean shares | ₩1.286m | ₩1.322m on Jul. 30 | +2.8% | −3.1% at ₩1.246m on Jul. 29 |
| QQQ | $667.74 | $661.73 on Jul. 29 | −0.9% | −1.0% at $661.14 |
| SOXX | $461.44 | $465.00 on Jul. 29 | +0.8% | +0.6% at $464.08 |
| SMH | $506.72 | $504.22 on Jul. 29 | −0.5% | −0.6% at $503.63 |
These names bottomed at end of Apr levels.
For the past few quarter, capex figures and related comments from hyperscalers are the key metrics to watch, especially for gauging future demand for semiconductor companies.
The higher the capex number, the higher the revenue estimates.
This worked but became less useful lately.
Investors don’t like it if only the capex is growing, which pushes hyperscalers free cash flows to negative territory.
Investors want to see higher demand signal, which can justify these higher capex numbers.
Thus, backlogs or RPOs (emaining performance obligations) are more important now.
| Quarter | AWS backlog | Microsoft commercial RPO | Google Cloud backlog | Oracle total RPO |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1Q25 | 189 | 315 | 90 | 130 |
| 2Q25 | 195 | 368 | 106 | 138 |
| 3Q25 | 200 | 392 | 155 | 455 |
| 4Q25 | 244 | 625 | 240 | 523 |
| 1Q26 | 364 | 627 | 462 | 553 |
| 2Q26 | 496 | 678 | 514 | 638 |
Another thing to watch is the weighted-average backlog duration of these backlogs – within how many years will backlog become revenue?
Microsoft explicitly commented about 2.3 years.
RPO, including OpenAI, has a weighted average duration of 2.3 years. And roughly 30% will be recognized in revenue in the next 12 months, up 37% year-over-year. The remaining portion recognized beyond the next 12 months increased 112%.
In addition, utilization is also an indicator.
Amazon said “lion’s share” of AWS compute capacity for 2027 had already been reserved during 2q26 earning call, which is very good to hear.
Samsun Electronics has two ticker in South Korea: 005930 (common stocks), and 005935 (preferred shares).
The main difference is voting rights – 005935 has no voting rights.
| Common | Preferred | |
|---|---|---|
| Korea ticker | 005930 | 005935 |
| Voting rights | One vote per share | No voting rights |
| Business exposure | Samsung Electronics | Same Samsung Electronics |
| Dividend | Standard dividend | Almost identical dividend—only ₩1 more annually |
| Liquidity | Higher | Lower |
| Typical valuation | Trades at a premium | Trades at a discount |
The discount is large. Recently it’s larger at over 25% or 30%+.
The main reason is probably ETF buying.
Passive funds, index futures hedging and most Samsung-focused ETFs direct their purchases into 005930, not 005935.
And for some strategic investors, voting rights is meaningful.
However, this is still a large discount – Google Class C vs Class A common shares discount is within 0.5%.
ETFs buy both Google A and C.
Is that in order to market security, the insecure factors may advance.
The higher the risk, the higher the value of security.
Will those selling security make friends with those who making threats?
A widely cited study covering World Cups from 1950–2006 found that the U.S. market lost an average 2.58% during the tournament’s defined “effect period,” versus an average gain of 1.21% over comparable-length periods outside World Cups.
The 2022 Crash: During the 2022 Qatar World Cup, the global stock market fell by 4.6% and the S&P 500 dropped by 5.4%.
Why might it happen?
1. Losses hurt more than victories help.
Fans become significantly more pessimistic after elimination, but investors do not become equivalently optimistic after an ordinary victory. During the knockout stage, every match creates one disappointed country, so the negative mood effects may accumulate globally.
2. Investors are distracted.
When a national team is playing, investors watch football instead of markets. Research covering 15 countries during the 2010 and 2014 World Cups found that trading volume could fall by as much as 48% during national-team matches. Domestic markets also temporarily reacted less to global-market news.
The current 2026 World Cup looks fine so far, although Nasdaq is weak in recent days.
