Category: personal_noteS

Bond yield becomes a topic? looks fine for Europe

Benchmark 10-year yield ranges:

Period Germany Italy Spain Background
Late 1970s–1980s 6–11% 10–14% 11–14% High inflation and nominal growth
Early 1990s peak ~9% 14.2% 14.0% Currency/ERM crisis
2000–07 3–5% 3.5–5.5% 3.5–5.5% Euro convergence
2011–12 crisis peak ~2% 7.3% ~7.6% Euro break-up/default risk
2020–21 low −0.8% 0.45% Around 0% ECB QE and pandemic policy
August 2026 3.26% 4.08% 3.72% Fiscal expansion, inflation and supply

How did European stocks perform?

 

Year STOXX Europe 600 price return Total return Broad environment
1988 +22.2% +25.4% Growth and yields rising
1989 +24.5% +28.0% Reunification optimism
1990 −17.8% −15.3% Bund yields/rates peak; recession fears
1991 +12.5% +15.8% Partial recovery
1992 +1.6% +5.8% ERM currency crisis
1993 +35.9% +40.7% Rate cuts and collapsing yields

 

Index 2011 2012
STOXX Europe 600 price −11.3% +14.4%
STOXX Europe 600 total return −8.6% +18.2%
Germany DAX −14.7% +29.1%
Italy −25.2% +7.8%
Spain IBEX −13.1% −4.7%

Note that 2011-12 is different – one key evidence is German yield yield was falling, while now it’s rising in 2026. Note that 2012 stock increased due to euro-breakup crisis being contained.

Germany’s 10-year yield has increased from about 2.86% at end-2025 to 3.26%, or roughly +40 bp YTD.

Year-end Germany Italy Spain STOXX 600 price return
2008 3.05% 4.47% 3.86% −45.6%
2009 3.14% 4.01% 3.80% +28.0%
2010 2.91% 4.60% 5.37% +8.6%
2011 1.93% 6.81% 5.50% −11.3%
Jul-12 1.24% 6.00% 6.80% Crisis peak
2012 year-end 1.30% 4.54% 5.34% +14.4%

 

Thoughts from people more than 75 year ago

Where is our thought leader these days?

Moreover, if we move in the direction of making machines which learn and whose behavior is modified by experience, we must face the fact that every degree of independence we give the machine is a degree of possible defiance of our wishes. The genie in the bottle will not willingly go back in the bottle, nor have we any reason to expect them to be well disposed to us.

Wiener_Norbert_The_Machine_Age_v3_1949

Meanwhile,

I think affluent middle class is key to a lot of things, especially for the US.

The rise of cheap Chinese open-weight models is a shock, if not an “attack”.

“Middle class” that is merely existing without a lot of options in life is not affluent middle class. Free will doesn’t prevail in this case.

About AMD

1/ OpenAI warrants and target price

OpenAI’s AMD warrant (max 160 million AMD shares) agreement says the first tranche follows delivery of the first 1 GW and full vesting requires purchases reaching 6 GW. AMD also disclosed that the stock-price targets rise to $600 for the final tranche.

AMD last year talked about $20 non-gaap EPS within the next three to five years. And now it says it will be significantly above $20.

Using the Nov 2025 stated goal of $20, OpenAI’s last tranche of $600 is 30x, and given it maybe $30 non-gaap eps, it’s just 20x.

2/ Lisa Su doesn’t own much?

Lisa Su currently owns approximately 3.61 million AMD shares outright, equal to about 0.22% of AMD.

AMD’s March 2026 proxy disclosed that Su also held 413,529 options exercisable within 60 days. Adding those to her currently reported actual shares gives approximately 4 milion beneficially owned shares or approximately 0.247% of AMD.

However, she came as CEO. She is not the founder.

Hefei leaders during CXMT’s first 10 years

Changxin Technology Group got listed on Monday.

It’s such a big event – it becomes mainland China’s most valuable listed company.

Here is a list of 合肥市委书记 (Hefei Party secretaries) in those years.

