Tag: Finance

China’s currency policy

It’s a very keen observation and description by Kenneth Rogoff in his book Our Dollar, Your Problem that China prioritizes a USD exchange-rate objective over domestic inflation targeting.

What are the implications?

1/ Tighter capital movement control

The “impossible trinity” says a country cannot simultaneously have a fixed (or tightly managed) exchange rate, free capital movement, and independent monetary policy.

Since China uses the peg and China wants more independent monetary policy (when Fed raised interest rate last cycle in 2022, China didn’t follow), it has to have tighter capital movement control.

Or PBOC policy shall move more in-line with US Fed policy.

2/ Real exchange rate moves

With a mostly fixed nominal RMB/USD, the real exchange rate moves via the inflation gap:

If China inflation below the US, China gets a real depreciation (more competitive) even without nominal RMB weakening. This is what happened in the last few years, and foreigners will find traveling in China very cheap (e.g. Chinese hotel price).

If China inflation above the US, China gets a real appreciation (less competitive) even if the nominal stays “stable.”

3/ Intervention can force money/credit swings 

Defending the exchange-rate path often requires buying/selling FX:

When inflows are strong, the central bank buys USD and creates RMB liquidity (which can be inflationary/credit-boosting).

When outflows dominate, defending the rate can drain RMB liquidity (which can be contractionary).

4/ It tends to bias the economy toward tradables and away from household consumption

If the RMB is held weaker than it otherwise would be (or just “less strong” than productivity would imply), it functions like:

a subsidy to exporters/tradable producers, and

a tax on importers/consumers (imports cost more in RMB terms than under a stronger currency).

5/ Bigger reserves and bigger balance-sheet exposure to USD assets

Exchange-rate management usually accumulates FX reserves (especially in surplus periods). That brings valuation risk when USD moves, opportunity cost (low-yield reserve assets vs domestic needs), geopolitical/financial exposure to the dollar system.

China’s missing inflation in early 2000s

In Our Dollar, Your Problem, author raised this question – why China didn’t see a faster inflation it should see. The higher inflation rationale is that when tradable goods sector productivity rises fast, this part of the economy will attract more workers, presumably from non-tradable goods sector. Thus, wage should rise and likely at a faster pace than the productivity gain in non-tradable goods sector, which should result in higher inflation in non-tradable goods sector to counter labor inflation.

In the books, the author mentioned one plausible explanation, which was Chinese gov could move massive population from rural areas to cities and factories. The amount of inflow was so large that wage increases were not seen. Thus, there is lower than expected service inflation.

This sounds reasonable.

I have additional arguments on #why China didn’t see strong inflation in non-tradable goods sector.

1/ The high-end of services are not priced fairly in China.

Unlike more capitalism-driven societies, the high-end supply and demand are exchanged in non-monetary channels. E.g. think about the high-end healthcare senior gov officials may receive in China – that’s not charged at the “market price”. Thus, you can’t measure the inflation, if that doesn’t carry a “price”.

In additional, the high-end services may not be available to the public or openly marketed. Thus demand is lower than it should be.

2/ High-end demand is shifted abroad.

Chinese wealthy like to shop, travel and live abroad.

This lowers the inflation across the board.

So they say central banks are buying gold

I did some research and tried to put pieces together.

1/ Central banks are buying, but top country is Poland (National Bank of Poland).

None of G7 is top buyers in 2025 till Nov.

German is a small buyer.

Source: IMF, respective central banks, World Gold Council

 

2/ The total buying from central banks surged in 2022

2022 vs 2021, more than doubled

2022 vs 2018, more than 50% surge

Year
Annual central bank net gold purchases, tonnes
2014 601.2
2015 579.6
2016 394.9
2017 378.6
2018 656.2
2019 605.4
2020 254.9
2021 450.1
2022 1080.0
2023 1050.8
2024 1089.4

Source: www.visualcapitalist.com

3/ Many gold buyers are Russia trading partners, except for Poland

Six of top seven central bank gold buyers in 2025 through Nov is a top Russia trading partner.

Poland (no)

Kazakhstan (yes)

Brazil (yes)

Azerbaijan (yes)

Turkey (yes)

China (yes)

Czech (yes)

Top Russia trading partners in 2024.

Source: oec.world

It looks possible that as Russia doesn’t want to accept or own USD, or it can’t use USD, its trading partners are buying gold as a form of payment.

 

Chatted with ChatGPT and created model for gold price

With a 5-year time frame, I tried to create a gold price model for 2028, based on 2023 gold price.

Gold_2028 (USD/oz)
– Low $4,087
– Base $6,070
– High $9,556

gold_2028_model_with_deficit_cb

Disclaimer: I am not expert on gold nor did I have spent considerable time in studying it. But I was trying to understand different drivers behind gold price. I asked ChatGPT to pick the coefficients, so there is little credibility behind these coefficients.

 

Notes of Paul Tudor Jones (PTJ) on AI bubbles

Paul Tudor Jones on the AI Bubble Debate by Bloomberg

The only way to reduce debt to GDP is to have obviously nominal growth exceed your interest rate.

