Tag: Business

Notes on CATL 2023

`1/ shareholder return is real

annual dividend of 22bn rmb, out of net income of ~44bn net income -> ~50% payout ratio.

this is also due to scaling back of capex (down 30% yoy in FY23)

 

2/ growth has slowed to almost zero

q4 gross profit is up only +2% yoy

q4 net income is -1% yoy

however, with utilization up, 2024H2 and beyond should return to growth

 

3/ barrier in internationalization

both EU and US want to localize the whole value chain, which seems to be a big investment, and involves upstream & downstream companies.

CATL doesn’t see good return and hasn’t done massive capital-heavy investments.

Licensing model is what clients are happy about, which is capital-light for CATL, but growth in net income would be less.

 

Tesla Shanghai export – not looking great

Global EV demand is weak; Tesla Shanghai’s export also seems to be under pressure.

Tesla Shanghai Jan+Feb export number is down 22.5% yoy.

Overall (export+domestic) Tesla Shanghai Jan+Feb is down 6% yoy.

Looks to be a flattish or small growth year for Tesla SH in 2024.

Btw, looks like Elon Musk is really focusing on Grok, SpaceX, and Twitter.

McDonald’s China menu price / China CPI

There was this “oh麦” membership offered by McDonald’s China.

If you buy the membership, you can purchase several “4件套” for a bigger discount.

It was rmb 29 for [Big Mac combo meal + 5 Chicken Nuggets] back in 2021.

The price increased by 1 rmb generally in July 2022, when the membership was upgraded to “O麦金” membership. [https://www.zhihu.com/question/543192349]

[Big Mac combo meal + 4 Chicken Nuggets] -> 30 rmb, or 3.4% increase

The cheaper grilled chicken combo + 4 chicken nuggets also increased by 1 rmb to 26 rmb, or 4%; considering the number chicken nuggets decreased by 1, price hike here is more than 4%.

In Dec 2023, “4件套” price hiked by another 1 rmb.

[Big Mac combo meal + 4 Chicken Nuggets] -> 31, or 3.3% increase

The cheaper grilled chicken combo + 4 chicken nuggets also increased by 1 rmb to 27 rmb.

Another interesting thing is the price before discount.

Here is the table to summarize the modest price increase in China.

 

Nio real net cash position (21q4 – 23q4)

Interest charting…

if we exclude restricted cash, and cash borrowed from WC, and recent equity injection, here is Nio’s quarterly end net cash position.

What’s the problem?

  • declining/pressure gross profit level (GP per car x volume) due to fierce competition & macro backdrop doesn’t support strong demand
  • increasing opex & capex (autonomous driving, chips, international expansion, new sub-brand, battery swap stations etc.) with a limited gross profit level.

Meta’s growth potential?

Meta’s bottom-line looks amazing – diluted EPS almost tripled from a year ago (+168% yoy).

How?

  • Headcount shrunk 25%
  • Revenue grew 25%
  • $20bn+ buyback in the past 4 quarters

Cheers to Susan Li, the new CFO announced back in 2022q2 earnings. Delivering numbers that investors needed.

Efficiency has improved dramatically – quarterly operating income per full-time employee more than tripled from $65k to $208k.

AI story is impressive; and Metaverse is not dead.

What are the concerns?

1) two-year cagr not impressive: at the midpoint of 2023q4 guidance, two year revenue cagr (vs 2021q4) is <7%.

Two year ads revenue carg for US, Canada and Europe is 6.7% in 2023q3.

Remember, most of Meta’s revenue is ads in US, Canada and Europe (2/3 in 2023q3). User growth obviously is not meaningful. It needs ARPU to grow. While ads pricing won’t be strong given macro uncertainties, it will then rely on showing more ads to users, which won’t be something people would enjoy.

2) operating cost would be higher: infrastructure cost would rise due to AI investments. Reality Lab operating cost would be higher. Two large layoffs were done; hard to cut further. More importantly, new revenue streams are less lucrative than ads (which has over 80% gross margin).

2) regulation, fine: Meta was sued – that has hit the headline. Meanwhile, EU’s DMA would take effect next year. Plus, AI is very data-driven. However, can companies easily get data this time around?

Will EPS continue to grow at 15% or above for 2024, 2025 and beyond? I think doable, but is AI an easily profitable business? Let’s see.

Perfect Diary or YSG? The dilemma for brand advertising

Following up on the previous blog, Perfect Diary seems to be at the perfect stage to do more brand advertising.

Two problems tho –

1/ what is the core message? Compared with 花西子, perfect diary seems to be less special in terms of message it sends.

2/ YSG wants to be the pipe or the platform. To do so, it needs resources to diversify, which inherently means the lower importance of perfect diary.

It seems to me that the conflict is also due to the short time frame the management has. To go for the ultimate J-curve of perfect diary and to become the holding group with successful tiered brands in a few years = a extremely tough goal.

If we draw a matrix – categories on the x-axis and premium level on the y axis, plus female/male on the z-axis.. long way to go.

Brand advertising in 新国货时代

Many new consumer brands in China are at the inflection point now. While they are often good at initial traffic generation and use of KOLs, brand advertising seems still an effective and a necessary step to go mainstream. It’s also the ultimate battle that can build brand equity into a long-term competitive advantage.