 

Taking 2016, when CXMT was established in Hefei, as the starting point, five Hefei Party secretaries are relevant to the company’s development:

Hefei Party Secretary Term CXMT Development Stage Subsequent Career and Current Status
Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) Sep. 2011–Nov. 2016 Project incubation and establishment Later served as Executive Vice Governor of Anhui, Executive Vice Mayor and Deputy Party Secretary of Chongqing, Vice Chairman of the Chongqing People’s Congress, and Chairman of the Shanxi CPPCC. Investigated in December 2024 and sentenced at first instance in March 2026 to life imprisonment for accepting more than RMB 127 million in bribes.
Song Guoquan (宋国权) Nov. 2016–May 2020 Fab construction, technology introduction, and initial mass production Later became Vice Chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. Retired after the 2023 leadership transition and now mainly serves as President of the Anhui Intangible Cultural Heritage Research Association. He continues to appear at public events.
Yu Aihua (虞爱华) May 2020–Mar. 2024 Capacity expansion and development of the surrounding semiconductor ecosystem Subsequently promoted to Deputy Party Secretary of Anhui and Secretary of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In 2025, he moved to the Anhui CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice Chairman. He continues to perform public duties.
Zhang Hongwen (张红文) Mar. 2024–Mar. 2025 Mature expansion and IPO preparation Disappeared from public view after December 2024, left his positions without receiving a new appointment, and was later removed as an Anhui Provincial People’s Congress delegate. His status is highly unusual, although no formal disciplinary investigation has been publicly announced.
Fei Gaoyun (费高云) Apr. 2025–May 2026 Final IPO preparation stage Placed under disciplinary and supervisory investigation on May 6, 2026. As of the latest public information, no subsequent announcement of expulsion from the Party, prosecution, or sentencing had been made.

1. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣): Involved at the Project’s Starting Point, but Not Its Principal Builder

CXMT and the first phase of its Hefei DRAM manufacturing project were established in 2016. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) remained Hefei Party secretary until November of that year, meaning the project’s initial planning, government investment framework, and decision to locate in Hefei were likely developed during the final period of his tenure.

However, the construction of the fabs and the transition into commercial production mainly occurred under his successor, Song Guoquan (宋国权).

After leaving Hefei, Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) continued to rise through the political system and eventually became Chairman of the Shanxi CPPCC. A court later found that he had accepted more than RMB 127 million in bribes between 2006 and 2024 while holding various government positions, including those of Hefei mayor and Hefei Party secretary.

Public court documents have not specifically linked his bribery case to CXMT. It would therefore be inappropriate to claim that his criminal case involved the CXMT project.

Assessment: Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) was the Party secretary during CXMT’s project-establishment phase, but not the principal official responsible for its construction and commercialization.

2. Song Guoquan (宋国权): The Most Important Party Secretary for CXMT’s Early Development

Song Guoquan’s (宋国权) tenure covered CXMT’s most difficult transition: moving from plans and capital commitments to a functioning fab and commercially viable DRAM production.

Key milestones during his tenure included:

  • Construction of the first Hefei fab beginning in March 2017.
  • Completion of the main fab building in January 2018.
  • Initial wafer runs for 8Gb DDR4 in July 2018.
  • Announcement of mass production in September 2019.
  • Initial commercial orders and sales beginning in November 2019.

Among the five officials, Song Guoquan (宋国权) therefore had the most direct association with CXMT’s successful execution. During his tenure, the company had already committed substantial capital but had not yet proven its technology or manufacturing capability. The core task was to complete the facility, establish a production process, achieve acceptable yields, and begin commercial shipments.

After leaving the Hefei Party secretary position, Song Guoquan (宋国权) became Vice Chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress. He subsequently retired from full-time government office and has remained publicly active through cultural and intangible-heritage organizations. There have been no public reports of investigations or disciplinary action against him.

Assessment: Song Guoquan (宋国权) was CXMT’s “construction and mass-production Party secretary.” His tenure was the most important for turning the company from a government-backed project into an operating DRAM manufacturer.

3. Yu Aihua (虞爱华): Transforming CXMT from a Single Project into an Industrial Cluster

Yu Aihua (虞爱华) took office in May 2020, after CXMT had already achieved initial DDR4 mass production. The company’s strategic focus had therefore shifted from proving the viability of one fab to expanding capacity, upgrading technology, and developing a broader local semiconductor supply chain.

