Who is the first the blink?
Looks like Meta?
Sure Meta can / will need to sell more compute, which then supports more capex.
But that is an entirely new business for Meta.
Changxin Technology Group got listed on Monday.
It’s such a big event – it becomes mainland China’s most valuable listed company.
Here is a list of 合肥市委书记 (Hefei Party secretaries) in those years.
Taking 2016, when CXMT was established in Hefei, as the starting point, five Hefei Party secretaries are relevant to the company’s development:
| Hefei Party Secretary | Term | CXMT Development Stage | Subsequent Career and Current Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) | Sep. 2011–Nov. 2016 | Project incubation and establishment | Later served as Executive Vice Governor of Anhui, Executive Vice Mayor and Deputy Party Secretary of Chongqing, Vice Chairman of the Chongqing People’s Congress, and Chairman of the Shanxi CPPCC. Investigated in December 2024 and sentenced at first instance in March 2026 to life imprisonment for accepting more than RMB 127 million in bribes. |
| Song Guoquan (宋国权) | Nov. 2016–May 2020 | Fab construction, technology introduction, and initial mass production | Later became Vice Chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. Retired after the 2023 leadership transition and now mainly serves as President of the Anhui Intangible Cultural Heritage Research Association. He continues to appear at public events. |
| Yu Aihua (虞爱华) | May 2020–Mar. 2024 | Capacity expansion and development of the surrounding semiconductor ecosystem | Subsequently promoted to Deputy Party Secretary of Anhui and Secretary of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In 2025, he moved to the Anhui CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice Chairman. He continues to perform public duties. |
| Zhang Hongwen (张红文) | Mar. 2024–Mar. 2025 | Mature expansion and IPO preparation | Disappeared from public view after December 2024, left his positions without receiving a new appointment, and was later removed as an Anhui Provincial People’s Congress delegate. His status is highly unusual, although no formal disciplinary investigation has been publicly announced. |
| Fei Gaoyun (费高云) | Apr. 2025–May 2026 | Final IPO preparation stage | Placed under disciplinary and supervisory investigation on May 6, 2026. As of the latest public information, no subsequent announcement of expulsion from the Party, prosecution, or sentencing had been made. |
CXMT and the first phase of its Hefei DRAM manufacturing project were established in 2016. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) remained Hefei Party secretary until November of that year, meaning the project’s initial planning, government investment framework, and decision to locate in Hefei were likely developed during the final period of his tenure.
However, the construction of the fabs and the transition into commercial production mainly occurred under his successor, Song Guoquan (宋国权).
After leaving Hefei, Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) continued to rise through the political system and eventually became Chairman of the Shanxi CPPCC. A court later found that he had accepted more than RMB 127 million in bribes between 2006 and 2024 while holding various government positions, including those of Hefei mayor and Hefei Party secretary.
Public court documents have not specifically linked his bribery case to CXMT. It would therefore be inappropriate to claim that his criminal case involved the CXMT project.
Assessment: Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) was the Party secretary during CXMT’s project-establishment phase, but not the principal official responsible for its construction and commercialization.
Song Guoquan’s (宋国权) tenure covered CXMT’s most difficult transition: moving from plans and capital commitments to a functioning fab and commercially viable DRAM production.
Key milestones during his tenure included:
Among the five officials, Song Guoquan (宋国权) therefore had the most direct association with CXMT’s successful execution. During his tenure, the company had already committed substantial capital but had not yet proven its technology or manufacturing capability. The core task was to complete the facility, establish a production process, achieve acceptable yields, and begin commercial shipments.
After leaving the Hefei Party secretary position, Song Guoquan (宋国权) became Vice Chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. He subsequently retired from full-time government office and has remained publicly active through cultural and intangible-heritage organizations. There have been no public reports of investigations or disciplinary action against him.
Assessment: Song Guoquan (宋国权) was CXMT’s “construction and mass-production Party secretary.” His tenure was the most important for turning the company from a government-backed project into an operating DRAM manufacturer.
