OYO Countered In China

To be honest, I haven’t tried either brand.

But the game of capital is on.

OYO is grown from India with series B ($100mn), C ($90mn), D ($250mn), E ($1bn) led by SoftBank. Huazhu has participated between D and E; Grab, Didi, Airbnb has participated in Series E separately.

From my understanding, OYO is pursing a model that provides minimum standardization with the least cost while getting data and digitalizing management.

The most valuable thing OYO provides is the traffic (if any), which is where OTA’s profits come from and where hotel chains are good at.

The brand itself tho, doesn’t have much power. China’s overall hospitality standard is higher than India’s I think (with players like Jinjiang, Huazhu, etc.)

OYO’s rapid expansion in China might make it worse.

But it is really big – said to have 10k+ hotels and 450k+ rooms on its website.

It now has a three-tier branding: 轻享,智享,尊享

Branding-up and providing more values is really important. Hotel owners may end up with less profit in the long-run.

It’s like imperialism in the hotel sector.


The traditional hotel sector in China has reacted with their own exploration in “light franchise” (but might be late for this game).

H hotel by Huazhu

轻简 by Botao

轻住 from MeituanDianping

OYU by TongchengYilong

 

 

China’s Fresh Produce E-commerce (2)

previous post – China’s Fresh Produce E-commerce (1)

Second Round

The two words that characterize the second (current) model is “front warehouse” (前置仓).

By managing more distributed front warehouses (mostly in cities), the fresh produces e-commerce companies can usually deliver within 2 hours after an order is placed.

The model could be exemplified by the current focus of Hema (盒马鲜生) and MissFresh (每日优鲜). The difference – Hema’s warehouses are also consumer-facing stores; MissFresh’s warehouses are expanding much faster and many have no “experience store” functions.

Hema is financed within Alibaba (consolidated in earnings reports) and MissFresh has raised several hundred millions from Tencent.

Hema

Hou Yi (侯毅), the CEO and founder of Hema, worked for JD.com and in charge of JD logistics, prior to joining Alibaba. He has rotated to the O2O (online to offline department) and was the founder of the predecessor of JD Daojia (京东到家), JD’s delivery team. It has been rumored that firstly HOU proposed to Richard Liu, the CEO and founder of JD.com, about the idea of Hema; unfortunately, LIU did not approve that idea at that time. Later HOU approached ZHANG You (张勇), the CEO of Alibaba Group, and get offered to join Alibaba and try out his idea. [equalocean]

Since its beginning in 2016, Hema has now expanded into 130 stores in 19 cities as of March 2019.

Tmall’s fresh stores have also been consolidated into Hema’s operations, announced in December 2018. (meanwhile, JD’s fresh produces team was combined with 7-fresh in the same month)

Its operation summary compared with competitors provided by EqualOcean.

MissFresh

Jan 2017, Series C, $100 million led by Lenovo Capital

Sep 2017, Series C+, $230 million led by Tiger Global and Genesis Capital

Dec 2017, Series D, said to be $500 million; another report said $200 million to spin off 便利购 (the unmanned shelves)

Sep 2018, Series E, $450 million led by 高盛(GSIP)、腾讯、时代资本、Davis Selected Advisers

Tencent has invested four times so far.

Its core competitiveness lies in its front warehouse network, inventory management system and local community operation. MissFresh has an average duration of inventory of 2.5 days.

MissFresh is targeting gross margin at ~20% in the long-term while maintaining an operating margin at 10-15%.


So we can see that attempts are made to locate “warehouses” closer to consumers and to shorten the waiting time to ~30min.

Alongside the 1st and the 2nd rounds, there is another attempt – not necessarily new but will take some time to stabilize, if possible) – to combine 1) mainline logistics, 2) city delivery networks, 3) front-warehouses + community stores, all facilitated by digitalized and AI-driven systems.

 

China’s Fresh Produce E-commerce (1)

Overall Market Size And Online Percentage

Fresh produce has long been seen as an undeveloped area within e-commerce.

The penetration rate of e-commerce in the Chines apparel market is ~35% in 2017, while the fresh produce category’s is only in the single-digit range (but growing fast!).

The overall size of fresh produce market in China is around 5,000 billion RMB. So the online sales is ~1% in 2015 and ~4% in 2018.