During his tenure:

  • The Fab C project was initiated in June 2020.
  • Construction of the C2 module began in December 2021.
  • The Hefei A2 fab building was completed in June 2022.
  • Hefei continued to attract semiconductor equipment, materials, packaging, design, and supporting companies.

Yu Aihua (虞爱华) frequently described Hefei’s model as “industrial investment” rather than ordinary venture capital. Under this approach, the local government combined equity investment, land, infrastructure, financing, supply-chain development, and customer-market support to build strategic industries.

In 2024, Yu Aihua (虞爱华) was promoted to Deputy Party Secretary of Anhui and also served as Secretary of the provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In 2025, he moved to the Anhui CPPCC as Deputy Party Secretary and Vice Chairman.

This represented a clear reduction in executive authority and effectively ended his upward political trajectory. However, he has continued to participate in public meetings and official activities, and there has been no public indication that he is under investigation.

Assessment: Yu Aihua (虞爱华) was CXMT’s “capacity-expansion and industrial-ecosystem Party secretary.” He helped develop CXMT from a standalone manufacturing project into the center of a larger Hefei semiconductor cluster.

4. Zhang Hongwen (张红文): A Short Tenure and a Highly Unclear Political Status

Zhang Hongwen (张红文) became Hefei Party secretary in March 2024 and remained in the position for roughly one year.

By this point, CXMT was already an established DRAM producer. Zhang Hongwen’s (张红文) tenure therefore corresponded more closely to advanced-product expansion, corporate restructuring, financing, and preparation for a potential public listing than to the company’s original establishment or manufacturing ramp.

His departure was highly unusual:

  • He stopped appearing publicly after December 10, 2024.
  • In March 2025, it was confirmed that he was no longer an Anhui Provincial Party Committee member or Hefei Party secretary.
  • No new position was announced.
  • In December 2025, he was removed as a delegate to the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress.

This combination of events commonly suggests serious internal disciplinary action, organizational investigation, or another form of political handling. However, no formal announcement by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has publicly confirmed that Zhang Hongwen (张红文) is under investigation.

There is also no authoritative public evidence linking his disappearance or removal to CXMT.

Assessment: Zhang Hongwen (张红文) was CXMT’s “mature expansion and capital-markets preparation Party secretary.” He appears likely to have encountered serious political trouble, but the specific cause remains undisclosed.

5. Fei Gaoyun (费高云): Investigated During CXMT’s Final IPO Preparation Stage

Fei Gaoyun (费高云) became Hefei Party secretary in April 2025 and served for approximately one year.

His tenure covered the final stages of CXMT’s listing preparation and continued capacity expansion. On May 6, 2026, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection announced that Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was under investigation for suspected serious violations of discipline and law.

CXMT subsequently completed its public listing in July 2026, meaning Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was investigated before the company formally entered the public market.

As of the latest information included in the original summary, there had been no public announcement that Fei Gaoyun (费高云) had been expelled from the Party, transferred for prosecution, or sentenced. The investigation remained ongoing.

There is no authoritative evidence that his case is connected to CXMT.

Assessment: Fei Gaoyun (费高云) was CXMT’s “IPO preparation Party secretary.” His long-term contribution to the company is difficult to evaluate because his tenure was brief and ended with a formal investigation.

Overall Assessment

The political outcomes of the five Hefei Party secretaries associated with CXMT’s development have varied substantially:

  • Formally investigated and sentenced: Wu Cunrong (吴存荣).
  • Formally placed under investigation: Fei Gaoyun (费高云).
  • Highly abnormal departure, but no public investigation announcement: Zhang Hongwen (张红文).
  • Normal retirement: Song Guoquan (宋国权).
  • Transferred to the CPPCC and continuing normal public duties: Yu Aihua (虞爱华).

In terms of their direct importance to CXMT’s development, a reasonable ranking would be:

Song Guoquan (宋国权) > Yu Aihua (虞爱华) > Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) > Zhang Hongwen (张红文) ≈ Fei Gaoyun (费高云)

Song Guoquan (宋国权) ranks first because his tenure covered construction, technology validation, and the beginning of commercial production. Yu Aihua (虞爱华) ranks second because his tenure covered large-scale expansion and the development of Hefei’s broader semiconductor ecosystem. Wu Cunrong (吴存荣) was relevant to the project’s initial formation, while Zhang Hongwen (张红文) and Fei Gaoyun (费高云) served during later, relatively short periods.