– Paul Tudor Jones

Here are notes for Paul’s interview and my opinions

  • Today feels like Oct 1999, but if this is a bubble, it’s a small one. Past bubbles ran 400–600%. Nasdaq is “only” ~200% off the bottom. Blow-off possible, not inevitable. [I agree; see my previous post Is it like internet bubble? in October]
  • Key bull case: rates. If Fed funds fall toward ~2.25–2.75%, that’s powerful fuel for equities. Markets look 6–9 months ahead, not at today’s data. [Sure]
  • Difference vs 1999: companies are profitable. [I don’t agree; I believe AI model companies like OpenAI etc. are losing a lot of money; let’s see when they publish numbers for IPOs]
  • Risk isn’t traditional leverage like in margin accounts — it’s derivative leverage: options, leveraged ETFs (up 250% from 2022 bottom), and trader-driven equity flows. [Very real]
  • Jones stays a trend follower. Recently, gold & silver > Bitcoin despite massive crypto inflows. He now expects precious metals to outperform crypto into year-end. [I wouldn’t agree back then; but I would be very wrong, so far]
  • Bond vigilantes were held in back; money debasement happened in gold and bitcoin instead. [True]
  • Biggest risk: concentration everywhere — stocks, investors, and policy power. [Agree]
  • Bottom line: short-term cautious, but Paul believes markets can be substantially higher by year-end. Likely long: Nasdaq. Short: Bonds.

Notes on JPY strength

Coordinated intervention

Reports that the New York Fed did “rate checks” (often interpreted as a potential prelude to intervention) plus Japan officials stressing coordination with the U.S. put the market on alert.

Previous examples

In March 2011, the G7 announced concerted intervention after extreme yen volatility following Japan’s earthquake.

What was happening in 2011?

Markets anticipated Japanese insurers and investors would bring money back to Japan to pay claims and fund rebuilding.

What’s happening now and why US wants a stronger yen now?

Excess volatility and disorderly FX moves can harm economic/financial stability

Japan’s finance minister has said the U.S. Treasury secretary shared concerns about “one-sided depreciation” of the yen, which signals the U.S. doesn’t want to be seen as tolerating a move that could be framed as giving Japan an unfair export boost.

A weak yen can worsen import-cost inflation and political stress in Japan.

Some exit from Japan might cause the temporary yen weakness (e.g. China selling).

 

 

Assessing 2025 predictions – CICC overseas

1/ US equity

S&P ended at 6,845.50, with ~18% total return in 2025, or doubling CICC’s return prediction.

我们测算，在乐观预期 10%盈利增长的驱动下，标普 500 或从当前的 5800 上涨 8~10%至 6200~6400 点左右。

– CICC Nov 2024

2/ US treasury

In 2025, US 10yr treasury is rarely below 4%; ended ~25bps higher than CICC prediction.

10 年美债利率合理中枢为 3.8-4%

– CICC Nov 2024

3/ US dollar

In 2025, US dollar index is rarely above 100 after Apr tariff announcement, lower than CICC prediction.

我们测算的中枢为 102-106

– CICC Nov 2024

4/ Copper & Oil

Oil declined in 2025, but copper is up 50%.

大宗中性偏多，等待催化剂。铜的需求更多与中国相关，油则更多受地缘和供给影响。从中美信用周期角度，在目前点位进一步看空意义不大，但向上动力和时间目前仍不明朗，需要等待催化剂。

– CICC Nov 2024

 

5/ Gold

Gold is extremely strong, ending 2025 with near $4,300 to over $4,400 per ounce, a lot higher than CICC prediction

黄金短期中性。黄金已经超出我们基于实际利率和美元的基本面模型测算可支撑的 2400-2600 美元/盎司。但地缘局势、央行购金和局部“去美元”需求带来了额外的风险溢价。我们测算，俄乌局势以来溢价中枢上行至 100-200
美元。长期依然可以作为不确定性对冲，但短期我们建议中性。

– CICC Nov 2024

The worst credit is issued at the best of times

I am recently reading Howard Marks’ The Most Important Thing and come across the section describing the credit cycle.

Why the worst credit is issued at the best of times?

Because bad news is scarce and when financial institutions compete for market share by lowering lending standards or required returns.

Typically when there is more capital available to companies or individuals, you have lower return on capital when they invest.

Then when something bad happens, the cost of capital can shoot up and become higher than the return of capital generated by the previous projects.

These projects can’t sustain in the new environment and thus are destroying capital.

———

This is also true in valuation and VC returns.

The worst VC deals are made during the best of times!

Remember the 2020-21 era? Not hard to destroy some capital if you invest in a SaaS company with 40x P/S during that time.

Read more on SaaS P/S here – The previous 40x P/S sector was SaaS

How do interest rates move during wars?

Interest rate should go up.

Several factors are moving the interest rates up during wars.

  • Governments are borrowing more to fund the war; thus rates are higher
  • Production is impacted thus inflation should be higher
  • Currency can be weaker, as people are moving money to safer places, plus the fear of gov printing money. The higher interest rate is needed to compensate for the FX risk

During WWI, UK interest rose.

Consol (Long-Term Bond) Yields in the United Kingdom moved up as the war progressed:

1913: 3.4275%

1914: 3.4823%

1915: 3.8580%

1916: 4.3165%

1917: 4.5823%

1918: 4.4287%

1919: 4.6372%

However, other factors also play an role. For example, as governments want to keep borrowing costs low, interest rates can be depressed.

During WWII, US effectively ran yield-curve control: the Fed supported Treasury prices to keep yields from rising too much. Fed “assisted the Treasury in this effort by implementing a form of yield curve targeting, capping interest rates at several points along the yield curve: from 3/8 percent on T-bills to 2½ percent on long-term bonds.”