Yes 20% · No 80%
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Yes 36% · No 65%
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Yes 90% · No 10%
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In April, CPI hit 3.8% annually and 0.6% MoM. Excluding food and energy, the core CPI increased 2.8% and 0.4%.
The 3.8% annual figure is the highest since May 2023.
However, as shelter is a big part of CPI, and Oct 2025 data is missing, there is a one-off bump here (0.6% MoM).
Oil price is obviously rising a lot, in March/April/May.
but that has eased in Jun
Other interesting items like tomatoes.. which rose 15% MoM in April, is impacted by bad weather and US gov July 2025 17.09% antidumping duty on Mexico tomatoes.
Bilibili, a younger Chinese user focused video website generates advertising revenue at about 7.5 rmb per DAU per month, slightly above $1 ARPU per month.
That is less than half of Kuaishou, which is above 16.5 rmb per DAU per month, or about $2.4 ARPU per month.
Kuaishou’s DAU size is near 4x Bilibili, so ads revenue is nearly 8x larger.
But these are nothing compare with Meta, which commands about $30-$40 ARPU per month in North America.
So Kuaishou is only like 1/10.
Douyin is the highest in China.
Using $50bn pure ads in China and 800mn DAU gives about $5 ARPU per month.
On top of that there are e-commerce, local services, payments, live-streaming etc. so overall Douyin app ARPU is a lot higher than pure ads.
Just comparing ads revenue: Douyin DAU 3-3.5x Meta NA but ads ARPU is 15% of Meta, which will give you about 50% of Meta NA ads rev of ~$100bn.
明祚二百余年,其实不能与汉唐泱泱大国之风相提并论。其中缘故,可能由于开国之初,太祖立“皇明祖训”,严嘱子孙不得轻易改变他订立的典章制度。固然后世皇帝破坏“祖训”之处不少,这一保守的基调是一锤定音,以致明代政治,难有改革。
…
明太祖废宰相,皇权定于⼀尊,于是⽂官与皇帝之间,无复汉代与宋代可见的制衡。绝对的皇权,保护了保守主义,以致质疑当时制度的思想,都难逃政治权力的压制。皇帝自己不能行使权力时,绝对的权力落在近侍、宦官手中。于是有明一代,自仁宣以后,宦寺鱼肉文官与儒生的事迹,不绝于史书。明代宦官专权,擅作威福,其灾害不在贪污败坏,更在于斫丧了文化与思想的元气。
明代中叶以后,知识分子及社会大众都对上述令人窒息的压抑之气,兴起各方面的反弹。那些史事,将有专节论述,此处不赘。反弹的力量与压制的绝对权力之间,有各种冲突。中国的人才,以及社会的文化活力,都在这一长达百年的斗争中,消耗殆尽!后果是明末的中国,不再有余力面对正在开展的世界新局。能察觉这一变局的人已经太少,更论思考如何适应这一即将叩关的世界形势!
闭关锁国 and 落后 backwardness is a result of A) first emperor’s 皇明祖训 which forbids revolution, B) a lack of a balancing of power, C) pushbacks and crackdowns destroy resources and productivity to move forward.
For the first quarter of 2026, the net increase in mid-to-long-term household rmb debt is lower than 2015 by ~33%. This is an approx of net new mortgages.