First Round

The first wave of exploration is an extension of traditional e-commerce platform + specialized logistics (cold chain).

Miao Fresh (by Tmall, Alibaba) and JD Fresh (by JD) are the two examples (and first movers) in this round.

Self-built logistics has been one of JD’s core capabilities for a long time. And the war in fresh produces, requiring an upgrade in cold chain, has made JD Fresh a very competent player in this field (besides the upgraded potential in logistics-as-a-service) .

JD Cold Chain Logistics | Source: JD Fresh Presentation

Tmall seems to have a better position in recruiting overseas/premium sellers (cherries, lobsters, crawfish, etc.)

Meanwhile, Alibaba (Tmall) has been investing in Yiguo continuously. In March 2016, Yiguo raised ~$250 million Series C from Alibaba and KKR.

Yiguo’s subsidiary ExFresh (安鲜达), China’s largest cold-chain company established to serve the fresh food via e-commerce, according to a new release from KKR in 2016.

Source: exfresh.com.cn

And Suning, a strategic partner with Alibaba and a very strong player in 3C retailing, led a round of $200 million (Series C+) for Yiguo in Dec 2016.

Then in Aug 2017, Yiguo finished its Series D of $300 million from Tmall (Alibaba).

But the battle in fresh produces is more than the battle in cold chain + traditional e-commerce. It involves exploring the new format of retail.

And so comes the Second Round…

How Do E-commerces Generate Revenue? (3)

(1) and (2) in this series can be seen as a large category, where the companies are not holding inventories.

So the other category of e-commerce companies (e.g. JD.com) or the original Amazon model – is to hold inventories and to profit from the differences between retail and wholesale prices.

The goods will appear both in top-line revenues and in COGS – where as the marketplace model doesn’t include any value of goods sold on its platform.

For 2016, 2017 and 2018, over 90% of JD’s revenue comes from online direct sales or net product revenues.

net product revenues (¥, millions): 237,944 | 331,824 | 416,109

Usually they

    1. start with one or a few categories of goods (e.g. books for Amazon and electronics for JD)
    2. they could expand into other categories to be an “everything’s store”; or stay within their specialized categories and grow into highly related services (to better serve their distinct customers).
    3. have lots of investments in their infrastructures; then it becomes natural that they could only provide the logistics, marketing and other services instead of purchasing everything first. The packaged services are then accounted as revenues for JD/Amazon.

Because the fees are usually based on total value of goods (commissions), the services revenues are also related to GMV.

net service revenues (¥, millions): 20,346 | 30,508 | 45,911

Meanwhile, for 2016, 2017 and 2018,

JD’s total GMV (¥, billions): 939.2 | 1,294.5 | 1,676.9

After deducting the direct sales figures, we could see the revenue take-rate for pure services are 2.9% 3.2% 3.6%


JD’s discussed its business model in its F-20 for 2018

Since founding our company, we have focused on developing our online direct sales business as well as building our own fulfillment infrastructure, including last mile delivery capability, all based on our proprietary technology platform to support our operations. As our online direct sales business grew substantially in size, we launched our online marketplace to complement it and expand our product offerings, leverage our established fulfillment infrastructure and technology platform and ensure a superior customer experience. The combination of our online direct sales and online marketplace, and our own nationwide fulfillment infrastructure and technology platform, make us a uniquely strong player in China’s online retail industry in terms of providing superior customer experience.

Leveraging the significant scale of our business, cutting-edge technologies, and our well-established retail infrastructure, we have also begun to offer comprehensive services that complement our core business and create significant value for a wide range of business partners. Ultimately this will boost business development and the overall customer experience.

Online Direct Sales

In our online direct sales business, we acquire products from suppliers and sell them directly to customers. We started selling computer products online in 2004 and introduced mobile handsets, consumer electronics products and auto parts and accessories by 2007. We significantly expanded our product offerings in 2008 with home appliances and a wide array of general merchandise product categories, and have been continually adding new products and categories since then. As we now offer a wide range of categories through our online direct sales business model, net revenues from electronics products, which include computers, mobile handsets and other mobile digital products, and home appliances, have declined as a percentage of our total net revenues.