Yu Aihua (虞爱华) took office in May 2020, after CXMT had already achieved initial DDR4 mass production. The company’s strategic focus had therefore shifted from proving the viability of one fab to expanding capacity, upgrading technology, and developing a broader local semiconductor supply chain.
During his tenure:
Yu Aihua (虞爱华) frequently described Hefei’s model as “industrial investment” rather than ordinary venture capital. Under this approach, the local government combined equity investment, land, infrastructure, financing, supply-chain development, and customer-market support to build strategic industries.
In 2024, Yu Aihua (虞爱华) was promoted to Deputy Party Secretary of Anhui and also served as Secretary of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In 2025, he moved to the Anhui CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice Chairman.
This represented a clear reduction in executive authority and effectively ended his upward political trajectory. However, he has continued to participate in public meetings and official activities, and there has been no public indication that he is under investigation.
Assessment: Yu Aihua (虞爱华) was CXMT’s “capacity-expansion and industrial-ecosystem Party secretary.” He helped develop CXMT from a standalone manufacturing project into the center of a larger Hefei semiconductor cluster.
Zhang Hongwen (张红文) became Hefei Party secretary in March 2024 and remained in the position for roughly one year.
By this point, CXMT was already an established DRAM producer. Zhang Hongwen’s (张红文) tenure therefore corresponded more closely to advanced-product expansion, corporate restructuring, financing, and preparation for a potential public listing than to the company’s original establishment or manufacturing ramp.
His departure was highly unusual:
This combination of events commonly suggests serious internal disciplinary action, organizational investigation, or another form of political handling. However, no formal announcement by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has publicly confirmed that Zhang Hongwen (张红文) is under investigation.
There is also no authoritative public evidence linking his disappearance or removal to CXMT.
Assessment: Zhang Hongwen (张红文) was CXMT’s “mature expansion and capital-markets preparation Party secretary.” He appears likely to have encountered serious political trouble, but the specific cause remains undisclosed.
Fei Gaoyun (费高云) became Hefei Party secretary in April 2025 and served for approximately one year.
His tenure covered the final stages of CXMT’s listing preparation and continued capacity expansion. On May 6, 2026, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was under investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline and law.
CXMT subsequently completed its public listing in July 2026, meaning Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was investigated before the company formally entered the public market.
As of the latest information included in the original summary, there had been no public announcement that Fei Gaoyun (费高云) had been expelled from the Party, transferred for prosecution, or sentenced. The investigation remained ongoing.
There is no authoritative evidence that his case is connected to CXMT.
Assessment: Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was CXMT’s “IPO preparation Party secretary.” His long-term contribution to the company is difficult to evaluate because his tenure was brief and ended with a formal investigation.
The political outcomes of the five Hefei Party secretaries associated with CXMT’s development have varied substantially:
In terms of their direct importance to CXMT’s development, a reasonable ranking would be:
Song Guoquan (宋国权) > Yu Aihua (虞爱华) > Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) > Zhang Hongwen (张红文) ≈ Fei Gaoyun (费高云)
Song Guoquan (宋国权) ranks first because his tenure covered construction, technology validation, and the beginning of commercial production. Yu Aihua (虞爱华) ranks second because his tenure covered large-scale expansion and the development of Hefei’s broader semiconductor ecosystem. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) was relevant to the project’s initial formation, while Zhang Hongwen (张红文) and Fei Gaoyun (费高云) served during later, relatively short periods.
It is important not to infer that CXMT itself was involved in corruption merely because several former Hefei Party secretaries later encountered political or legal problems. Public information concerning Wu Cunrong (吴存荣), Zhang Hongwen (张红文), and Fei Gaoyun (费高云) has not established a direct connection between their cases and CXMT.
CXMT’s development was the result of several factors working together over multiple political administrations: local-government industrial investment, national semiconductor policy, the work of the company’s management and engineering teams, and sustained access to capital and manufacturing resources.