The weakness started when US restarted strike on Iran over the Jul 11-12 weekend, after US team’s exit on Jul 6 (defeated by Belgium).
| Index | June 10 | July 17 | World Cup return |
|---|---|---|---|
| S&P 500 | 7,266.99 | 7,457.69 | +2.62% |
| Dow Jones | 49,918.78 | 52,146.42 | +4.46% |
| Nasdaq Composite | 25,169.50 | 25,520.24 | +1.39% |
| Russell 2000 | 2,835.46 | 2,962.22 | +4.47% |
This Weibo guy, called Feng Ge (Brother Feng), said on July 8 that he can’t withstand the loss and cut positions (in tech mainly).
The next day July 9 stock market came back strong.
On the very strong July 9, he said he bought back (fully invested).
Then on Jul 10 stock market was in a bloodbath.
After Jul 10 close, he said he wouldn’t quit this time – tech is the future and will rise again.
On July 15, he commented that innovative drugs is interesting, which marked the end of a few weeks rally of HK biotech/healthcare stock.
On Jul 16, he commented that “tech has bottomed” / “correction is done”, which is actually the peak of the day.
China’s retail investors have found their Jim Cramer.
Interesting that retail investors care much more about sunken cost than opportunity cost.
For one thing, sunken cost can be easily measured – how much you bought and how much is the unrealized p/l.
Opportunity cost is harder to measure, as you need to constantly have a view on various things.
Perhaps money market fund rate is the most obvious opportunity cost rather than S&P 500, although I believe the latter is more important.
However easiness to measure shouldn’t matter.
As I think sunken cost can be ignored while opportunity cost should be the only thing that matters.
Except that you think you are playing poker with multi round game theory – easy to fold makes you more likely to be bluffed in future.
For 1q26, SK Hynix posted ₩51.6 trillion won profit before tax.
Among that ₩51.6tn, ₩37.6tn is operating profit and ₩9.88tn is investment valuation gain, mostly related to Kioxia.
SK hynix owns convertible bonds that can be converted into substantially all the voting rights of BCPE Pangea Cayman2, and that vehicle holds the 77.4 million Kioxia shares, which is about 14% of Kioxia.
Kioxia’s closing share price was ¥19,080 on March 31, 2026 and Kioxia closed at ¥89,680 on June 30.
77.4m×(¥89,680-¥19,080)×₩9.5194=₩52tn
52 trillion won of Kioxia investment paper gain in a quarter.
The Kioxia investment gain alone is more than 1q26 operating profit of ₩37.6tn.
While Bain Capital needs to sell as a PE fund, SK Hynix can hold much longer.
“Recovered” is not yet the same as “reused”.
1/ China recovered the first stage, not the entire rocket.
2/ Only after a successful second flight with that same booster can China demonstrate operational reuse.
The first stage contains most of the rocket’s engines and represents a large share of its manufacturing cost.
Net-based capture system: rocket does not need to carry conventional landing legs, their deployment mechanisms, and as much associated structural reinforcement throughout the flight.
However, the heavy landing legs is more reusable outside of earth more easily I assume – especially for the first time for a planet.
1/ Washington Post
In 2000, the company spent about $125 million developing Kaplan, online education and Washingtonpost.com.
Kaplan became a success.
Kaplan revenue grew roughly 76% in two years, while it swung from a meaningful loss to profitability. Test preparation benefited as the weak job market sent more people back to graduate school, while Kaplan Higher Education produced record enrollment, revenue and operating income.
2/ H&R Block
Core tax business is a recurring, mostly cash-paid service that was largely insensitive to technology spending or stock-market valuations.
H&R Block owned Option One, a large non-prime mortgage originator. As the Federal Reserve cut rates following the dot-com collapse, refinancing activity surged. << an early subprime-housing trade
3/ Wells Fargo
Wells Fargo surged in 2000 as money rotated away from expensive technology stocks toward reasonably valued, profitable financial companies. Even after its 20% decline in 2001, an investor entering at the end of 1999 still made roughly 24% through 2002, versus a 38% loss for the S&P 500.
Its underlying banking businesses also remained healthy: Wells Fargo reported growing net interest income and improving earnings in parts of its business during 2002.