Retail Infrastructure

Online Marketplace. In our online marketplace business, third-party sellers offer products to customers on our online marketplace and pay us commissions on their sales. We launched our online marketplace in October 2010, and have been adding new products and services since then. As of December 31, 2018, there were more than 210,000 third-party sellers on our online marketplace. We provide transaction processing and billing services on all orders placed on our online marketplace and require third-party sellers to meet our strict standards for authenticity and reliability. We tag certain top stores on our platform as “JD Haodian ( 京东好店 ),” based on third-party merchants’ quality of service during the entire purchase process. Such certification can help our top merchants improve their sales volumes on the platform. Furthermore, it sets a benchmark to encourage other merchants to improve their quality of service. We aim to offer customers the same high-quality customer experience regardless of the source of the products they choose.

Marketing Services. Leveraging our AI capabilities and the comprehensive dataset accumulated from a wide range of business scenarios along the entire value chain, we provide a variety of marketing services to suppliers, merchants and other partners in the ecosystem through our proprietary advertisement technology platform.

In 2017, we started to offer our suppliers and merchants a new fully-automated marketing platform that can make targeted product recommendations to users on www.jd.com and our mobile apps, and across our content partnership network, driving new customers and repeat purchases for advertisers automatically. Powered by AI, the platform only requires advertisers to input total budget, unit bid price and optimization goals to market to their targeted audiences, which enables advertisers to lower their operating costs and increase their returns.

In order to provide our partners with better targeted marketing and broader access to advertisement resources, in addition to our successful partnership with Tencent, Baidu and ByteDance, we also formed strategic partnerships with other leading mobile internet companies such as Qutoutiao and iQIYI, with an aim to leverage these companies’ powerful big data resources, massive user bases and AI-driven technologies to strengthen collaboration in precision marketing, user access points and content-driven marketing.

JD Logistics Services. In April 2017, leveraging our advanced technology and logistics expertise, we established JD Logistics, a business group under JD.com, to provide logistics services to businesses across a wide range of industries including those beyond e-commerce. We have opened up our technology-driven fulfillment infrastructure by offering comprehensive supply chain solutions to third-party sellers on our marketplace and to merchants that do not sell products on our online marketplace, including warehousing management, transportation, delivery, after-sale services, and logistics technology solutions, including cloud-based service and data analytics, or a combination of these services. Our logistics services to third parties have experienced rapid growth and have been well received by major clients such as Nestle, NetEase, Gree, and others. We are dedicated to developing an effective, environmental-friendly, innovative and smart “green logistics system” through developing and promoting the use of innovative and environmental-friendly materials and a series of technological innovations.

In the second quarter of 2018, to reduce product-to-customer distance and provide customers with innovative delivery options, JD Logistics launched the “Flash Delivery” initiative, offering delivery times ranging from several minutes to about one hour for selected merchandise in certain areas through optimally allocating merchandise across its distribution network, including front-line metropolitan distribution centers, delivery stations and partners’ offline stores, based on its analysis of customer demands. Moreover, in October 2018, JD Logistics opened up its leading logistics network to consumers, offering parcel delivery service to users in certain regions. Leveraging JD Logistics’s extensive delivery network, users in these areas can conveniently send items intra-city and throughout most of mainland China with JD Logistics’s same fast and reliable delivery service.

JD Property Management Group. In 2018, we established our property management group, JDPM, which owns, develops and manages our logistics facilities and other real estate properties, to support JD Logistics and third parties. JDPM has unique advantages to secure scarce land resources as we continue to help boost economies across China through creating employment opportunities and contributing tax, among others. JDPM aims to develop its logistics assets portfolios while maintaining strong capital discipline. With the expansion of asset portfolios, we will adopt a capital recycling strategy through our fund management platform and other partnerships, such as our partnership with GIC, Singapore’s sovereign wealth fund. See “Item 5.B. Operating and Financial Review and Prospects—Liquidity and Capital Resources.” We believe this strategy will help further expand our asset portfolios, minimize our related future capital expenditures and enhance our returns.

Omni-channel Initiatives. To achieve our “Boundaryless Retail” vision, we are exploring a variety of omni-channel integration opportunities and innovative business models. Leveraging our well-established retail infrastructure, we believe we are well-positioned to create an enhanced shopping experience for consumers and improve efficiency for our business partners.