Three takeaways:

1/ buying traffic is cost-effective and useful in early stage to test and improve the product. But it seems to have a decreasing marginal return after certain level – this is also where brand advertising should kick in.

2/ brand advertising may take time to be “effective” when non-linear growth can be observed. Three key factors to determine whether it will work / how long it’s gonna take: 产品完成度，种草基础，渠道渗透

3/ for new segments, first mover or the current market share leader doesn’t effectively mean it’s the winner – as long as there is no clear leadership in consumers’ mind. The first to establish a strong association or become the cognitive referent is the key.

Second-hand e-commerce boom (hype)?

Poshmark (POSH) had a great run at the beginning of 2021 – closed at $101.5 per share on its first day (Jan 14), or 142% higher than its IPO price of $42.

On March 29, ThredUp (TDUP) went IPO with $14 listing price, closing its first day at $31.4 per share, or 124% higher.

Capital reacts fast in China as Zhuanzhuan raised $390 million on Apr 1. Zhuanzhuan was from Wuba and raise $300 in Sep 2019. In May 2020, Zhuanzhuan merged with Zhaoliangji, with post-merger valution of $1.8 billion.

However, valuations seem to be rich.

A long RealReal (REAL) short Poshmark (POSH) trade would return more than 13% in four week (March 4 – April 1).

Poshmark was trading at 10x forward rev while RealReals is below 5x.

If short was implemented right before Poshmark’s earnings on Mar 11, which disappoints, return would be 29%.

2020 revenue

Poshmark: $262.1mn

RealReal: $299.9mn

ThredUp: $186.0mn

Btw, these companies are not growing crazy at 50% or above – CAGR for the next 3 years is like 30%.

DoorDash Beyond Pandemic

Back in January, I wrote about how DoorDash could be valued at $60bn, with solid earnings (in the future).

While I question the near-term growth beyond $60bn, today’s earnings obviously doesn’t help.

Its stock drops more than 10% after-market.

Two things that the market seems to be too optimistic about:

1/ GOV and revenue growth – won’t be amazing

While it’s amazing that DoorDash GOV grew more than 200% in 2020, its forecast for 2021 is conservative: $30bn to $33bn, or 28% growth at the middle point.

Given Q4 GOV is ~$8.2bn, it’s basically forecasting minimal sequential growth. (lower in Q3/Q3 and higher in Q1/Q4, considering seasonality)

Our outlook anticipates the successful rollout of COVID-19 vaccines, among other things. Though we cannot predict the short or long-term effects this will have on consumer behavior, our guidance assumes it creates headwinds to growth in total orders and average order values. We caution investors that the outlook for 2021 remains highly uncertain, and consumer behavior could deviate from the expectations included in our guidance. Our guidance also assumes that the timing of scaled vaccinations will coincide with our seasonally softer Q2 and Q3 periods. Consequently, our forecast assumes increasing consumer churn, reduced order frequency at the cohort level, and slightly smaller average order values beginning in Q2. Because of this, our full year 2021 guidance assumes Marketplace GOV in Q2 and Q3 will be below the levels we expect in Q1.

2/ Profits – won’t be amazing

While DoorDash posted ~10% adj. EBITDA margin for the past three quarters, it may not be able to do so in 2021.

Considering $86 million adj. EBITDA in 2020 Q3, the forecast of $0-200 million for FY2021 seems lower than what investors were expecting.

That being said, to maintain a healthy ecosystem and to withstand the normalization of life, DoorDash needs to put extra efforts in retaining users and Dashers, and business partners. And it can and will invest more in acquiring talents.

Even 2021 GOV is $30-33bn, it will diversify (more heathy/stable demand), growing outside of the food delivery business. In 2023, this number can still go to $50 billion (say 2 billion orders x $25 per order), growing at over 25%.

And on the subscription front,

While DashPass orders carry a below-average Take Rate, the average DashPass subscriber orders more frequently and stays on the platform longer than the average non-subscriber.

DoorDash is playing the long game and the business is here to stay.

Be patient.

Unit Economics For Streaming on Kuaishou

As of Feb 2021,

For independent individuals – 40% of gross value of virtual gifts, when tax withheld is 20%

Streamers = 40%

Streamer’s tax withheld by Kuaishou = 10%

Kuaishou = 50%

For streamers under a “family/union” – varies.

Unions can set the sharing ratio to between 35% and 50%.

For example, if the ratio is set at 40%, and tax withheld is 0 (to simplify)

Streamers = 40% (certain tax should be withheld)

Union = 10%

Kuaishou = 50%

In addition, Kuaishou gives back additional revenue-sharing (“bonus”) as incentive if certain growth/active targets are achieved, up to 12% of gross value (after-tax I assume).

The larger the union, the higher basic bonus (up to 2%) it can get. Active bonus (1%) requirement is a bit higher for larger union. Growth target is lower for large unions. Growth bonus is tiered and every union can potentially get the full 9% growth bonus.

Therefore, if a union get say 5% bonus, following the previous example, then

Streamers = 40%

Union = 15%

Kuaishou = 45%

Unions can set certain bonus internally for streamers, and often provide a base pay + % commission model for streamers.

We could see from Kuaishou’s reported financials that after deducting “revenue sharing to streamers and related taxes”, Kuaishou retains a bit over 40% of its live-streaming revenue.