It is important not to infer that CXMT itself was involved in corruption merely because several former Hefei Party secretaries later encountered political or legal problems. Public information concerning Wu Cunrong (吴存荣), Zhang Hongwen (张红文), and Fei Gaoyun (费高云) has not established a direct connection between their cases and CXMT.

CXMT’s development was the result of several factors working together over multiple political administrations: local-government industrial investment, national semiconductor policy, the work of the company’s management and engineering teams, and sustained access to capital and manufacturing resources.

Here is the list of relevant Hefei mayor

 

Hefei mayor Term CXMT stage Subsequent career and current status
Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) Jan. 2012–Aug. 2016 Project incubation and initial approval Investigated in July 2016 and expelled from the Party and public office in December 2016. I found no authoritative public announcement of a subsequent prosecution or sentence.
Ling Yun (凌云) Aug. 2016–Apr. 2021 Fab construction, technology validation and first commercial production Became Huangshan Party secretary in 2021. Since January 2025, she has served as director of the Anhui CPPCC Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, Overseas Chinese and Foreign Affairs Committee.
Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) Apr. 2021–Jan. 2026 Capacity expansion, product upgrading and IPO preparation Resigned as mayor in January 2026 and became Party-group secretary of the Anhui CPPCC Economic Committee. This appears to be a normal retirement-transition appointment.
Zhang Quan (张泉) Jan. 2026–present IPO completion and post-listing expansion Current Hefei mayor. He had already served as Hefei executive vice mayor from 2023, so his involvement with CXMT began before becoming mayor.

 

1. Zhang Qingjun (张庆军): The project-incubation mayor

Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) was mayor when the CXMT project was conceived and initially established in 2016. Because the publicly available CXMT timeline does not identify individual officials responsible for the decision, it is safest to say that he was part of the municipal leadership during the project’s formation—not that he personally created or controlled the project.

His overlap with CXMT was brief. He was placed under investigation on July 30, 2016, and formally resigned as mayor the following month. In December 2016, he was expelled from the Party and dismissed from public office for serious disciplinary violations, including using his position for private benefit.

I have not found an authoritative court or procuratorate announcement showing that Zhang was subsequently prosecuted or sentenced. Therefore, his latest clearly documented public status remains the 2016 dual expulsion, rather than a confirmed criminal conviction.

Assessment: Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) was CXMT’s project-incubation mayor, but he left before construction began and was not responsible for the execution or production ramp.

2. Ling Yun (凌云): The most important mayor in CXMT’s history

Ling Yun (凌云) became acting mayor in August 2016 and was formally elected in October. Her term covered essentially the entire zero-to-one process:

  • Fab construction beginning in March 2017.
  • Completion of the first factory building and equipment move-in in January 2018.
  • Trial production in July 2018.
  • DDR4 mass-production announcement in September 2019.
  • First commercial orders in November 2019.

Her direct public association with CXMT is also well documented. At the September 2019 signing of the broader Hefei ChangXin integrated-circuit manufacturing base, Ling described a planned industrial complex centred on CXMT, including the wafer fab, a supporting IC industrial park and an integrated residential area. The overall project was presented as a more-than-RMB 220 billion development, with CXMT’s wafer-manufacturing base representing the largest component.

This means that, on the government side, Ling was not merely present at the time. Her administration had to execute the difficult work of:

  • Deploying municipal and district-level capital.
  • Constructing fab-related utilities and infrastructure.
  • Coordinating equipment installation and recruitment.
  • Helping the company obtain technology and intellectual-property access.
  • Supporting CXMT until it produced commercially saleable DRAM.

After leaving Hefei, Ling became Huangshan Party secretary. She stepped down from that position in December 2024 and was appointed in January 2025 to lead an Anhui CPPCC committee. She remains in normal public service and has not been publicly associated with a disciplinary investigation.

Assessment: Ling Yun (凌云) was CXMT’s construction, technology-validation and mass-production mayor. Among the mayors, she had the greatest direct importance to CXMT’s success.

3. Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰): The expansion and industrialisation mayor

Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) became mayor in April 2021, but his involvement with Hefei’s industrial projects began earlier: he had served as executive vice mayor from 2018 and as deputy Party secretary from late 2020. He therefore overlapped with the latter part of CXMT’s initial production ramp even before becoming mayor.

His mayoral term covered CXMT’s transition from a newly producing fab into a much larger DRAM platform:

  • Construction and completion of the Hefei second-phase main fab.
  • Continued capacity expansion.
  • Development of LPDDR5, DDR5 and LPDDR5X products.
  • Expansion of the local semiconductor materials, equipment, packaging and design ecosystem.
  • Corporate restructuring, fundraising and IPO preparation.

CXMT’s official timeline records that the Hefei second-phase main fab was topped out in June 2022. Luo also repeatedly highlighted CXMT in Hefei’s industrial strategy; his 2022 government report stated that CXMT’s 2021 revenue had grown approximately fivefold.

Luo remained mayor until January 2026, when Zhang Quan (张泉) replaced him. Later that month, Luo was appointed Party-group secretary of the Anhui CPPCC Economic Committee. Given his age—born in January 1966—and the absence of adverse announcements, this looks like a standard transition away from executive government office rather than a disciplinary removal.

Assessment: Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) was CXMT’s scale-expansion, product-upgrade and capital-markets mayor. He ranks second only to Ling because he covered both the late initial ramp and most of the large expansion cycle.

4. Zhang Quan (张泉): The IPO and post-listing mayor

Zhang Quan (张泉) became acting mayor on January 13, 2026 and was formally elected on January 24. He is the current Hefei mayor.

Although his mayoral tenure is still short, he was already Hefei’s executive vice mayor from 2023, meaning he likely participated in the government-side work surrounding CXMT’s later fundraising, expansion and listing preparation. That involvement is more relevant than his short formal mayoral term alone would suggest.

CXMT listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange’s STAR Market on July 27, 2026 under ticker 688825, so Zhang’s period as mayor begins with CXMT’s transition from a predominantly government-backed strategic project into a major publicly listed semiconductor company.

His future role will likely focus less on proving that CXMT can manufacture DRAM and more on:

  • Supporting additional capacity and technology upgrades.
  • Building equipment and materials suppliers around CXMT.
  • Managing the relationship between municipal state capital and public shareholders.
  • Extending the economic benefits of CXMT across Hefei’s semiconductor cluster.

Assessment: Zhang Quan (张泉) is CXMT’s IPO-completion and post-listing mayor, but it is too early to judge his ultimate importance.

Overall ranking

Based on direct importance to CXMT’s development to date:

Ling Yun (凌云) > Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) > Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) ≈ Zhang Quan (张泉)

The ranking differs somewhat from that of the Party secretaries:

  • Ling Yun (凌云) was probably the single most important municipal executive during CXMT’s zero-to-one phase.
  • Luo Yunfeng (罗云峰) had the longest combined exposure when his executive-vice-mayor period is included.
  • Zhang Qingjun (张庆军) was involved only at the project’s birth.
  • Zhang Quan (张泉) may eventually become important, but his mayoral record is still too short.

The striking contrast is that the mayoral sequence has been more stable than the Party-secretary sequence: one mayor was formally disciplined, while the subsequent three have either moved normally to other positions or remain in office. There is still no public evidence establishing that the disciplinary problems of Zhang Qingjun (张庆军), or any of the former Hefei Party secretaries, were connected to CXMT itself.

Summartized and written by ChatGPT.