We believe we are well-positioned to provide omni-channel solutions to customers and offline retailers in select locations in China by capitalizing on our strong online presence and leveraging Dada’s crowdsourced delivery system. Dada is one of our equity investees and its online-to-offline supermarket platform JD Daojia, which was JD’s asset before our transaction with Dada in April 2016, leverages the expanded delivery network, focuses on the location-based mobile commerce sector and collaborates with offline supermarkets, convenience stores and other local businesses to provide consumers with a speedy premium shopping experience. As of December 31, 2018, our joint venture, Dada-JD Daojia, had partnered with more than 100,000 stores from leading supermarket brands, including Walmart, Yonghui, Carrefour and CR Vanguard, by leveraging Dada’s crowd-sourcing delivery network. Dada-JD Daojia is China’s leading on-demand logistics and omni-channel e-commerce platform.

In June 2016, we entered into a series of agreements in relation to our strategic alliance with Walmart. We have collaborated with Walmart on e-commerce, including launching a Sam’s Club Flagship Store and Walmart China Flagship Store on JD.com, Sam’s Club Global Flagship Store, Walmart Global Flagship Store, and ASDA Flagship Store on JD Worldwide, and a one-hour delivery service from Walmart Stores in select cities through the JD Daojia app, as well as leveraging each other’s supply chain to enhance product selection for customers across China. We also experimented on other omni-channel opportunities, aiming at offering shoppers across China faster and more convenient access to high-quality products through multiple channels.

To provide customers with a more dynamic and interactive integrated omni-channel shopping experience, we have enabled some of our offline partners with a variety of the latest technologies such as facial recognition, product recognition, tracking system for customers’ in-store activities to name just a few. We have established a closed loop to accumulate a large volume of offline shopping data, and through further analysis of the integrated online and offline dataset, we can offer differentiated products in each offline franchise store that best suit potential customer demands. For instance, in August 2018, we launched a cooperation with China-based home furnishing retailer Qumei. Leveraging our extensive product selection, Qumei expanded its offering from furniture to a wide range of home products. Our ability to use big data to build accurate customer profiles has enabled Qumei to more effectively match its product selection with consumer demand. With the help of our cutting-edge technologies such as AI-based facial recognition and AR features, the cooperation enables Qumei to deliver a fully-interactive shopping experience in its traditional offline stores.

7FRESH, our offline fresh food market brand, is an example of a real-world trial of our “Boundaryless Retail” vision, the idea of enabling consumers to buy whatever they want, wherever and whenever they want it. In December 2017, we opened our first 7FRESH store in Beijing’s Yizhuang suburban area. Integrating advanced supply chain management know-how and cutting-edge storage technologies, our 7FRESH store is able to deliver a unique shopping experience by offering many fresh products (including fruit, flowers, vegetables and quality fresh seafood), providing food preparation and catering services, and making available a 30-minute delivery service for customers within three kilometers of the store. As of March 31, 2019, we opened 13 7FRESH stores in 8 cities.

We believe our 7FRESH business model will continue to evolve as we strive to pursue an enhanced shopping experience for our consumers and partners by exploring a variety of omni-channel opportunities, integrating quality products with superior services and providing fresh produce supply chain solutions to our partners.

How Do E-commerces Generate Revenue? (1) – Alibaba

So, Alibaba is now a diversified tech/internet company that not only has the biggest e-commerce presence in China, but also leads the cloud computing commercialization there.

Alibaba separates its business into four categories:

    • Core commerce
    • Cloud computing
    • Digital media and entertainment
    • Innovation initiatives and others

And “Core commerce” could further be divided based on China/International, retail/wholesale, logistics and others.

      • China commerce retail
      • China commerce wholesale
      • International commerce retail
      • International commerce wholesale
      • Cainiao logistics services
      • Others

“China commerce retail” is where most of the Taobao and Tmall’s numbers are presented – $36.9 billion, two-thirds of Alibaba’s total revenue in fiscal year 2019 (ended on March 31, 2019).

The revenue is supported by the huge GMVs of these two platforms.

  • Taobao GMV (billions, RMB, fiscal 16, 17, 18, 19) – 1,877 | 2,202 | 2,689 | 3,115
  • Tmall GMV (billions, RMB, fiscal 16, 17, 18, 19) – 1,215 | 1,565 | 2,131 | 2,612

A behemoth with a combined ¥5.7 trillion GMV (or more than $800 billion).