Here is the list of relevant Hefei mayor
| Hefei mayor | Term | CXMT stage | Subsequent career and current status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) | Jan. 2012–Aug. 2016 | Project incubation and initial approval | Investigated in July 2016 and expelled from the Party and public office in December 2016. I found no authoritative public announcement of a subsequent prosecution or sentence. |
| Ling Yun (凌云) | Aug. 2016–Apr. 2021 | Fab construction, technology validation and first commercial production | Became Huangshan Party secretary in 2021. Since January 2025, she has served as director of the Anhui CPPCC Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Affairs Committee. |
| Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) | Apr. 2021–Jan. 2026 | Capacity expansion, product upgrading and IPO preparation | Resigned as mayor in January 2026 and became Party-group secretary of the Anhui CPPCC Economic Committee. This appears to be a normal retirement-transition appointment. |
| Zhang Quan (张泉) | Jan. 2026–present | IPO completion and post-listing expansion | Current Hefei mayor. He had already served as Hefei executive vice mayor from 2023, so his involvement with CXMT began before becoming mayor. |
Summartized and written by ChatGPT.
| Transaction date | Assets | Buyer / capital partner | Seller / contributor | Stake acquired | Transaction value | Capacity | Implied price per GW |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jun. 29, 2026 | Three Northern Virginia hyperscale facilities: two in Manassas and one in Sterling | Digital Realty | Blackstone-affiliated funds | Blended 64%: 80% of two sites and 50% of one | US$3.5bn equity consideration; US$7.8bn 100% gross asset value, including assumed debt and remaining capex | 0.288GW | US$27.1bn/GW on gross asset value |
| Jul. 28, 2026 | Meta El Paso campus, Texas | BlackRock/GIP/HPS funds | Meta contributes land and construction in progress | BlackRock 80%; Meta retains 20% | US$14bn total fitted-infrastructure development cost; Meta contributed US$2.3bn of assets and BlackRock contributed US$4.9bn cash at closing | 1.0GW | US$14.0bn/GW |
| Oct. 21, 2025 | Meta Hyperion initial campus development, Louisiana | Blue Owl-managed funds | Meta contributes land and construction in progress | Blue Owl 80%; Meta retains 20% | US$27bn total development cost; Blue Owl initially contributed about US$7bn cash and Meta received a US$3bn distribution | ~2.0GW initial phase | ~US$13.5bn/GW |
| Oct. 1, 2024 | New Equinix xScale campuses across the U.S. | GIC and CPP Investments | New-build JV with Equinix; no conventional seller | GIC 37.5%; CPP 37.5%; Equinix 25% | More than US$15bn of total investable capital, including future debt | More than 1.5GW | ~US$10bn/GW, based on headline figures |
| Apr. 15, 2024 | Equinix SV12x, San Jose, California | PGIM Real Estate | Equinix contributes/develops project | PGIM 80%; Equinix retains 20% | US$600m JV/project capitalization | >0.028GW | <US$21.4bn/GW |
| Oct. 15, 2025 | Aligned Data Centers platform across North and South America | AIP, MGX and BlackRock’s GIP | Macquarie-managed funds and co-investors | 100% equity | US$40bn enterprise value | ~5GW operational and planned | ~US$8.0bn/GW |
Meta’s pricing is amazing – it targets eliminate Claude’s gross profit if Muse Spark capability can catch up.
| Model | Input ($/1M tokens) | Output ($/1M tokens) |
|---|---|---|
| Meta Muse Spark 1.1 | $1.25 | $4.25 |
| Claude Sonnet | ~$3 | ~$15 |
| Claude Opus | ~$5 | ~$25 |
With cached input.
| Model | Input ($/1M) | Cached Input ($/1M) | Output ($/1M) | Cached discount |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Meta Muse Spark 1.1 | $1.25 | $0.15 | $4.25 | 88% |
| Claude Sonnet | $3.00 | $0.30 | $15.00 | 90% |
| Claude Opus | $5.00 | $0.50 | $25.00 | 90% |
However, compare that with DeepSeek.