US data center transaction valuation

 

Transaction date Assets Buyer / capital partner Seller / contributor Stake acquired Transaction value Capacity Implied price per GW
Jun. 29, 2026 Three Northern Virginia hyperscale facilities: two in Manassas and one in Sterling Digital Realty Blackstone-affiliated funds Blended 64%: 80% of two sites and 50% of one US$3.5bn equity consideration; US$7.8bn 100% gross asset value, including assumed debt and remaining capex 0.288GW US$27.1bn/GW on gross asset value
Jul. 28, 2026 Meta El Paso campus, Texas BlackRock/GIP/HPS funds Meta contributes land and construction in progress BlackRock 80%; Meta retains 20% US$14bn total fitted-infrastructure development cost; Meta contributed US$2.3bn of assets and BlackRock contributed US$4.9bn cash at closing 1.0GW US$14.0bn/GW
Oct. 21, 2025 Meta Hyperion initial campus development, Louisiana Blue Owl-managed funds Meta contributes land and construction in progress Blue Owl 80%; Meta retains 20% US$27bn total development cost; Blue Owl initially contributed about US$7bn cash and Meta received a US$3bn distribution ~2.0GW initial phase ~US$13.5bn/GW
Oct. 1, 2024 New Equinix xScale campuses across the U.S. GIC and CPP Investments New-build JV with Equinix; no conventional seller GIC 37.5%; CPP 37.5%; Equinix 25% More than US$15bn of total investable capital, including future debt More than 1.5GW ~US$10bn/GW, based on headline figures
Apr. 15, 2024 Equinix SV12x, San Jose, California PGIM Real Estate Equinix contributes/develops project PGIM 80%; Equinix retains 20% US$600m JV/project capitalization >0.028GW <US$21.4bn/GW
Oct. 15, 2025 Aligned Data Centers platform across North and South America AIP, MGX and BlackRock’s GIP Macquarie-managed funds and co-investors 100% equity US$40bn enterprise value ~5GW operational and planned ~US$8.0bn/GW

民谣黄金时代

the year when the song become widespread / well-known

2012 – 董小姐 – 宋东野

2013 – 天空之城 – 李志

2014 – 南山南 – 马頔

2015 – 奇妙能力歌 – 陈粒

2016 – 成都 – 赵雷

2017 – 消愁 – 毛不易

2018 – 盗将行 – 花粥

2017 已经被资本主导的选秀节目影响

2018 之后已经被抖音/短视频影响/接管，因为要受众最大的话，最流行的不一定是最初的那种民谣了

Model pricing comparison

Meta’s pricing is amazing – it targets eliminate Claude’s gross profit if Muse Spark capability can catch up.

Model Input ($/1M tokens) Output ($/1M tokens)
Meta Muse Spark 1.1 $1.25 $4.25
Claude Sonnet ~$3 ~$15
Claude Opus ~$5 ~$25

With cached input.

Model Input ($/1M) Cached Input ($/1M) Output ($/1M) Cached discount
Meta Muse Spark 1.1 $1.25 $0.15 $4.25 88%
Claude Sonnet $3.00 $0.30 $15.00 90%
Claude Opus $5.00 $0.50 $25.00 90%

However, compare that with DeepSeek.

Model Input / 1M Cached input / 1M Output / 1M
DeepSeek V4 Flash RMB 1 / $0.15 RMB 0.02 / $0.003  RMB 2 / $0.3
DeepSeek V4 Pro  RMB 3 / $0.44 RMB 0.025 / $0.0037 RMB 6 / $0.89

Zhipu could see some trouble…

 

Model Input / 1M Cached input / 1M Output / 1M
Zhipu GLM-5.2 RMB 8 / $1.18 RMB 2 / $0.3 RMB 28 / $4.13
Meta Muse Spark 1.1 $1.25 $0.15 $4.25
DeepSeek V4 Pro  RMB 3 RMB 0.025 RMB 6

Also recall that I was mentioning the bifurcation in AI models and AI infra.

US hyperscalers drawdown from peak

 

Company Peak close Subsequent bottom close Peak-to-bottom drawdown
Oracle (ORCL) $328.33 — Sep. 10, 2025 $140.27 — Jul. 2, 2026 −57.3%
Microsoft (MSFT) $542.07 — Oct. 28, 2025 $352.83 — Jun. 25, 2026 −34.9%
Meta (META) $790.00 — Aug. 12, 2025 $525.72 — Mar. 27, 2026 −33.5%
Amazon (AMZN) $274.99 — May 6, 2026 $227.01 — Jun. 25, 2026 −17.4%
Alphabet (GOOGL) $402.62 — May 13, 2026 $337.39 — Jun. 26, 2026 −16.2%

Technically meta was not a hyperscaler.

FCF turning negative and shifting to memory makers is the biggest concern.