And here is its famous Singles’ Day GMV number in 2018 – $30.8 billion on a single day.

Source: notebookcheck.com

In comparison, Amazon had a GMV of nearly $300 billion in 2018 (not officially released number, but calculated).

Amazon GMV in 2018 = 10 * Alibaba’s 2018 Singles’ Day GMV

But what is Alibaba doing with all these merchandises transacted on its platform?

The “China commerce retail” category will be the main focus of here.


To start with, here is a description of Taobao from Alibaba’s 20-F for FY18.

Consumers come to Taobao Marketplace to enjoy an engaging, personalized shopping experience, optimized by our big data analytics. Through highly relevant and engaging content and real-time updates from merchants, consumers can learn about products and new trends. They can also interact with each other and their favorite merchants and brands. With a broad offering of interactive features such as live broadcast, groups and short videos, Taobao Marketplace has become an established social commerce platform.

Taobao Marketplace is also the entry point to verticals, such as second-hand auctions, and online travel booking, which may also be accessed through their own independent mobile apps.

Merchants on Taobao Marketplace are primarily individuals and small businesses. Merchants can create storefronts and listings on Taobao Marketplace free of charge. The escrow payment services provided by Alipay are free of charge to consumers and merchants unless payment is funded through a credit product such as a credit card, in which case Alipay charges a fee to the merchant based on the related bank fees charged to Alipay. Taobao Marketplace merchants can purchase P4P and display marketing services to direct traffic to their storefronts. In addition, merchants can acquire additional traffic from third-party marketing affiliates. Taobao Marketplace merchants can also pay for advanced storefront software that helps to upgrade, decorate and manage their online storefronts.

The revenue model of our China commerce retail business is primarily performance-based and is typically set by market-based bidding systems. Revenue from this model consists primarily of customer management revenue, commissions and other revenue.

Monetization Methods

  1. Customer management. (and I will call it ads or marketing services)

Alibaba says a substantial majority of our China commerce retail revenue from customer management, which primarily consists of:

        • P4P marketing services , where merchants primarily bid for keywords through our online auction system that match product or service listings appearing in search or browser results on a cost-per-click, or CPC, basis. Whether and where the listing will be displayed, and the corresponding prices for such display are determined by the algorithm of Alibaba’s online auction system based on a number of factors with various weights and through a market-based bidding mechanism.
        • Display marketing services , where merchants bid for display positions at fixed prices or prices established by a market-based bidding system on a cost-per-thousand impression, or CPM, basis.In addition to the above-mentioned P4P marketing services and display marketing services directly provided on our marketplaces, Alibaba also provides such services through collaboration with other third-party marketing affiliates. These third parties are primarily third-party online media, such as search engines, news feeds and video entertainment websites. These third-party online media enter into agreements with Alibaba to connect their designated online resources to our online auction system so that the merchants’ listings or other marketing information can be displayed on those third-party online media resources. Revenue from P4P and display marketing services provided through third-party marketing affiliates represented 3%, 3% and 2% of Alibaba’s total revenue in fiscal years 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively.
        • Taobaoke program , where Alibaba collaborate with shopping guide platforms, medium- and small-sized websites, individuals and other third parties, collectively “Taobaokes,” to offer marketing services. Taobaokes display the marketing information of merchants on their media which facilitate our merchants to market and transact. Merchants pay commissions to such Taobaokes based on a percentage of transaction value generated from users under the Taobaoke program. Commissions on Taobaoke are set by the merchants. Revenue from the Taobaoke program represented 3%, 3% and 3% of Alibaba’s total revenue in fiscal years 2016, 2017 and 2018, respectively.
  1. Commissions on transactions. In addition to purchasing customer management services, merchants also pay a commission based on a percentage of transaction value generated on Tmall and certain other marketplaces. The commission percentages typically range from 0.3% to 5.0% depending on the product category.Commission revenue increased by 37% from RMB34,066 million in fiscal year 2017 to RMB46,525 million (US$7,417 million) in fiscal year 2018, primarily due to the strong growth in physical goods GMV on Tmall.
  2. Other. Other revenue from our China commerce retail is primarily generated by our New Retail business, mainly Intime, Tmall Imports and Hema, and primarily consists of revenue from product sales, commissions on transactions and software service fees.