2015 was the year of 棚改货币化 / 去库存
2016 was the year of 房住不炒 (near end of the year)
3月末,本外币贷款余额284.51万亿元,同比增长5.7%。月末人民币贷款余额280.51万亿元,同比增长5.7%。一季度人民币贷款增加8.6万亿元。分部门看,住户贷款增加2967亿元,其中,短期贷款减少1640亿元,中长期贷款增加4607亿元;企(事)业单位贷款增加8.6万亿元,其中,短期贷款增加4.13万亿元,中长期贷款增加5.42万亿元,票据融资减少1.1万亿元;非银行业金融机构贷款减少3680亿元。
3月末,本外币贷款余额91.52万亿元,同比增长13.3%。月末人民币贷款余额85.91万亿元,同比增长14.0%,增速比上月末低0.3个百分点,比去年末高0.3个百分点。一季度人民币贷款增加3.68万亿元,同比多增6018亿元。分部门看,住户贷款增加8892亿元,其中,短期贷款增加2064亿元,中长期贷款增加6828亿元;非金融企业及其他部门贷款增加2.71万亿元,其中,短期贷款增加9543亿元,中长期贷款增加1.48万亿元,票据融资增加1643亿元;非银行业金融机构贷款增加632亿元。3月份人民币贷款增加1.18万亿元,同比少增661亿元。月末外币贷款余额9146亿美元,同比增长4.0%,一季度外币贷款增加341亿美元。
In fact, you need to go back to 2012 to find a lower number.
3月末,本外币贷款余额60.77万亿元,同比增长15.5%。人民币贷款余额57.25万亿元,同比增长15.7%,比上月末高0.5个百分点,比上年末低0.1个百分点。一季度人民币贷款增加2.46万亿元,同比多增2170亿元。分部门看,住户贷款增加4995亿元,其中,短期贷款增加2581亿元,中长期贷款增加2414亿元;非金融企业及其他部门贷款增加1.95万亿元,其中,短期贷款增加1.05万亿元,中长期贷款增加5906亿元,票据融资增加2575亿元。月末外币贷款余额5595亿美元,同比增长17.2%,一季度外币贷款增加211亿美元。
Last year, egg shortages and egg prices were capturing new headlines.
“Can’t find eggs” was a common complaint.
Feb 2025 CNBC – Wholesale egg prices have ‘blown way past’ record highs


Feb 2025 Bloomberg – 56-day streak of higher prices
Wholesale price was $8.07 per dozen – Feb 21, 2025, USDA Egg Market Overview
—-
What about now?


Back in 2016 and 2017, M1 growth was meaningfully faster than M2 growth in China, which typically indicates a high willingness to spend or invest in the economy.
That is a bullish sign.
On the contrary, if M1 growth is below M2 growth by a wide margin, it usually indicates people would rather save more than spend or invest.
That negative gap was deepening throughout 2024 till the famous 924 stimulus.
Using revised M1 growth rate, the negative gap was about -5% at the beginning of 2024 and about -10% in Sep 2024.
That negative gap shrunk to about -1% in Sep 2025 and about -3% in Feb 2026.
Actually, looking at M2 growth alone might give you a glimpse of China’s economy pulse and sentiment.
1991 Gulf War
The actual combat phase of the 1991 Gulf War lasted about 43 days.
Air war began: January 17, 1991 (Operation Desert Storm started) Ground war began: February 24, 1991 Ceasefire / fighting stopped: February 28, 1991
So there are two common ways to measure it:
Full active fighting period: January 17 to February 28, 1991 = 43 days
Ground combat only: February 24 to February 28, 1991 = about 100 hours / 4 days
2001 Afghanistan War
Start: October 7, 2001
Initial fighting end: Early December 2001 — Kandahar fell / the Taliban regime effectively collapsed, which is the more complete endpoint for the initial regime-toppling campaign.
About 2 month.
2003 Iraq war
Main invasion / conventional fighting phase, it began on March 20, 2003 and was largely completed by May 1, 2003, when the U.S. declared major combat over.
About 42 days.
All these actions are approved by US Congress so that US can use force for over 60 days.
From end of Fed to end of March
Fed is hard to react to oil supply shock.
1/ Fed is designed to manage demand. It cannot produce more oil or open shipping lanes. Historically, the Fed “looks through” supply shocks unless they start to bleed into the broader economy (secondary effects / expectation for inflation rises).
2/ Energy shocks often spike and subside relatively quickly. However, Fed policies take months or even years to fully permeate the economy. Fed would be slowing down the economy exactly when it might be trying to recover from the high energy costs.
“By the time the effects of a tightening in monetary policy take effect, the oil price shock is probably long gone, and you’re weighing on the economy at a time when it’s not appropriate.”