| Model | Input / 1M | Cached input / 1M | Output / 1M |
|---|---|---|---|
| DeepSeek V4 Flash | RMB 1 / $0.15 | RMB 0.02 / $0.003 | RMB 2 / $0.3 |
| DeepSeek V4 Pro | RMB 3 / $0.44 | RMB 0.025 / $0.0037 | RMB 6 / $0.89 |
Zhipu could see some trouble…
| Model | Input / 1M | Cached input / 1M | Output / 1M |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zhipu GLM-5.2 | RMB 8 / $1.18 | RMB 2 / $0.3 | RMB 28 / $4.13 |
| Meta Muse Spark 1.1 | $1.25 | $0.15 | $4.25 |
| DeepSeek V4 Pro | RMB 3 | RMB 0.025 | RMB 6 |
Also recall that I was mentioning the bifurcation in AI models and AI infra.
| Company | Peak close | Subsequent bottom close | Peak-to-bottom drawdown |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oracle (ORCL) | $328.33 — Sep. 10, 2025 | $140.27 — Jul. 2, 2026 | −57.3% |
| Microsoft (MSFT) | $542.07 — Oct. 28, 2025 | $352.83 — Jun. 25, 2026 | −34.9% |
| Meta (META) | $790.00 — Aug. 12, 2025 | $525.72 — Mar. 27, 2026 | −33.5% |
| Amazon (AMZN) | $274.99 — May 6, 2026 | $227.01 — Jun. 25, 2026 | −17.4% |
| Alphabet (GOOGL) | $402.62 — May 13, 2026 | $337.39 — Jun. 26, 2026 | −16.2% |
Technically meta was not a hyperscaler.
FCF turning negative and shifting to memory makers is the biggest concern.
Some of the notable AI services have been sunset, both in the US and in China.
In March 2026, Sora shutdown was officially announced. The consumer web and app experiences were shut down on April 26, 2026, while the developer API will end on September 24, 2026.
In Sep 2025, 秒鸭相机 (owned by Alibaba) has dissolved the team and news broke out in May 2026.
Baidu’s 文心一言 / Yiyan / Ernie Bot commercialization (membership-based) has not worked; Baidu announced the sunset of paid membership in Feb 2025 and began refund in Apr 2025. The chat function of frontier LLMs in China is basically free for all, but the paid subscription had previously cost about RMB 59.9 per month.
Yiyan service itself has been moved/remade/rebranded.
There are many more.
e.g. in China
| Product | Company | Type | Date/status | What happened |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Glow | MiniMax | AI companion | March 2023 | Removed following complaints involving sensitive content and privacy. It never returned under the Glow name; MiniMax later launched 星野. (21 Economic Net) |
| Trik AI | Xiaohongshu | AI image generation | Late 2023 | Shut after controversy and litigation over artists’ work; Xiaohongshu subsequently launched 奇域AI. (36Kr) |
| 未伴 | Tencent Music/QQ Music | AI companion and social app | June 2024 | Removed amid regulatory scrutiny of AI-companion content. Mainland services were discontinued rather than merely renamed. (21 Economic Net) |
| 腾讯翻译君 | Tencent | AI translation | March 13, 2025 | Web, app and mini-program all ceased operating. Translation functionality increasingly became part of 元宝 and Tencent’s larger products. (36Kr) |
| 万物追踪 | MiniMax | AI information monitoring | Around April 2025 | Entered public testing in January 2025 and was comprehensively delisted less than three months later. (36Kr) |
| 鹿班智能设计 | Alibaba | Automated advertising/design | June 30, 2025 | All services ended after Alibaba had already stopped purchases and renewals. (36Kr) |
| 奇域AI | Xiaohongshu | Chinese-style AI images | June 30, 2025 | Standalone service closed; some functionality was transferred to Xiaohongshu’s 镜构 mini-program. (36Kr) |
| 腾讯智影 | Tencent | AI video and digital humans | June 30, 2025 | Officially described as a platform “renovation,” but login ended, user data was cleared and its official account was later cancelled. This is best treated as an effective indefinite closure. (36Kr) |