Let’s do some calculation:

2018

    • revenue (customer management) – 114,285 million RMB
      • take rate: 2.3710% (of Taobao + Tmall GMV)
    • revenue (commission) – 46,525 million RMB
      • take rate: 2.1832% (of Tmall GMV)

2019

    • revenue (customer management) – 145,684 million RMB
      • take rate: 2.5438% (of Taobao + Tmall GMV)
    • revenue (commission) – 61,847 million RMB
      • take rate: 2.3678% (of Tmall GMV)

The higher take rates are generally good – it shows Alibaba’s market power and the value of its platform.

However, it also means selling on Alibaba’s platforms is becoming more expensive.

Meanwhile, it’s worth noting that when people use e-commerce to do searches, it’s not good to search engines like Baidu.

It is the same across China and US, where Amazon is growing its ads revenue in a market Google and Facebook dominate.

Actually, the value of Alibaba blocking Baidu’s search on Taobao pages in 2008 is a hundreds-of-billion-dollar action. (this didn’t happen in the US)

Diversification From Smartphones: Services For Apple, IoTs For Xiaomi

It has been a well-known fact that the global smartphone market is maturing and the shipment volume has found its turn.

The decline is real and accelerating.

 …first quarter of 2019 (1Q19) with shipment volumes down 6.6% year over year…

Smartphone vendors shipped a total of 310.8 million units in 1Q19, which marked the sixth consecutive quarter of decline. In 2018, smartphone shipments dropped 4.1% over 2017, which was inclusive of a first quarter that was down 3.5% – just half of what the market experienced in 1Q19.

International Data Corporation (IDC) April 30, 2019

Image result for global smartphone shipment


While top performers are still trying to grab market shares (some go for higher ASP targeting market shares in terms of revenue; others go for value targeting market shares in terms of shipments), they have designed their way to grow upon/out of smartphones.

Apple will go for services. [Read more from a previous post]

Meanwhile, Xiaomi, long being tagged as “the Apple of China”, is aiming the IoTs.

I would like to say the IoT focus is making Xiaomi more unique than its phone business.

As of March 2018, we (Xiaomi) had over 100 million connected devices (excluding smartphones and laptops)

…the largest consumer IoT platform globally according to iResearch

Xiaomi Corporation prospectus

And the segment grows fast in throughout 2018, and still maintained 56.5% growth rate in 2019 Q1.

Source: Xiaomi filings

Some of its items have risen fast into the go-to choice in those categories, such as Mi Air Purifier, Mi Band, etc.

Source: venturebeat.com

In November 2018, Xiaomi announced a strategic partnership with IKEA. IKEA’s full range of smart lighting products will be connected to Xiaomi’s IoT platform starting this December in China.

In January 2019, Xiaomi announced taking a 0.48% stake in TV manufacturer TCL, deepening an existing alliance that saw the two work together to integrate Xiaomi’s operating system into TCL products. [Techcrunch]

Another number – MIUI MAU is constantly adding ~17-19 million each quarter.

17Q1 17Q2 17Q3 17Q4 18Q1 18Q2 18Q3 18Q4 19Q1
MIUI MAU (millions) 138.3 146.0 156.5 170.8 190.0 206.9 224.4 242.1 260.9
incremental (millions) 7.7 10.5 14.3 19.2 16.9 17.5 17.7 18.8

Overall speaking, I think the IoT revenue should be around 30% for 2019 and may stay between 35-40% in the future.


At the same time, geographically speaking, Xiaomi is one of those companies that are benefitted the most from India’s growth.

A Roundup of Recent E-commerce IPOs

From Mogujie (NYSE: MOGU) to Ruhan (NASDAQ: RUHN) to Yunji (NASDAQ: YJ), a series of second-tier (in terms of size at least) Chinese e-commerce companies has filed with SEC and raised $66.5 million, $125 million, $121 million respectively (excluding any over-allotment option).

The interests were stirred by (at least) the capital market success of Pinduoduo.

In its IPO, Pinduoduo was valued at $23.8 billion including all outstanding share options, compared with a valuation of $15 billion following a funding round in April, 2018. (Reuters)

users comparison at PDD’s IPO vs. Taobao, JD | Source: Bloomberg, Jiguang

Following the IPO in July last year, Pinduoduo raised another $1,375 million in February at $25 per ADS (IPO priced at $19 for ~$1.6 billion).