| 异世界回响 | Soul | AI character companion | Around September 2025 | Reported withdrawn/stopped as Soul reduced its standalone AI-companion experiments. The exact final server date was not clearly published. (36Kr) |
| 狸谱 | Independent startup | AIGC anime and fan-art community | October 31, 2025 | Officially ceased operation despite reportedly reaching around one million monthly active users during its peak. (36Kr) |
| 冒泡鸭 | StepFun/阶跃星辰 | AI role-play companion | November 5, 2025 | Formally stopped operating after exceeding six million cumulative downloads, according to third-party app data cited by Chinese media. (36Kr) |
| 讯飞写作 | iFlytek | AI writing | November 30, 2025 | Officially terminated; users were instructed to export their content before closure. (36Kr) |
| XEVA / X Eva | Xiaoice/小冰 | AI clones and companionship | November 30, 2025 | Ended all operating services. (36Kr) |
| Wow AI | Meituan | AI friend and character chat | December 18, 2025 | Servers closed and users could no longer access their accounts. (36Kr) |
| 纸飞机AI | ModelBest/面壁智能 | AI companion | Reported exited in 2025 | Included in the 2025 shutdown census, although no precise public server-closure date was located. (36Kr) |
| momoAI | 清杉信息 | AI companion | Reported exited in 2025 | Listed among discontinued or withdrawn AI-companion products; detailed closure documentation is limited. (36Kr) |
| 我在AI | 有零科技 | AI companion | Reported exited in 2025 | Reported as withdrawn or no longer maintained; no clear public final-service notice was found. (36Kr) |
| AiU 爱哟 | Zhipu AI/智谱 | AI companion | Reported exited in H2 2025 | Standalone companion experiment was withdrawn as Zhipu concentrated resources elsewhere. Exact date is unclear. (36Kr) |
| Lumi 噜米 | 禹幻科技 | AI emotional companion | Reported exited in H2 2025 | Included in the companion-app withdrawal wave, but its final backend-shutdown date was not publicly documented. (36Kr) |
| 梯子AI | Baidu | AI search | March 4, 2026 | Shut after operating for roughly six months; its site and app-store listings disappeared and functions moved into the 文心 app. (Sina Finance) |
Some have become “zombies”.
| Product | Company | Condition as of June 30, 2026 |
|---|---|---|
| 胃之书 | Independent team | Had gone at least five months without an update by late 2025; user-feedback groups were reportedly nonfunctional or muted. No formal shutdown announcement, but it appeared close to natural abandonment. (36Kr) |
| AskXBOT | 澜码科技 | The company experienced unpaid wages, staff reductions and severe financing problems. AskXBOT appeared stalled, although the company website remained accessible, so it cannot be called a clean server shutdown. (Sina Finance) |
| Vega AI | Independent team | Included in the Chinese-media census of delisted or long-unmaintained AI applications. I found no reliable official closure notice or exact date. (36Kr) |
| 开搜AI | 快搜-related team | Listed as delisted or long-term unmaintained, but public evidence is insufficient to establish a precise final shutdown date. (36Kr) |
| 晓象 | Startup project | Reportedly encountered major operating and financing problems. Its product activity appears substantially stalled, but evidence does not support a precise “servers shut on X date” claim. (36Kr) |
| 小星星AI陪练 | 星星趣弹 | Included in the 2025 inactive-app census, but third-party download pages continued to appear. I would label it unconfirmed/inactive, rather than fully closed. (36Kr) |
Many can be found in the US.
| Product | What it did | Shutdown date | What happened |
|---|---|---|---|
| Huxe | Turned emails, calendars, webpages and prompts into personalized AI audio briefings/podcasts | May 28, 2026 | Removed from the app stores and stopped functioning. The founders said the team was moving on and would discontinue the product. (TechCrunch) |
| Rewind | Mac app that continuously recorded and made users’ screen and audio history searchable | December 19, 2025 | Following Meta’s acquisition of Limitless, the Rewind app’s screen and audio capture was disabled. Limitless’s Pendant service continued for existing users in supported regions, so only Rewind and other non-Pendant functionality were sunset. (Limitless) |
| Yara AI | AI mental-wellness and therapy-style chatbot | By November 2025 | The founder voluntarily wound down the service, citing concerns that AI chatbots were not safe enough for people experiencing serious mental-health situations. Its website now carries a farewell notice and directs users to other resources. (Yara AI) |
| Dot by New Computer | Personalized AI friend, confidante and companion | October 5, 2025 | New Computer sunset Dot after its co-founders decided to pursue different directions. Users were given one month to export their conversations and other data. (TechCrunch) |
| Woebot consumer app | CBT-based mental-health chatbot | June 30, 2025 | The direct-to-consumer Woebot app was retired; existing accounts became inaccessible. Woebot Health itself did not entirely disappear and continued working on institutional and provider-oriented applications. (Woebot Health) |
| Builder.ai | Claimed to use AI to make developing apps and websites easier | Operations collapsed in May 2025 | The Microsoft-backed company entered insolvency after financial problems, debt defaults and frozen or seized cash left it unable to continue operating normally. Its main U.S. entity subsequently filed for bankruptcy in June. (Financial Times) |
| Humane Ai Pin services | Screenless wearable assistant for AI queries, calls, messages and cloud-stored content | February 28, 2025 | Humane sold key assets to HP and switched off its servers. Calling, messaging, AI responses and cloud access stopped working, leaving most Pins substantially unusable. (The Verge) |
| Coqui AI commercial operations | AI voice generation, speech synthesis and voice cloning | January 2024 | The startup and its hosted commercial services shut down amid funding and monetization difficulties. The underlying open-source TTS code survived through community forks, so the technology itself did not vanish. (GitHub) |
| Artifact | AI-personalized news reader created by Instagram’s co-founders | Wound down during 2024 | Artifact announced that its market opportunity was insufficient and began winding down its app. Its core news reader remained alive longer than originally planned, before Yahoo acquired its technology and incorporated elements into Yahoo News. (Medium) |
| OpenAI AI Text Classifier | Website that attempted to identify whether text was written by AI | July 20, 2023 | OpenAI withdrew it because of its low accuracy rate. It was a particularly clean example of a product being shut down because the underlying AI simply did not work reliably enough. (OpenAI) |
| Neeva consumer search | Subscription-based, ad-free search engine that added generative-AI answers and citations | June 2, 2023 | Neeva could not attract enough users to make the consumer search business sustainable. The search website closed, user data was deleted and the company’s technology and team subsequently moved to Snowflake. (Search Engine Land) |
Excerpt from recent readings of When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows by Steven Pinker,
1. We try to gain status by not caring about status.
2. We rebel against conformity in the same way as everyone else.
3. We show humility to prove we’re better than other people.
4. We don’t care what people think, and we want them to think
this.5. We make anonymous donations to get credit for not caring about
getting credit.6. We bravely defy social norms so that people will praise us.
7. We avoid being manipulative to get people to do what we want
them to do.8. We compete to be less competitive than our rivals.
9. We help those in need, regardless of self-interest, because being
seen as the type of person who helps those in need, regardless of
self-interest, is in our self-interest.10. We make subversive art that only high-status people appreciate.
11. We make fun of ourselves for being uncool to prove we’re cool.
12. We self-righteously defend false beliefs to prove we care more
about the truth than virtue-signaling.13. We help our friends without expecting anything in return,
because we know they would do the same for us.14. We show everyone our true, authentic self—not who society
wants us to be—because that is who society wants us to be.