However, it seems that only Pinduoduo could maintain a high valuation.

Partially due to a bad timing, Mogu, valued at $3 billion in 2016 and seeking a valuation of $4 billion in early 2018, reduced its target and was priced at the lower end for $1.3 billion. The previous valuation was derived from a merger tho.

Mogu Inc. ended its New York debut at the same price as its initial public offering $14, after dipping as much as 15% during the day. [Caixing]

As of May 17, 2019, Mogu closed at $5.4 per ADS, down more than 61% from the IPO price of $14.

Ruhan, or Ruhhn, slipped 37% below its IPO price on the first day of trading following a $125 million NASDAQ offering. [AVCJ]

As of May 17, 2019, it closed at $4.25 per ADS, down more than 66% from the IPO price of $12.5.

Yunji, debuted this month, has maintained $0.01 above its IPO price of $11 as of May 17, 2019. Yunji’s valuation is more supported by its revenue (EV/revenue multiple is close to 1).


And a roundup of multiples at IPO, using an exchange ratio of 6.8

EV/GMV EV/Revenue
PDD 0.28 10.19
MOGU 0.43 7.06
RUHN 2.34 5.72
YJ 0.56 0.98

 

Coffee Chains And Prices In China

While Starbucks is probably the No.1 coffee brand in China, its position has constantly been challenged. Luckin Coffee, (briefly covered in a previous post) is cutting into the mass market with lower pricing.

Many people are eyeing on China’s growing coffee market, which will be huge and many are betting on the growth in average coffee consumption.

On the global capital market, Starbucks’ China push and Blue Bottle’s exciting/interesting movements (Jun 2015 $70 million series C; Sep 2017 acquired by Nestle, $425 million for ~68%) may as well push Chinese counter-parties to think about aggressive expansion or building boutique brands.

Listed here are 3 shops I visited recently. Will add more during the summer.

Costa, from UK

Costa Coffee is eyeing 1,200 stores in China by 2022, a big increase from more than 400 at the end of 2017.

Costa stores | Source: Business Insider

Costa is in direct competition with Starbucks, pricing its coffee at exactly the same level – grande latte @ ¥32.

% arabica, from Japan

% arabica @ the bund, Shanghai | Source: arabica.coffee

Started in 2014 in Kyoto, Japan, % arabica is a young brand. It opened the first store in China in Shanghai in Feb 2018 in a trendy (网红) way. It already has opened 4 store in Shanghai alone, including a roastery at the Bund (7 in mainland China and 4 in Hong Kong as of May 2019).

% arabica is a premium brand with latte price starting @ ¥35 (but in short size), @ ¥45 for a tall size (or a little bigger than tall.. cant’ tell exactly), @ ¥40 for tall ice latte.

S.Engine, from Shanghai

A trendy (网红) brand, 鹰集 is a little pricer than Starbucks, with its flagship store opened in January 2017 at Xintiandi, Shanghai.

While its office website only lists 3 locations right now, its has 6 places listed on Meituan in Shanghai. Growing very fast.

S.Engine on Meituan | Source: meituan.com

Pricing is in line with (or a little lower than) boutique coffee shops. Americano @ ¥28 and latte @ ¥36 (¥38 for ice latte). There is only one size (tall); a fair amount of cups are served in reusable cups.

NIO Feeling Similar Pain As Tesla – Lack of Demand

When Tesla said “Deliveries were approximately 63,000 vehicles, which was 110% more than the same quarter last year, but 31% less than last quarter”, NIO wanted to say something similar.

The 2019 Q1 deliveries number was approximately half of that in 2018 Q4. (Still a good job in ramping up production fast)

To compare in numbers:

    • Tesla deliveries is ~15.8x NIO’s in 2019 Q1, ~11.4x  in 2018 Q4
    • Tesla’s automotive revenue in 2018 Q4 was $6.3 billion vs. NIO $0.5 billion:  ~12.6x
    • Current valuation 8x ($40bn vs. $5bn)

NIO said ES6 (to start deliveries in June) should have more than 10,000 pre-orders before deliveries.