Consumption is a bigger component of China’s GDP than fixed investments

China’s fixed investments in past 5 years

China reported 社会消费品零售总额 Total Retail Sales of Consumer Goods (a narrower concept than consumption) is 501,202 亿元 in 2025, up 3.7% yoy.

China reported 社会消费品零售总额 is 487,895 亿元 in 2024.

From 2020 to 2025, fixed investments % of GDP has lowed from over 50% to 35%.

Meanwhile, 社会消费品零售总额 finally surpassed fixed investments in absolute amount in 2025, by a think margin.


Also see previous post on consumption: When we are saying China needs to boost household consumption

China has a large consumer market but where is growth

Online physical goods consumption cagr is almost 0% from 2023-25. [reported 6.5% and 5.2% growth in 2024 and 2025]

2023年,实物商品网上零售额130174亿元

2024年,实物商品网上零售额130816亿元

2025年,实物商品网上零售额130923亿元


Overall e-commerce growth, which is ~2% cagr 2023-25. [reported 7.2% and 8.6% growth in 2024 and 2025]

2025年,全国网上零售额159722亿元

2023年,全国网上零售额154264亿元


Ex-auto consumption growth is 3.3% cagr 2023-25. [reported 3.8% and 4.4% growth in 2024 and 2025]

2025年,除汽车以外的消费品零售额451413亿元

2023年,除汽车以外的消费品零售额422881亿元


Accumulated CPI is 0.5% from end of 2022 to end of 2025 (36 month).

 

Popmart, holidays and 犒赏经济

Recently, 犒赏经济 has become a hot topic in China. The related articles try to show resilience in consumption and suggest a way to lift consumption.

While I agree with the necessity of this concept, as consumption in China needs to upgrade to “quality consumption” as some may say, I think 犒赏经济 is also trying to avoid some other key issues.

1/ key examples of 犒赏经济 are also lipstick effect.

Usually these articles argue that the rise in blind box toy sale like Popmart is a form of 犒赏经济.

However, if you think about it, Popmart toy is also like high-end brand lipsticks – people are replacing large item luxury purchases (handbags etc.) with smaller items ($20).

The desire to buy luxury products still exist during a bad economy, but people choose to buy stuff that have less impact on their financials.

One common use case of Popmart toy is to attach it to luxury handbags. Adding the “attachment” makes people feel that the handbag is “new” , thus somehow replacing the need to buy a new one.

Other examples of 犒赏经济 can also be lipstick effect.

Buying a nice dessert on the way back home? That’s a replacement for a much more expensive dinner out.

2/ 犒赏经济 tolerates other negative effects on overall consumption like stress or off-times.

Some part of the 犒赏经济 is not to celebrate in my opinion.

The mental stress is usually mentioned as a cause of rise in 犒赏经济, but is that a good thing? Are economists going to argue that in order to drive 犒赏经济, more people need to feel the stress?

Plus, these articles avoided discussions of long working hours and short holidays.

Long working hours is limiting dinner consumption and other 夜间经济.

In most companies in China, young people only get 5 days of annual leave per years. In additional, many companies will ask why you take a leave, and there is no such thing as getting paid for unused leaves. I bet many European people would say that like hundreds of years ago.

In 1936, France introduced law for 2 weeks of paid leave for all workers. This is on top of 9 days of national holiday at that time. The 2 weeks was further raised to 3 weeks in 1956, to 4 weeks in 1969, and to 5 weeks in 1982.

Wonder why concert is more popular than traveling? Because concert is usually in the city or a weekend trip that doesn’t involve taking a leave.

Let me just stop here.

Overall there are huge potentials in consumption in China I believe, and the quality consumption is the way to go. But some limiting factors need to be addressed first.

Real interest rate comparison

China, 2020-2025

  • Real interest rate is mostly in 1-2% post-2020, using 7-day repo repurchase rate.
  • Although overnight rate could be 0.3% lower, real interest rate is still in positive territory.
  • in mid-2022, real interest rate is below 0 due to short-term CPI strength when shanghai is out of lockdown.

US, post dot-com bubble

Real interest rate is below 0%, like -1%.

Fed funds rate

 

December 2001 1.75% 11 rate cuts in a single year to fight the recession.
November 2002 1.25% Further easing as the recovery remained “jobless.”
June 2003 1.00% The Bottom. The lowest rate in 45 years at that time.

CPI

 

2001
177.1
2.8%
2002
179.9
1.6%
2003
184.0
2.3%

 

US, post GFC

Real interest rate is below 0%, frequently below -1%, near -4% in Sep 2011.

Fed fund rate: 0% until Dec 2015, plus QE to keep long term rates low

CPI

 

2009
214.5
-0.4%
2010
218.1
1.6%
2011
224.9
3.2%
2012
229.6
2.1%
 2013
233.0
1.5%
 2014
236.7
1.6%
 2015
237.0
0.1%

 

Real interest rate US vs China

US

10yr treasury: 4.1%

Fed funds rate: 3.50%-3.75%

CPI (Nov): 2.7%

The seasonally adjusted index for all items less food and energy rose 0.2 percent over the 2 months ending in November.

Real interest rate: 1.4% long term, ~1% short term

China

10yr treasury: 1.8%

7-Day Reverse Repo Rate: 1.4%

CPI (Nov): 0.7%

But Nov MoM CPI is -0.1%.

Real interest rate: 1.1% long term, ~0.7% short term

However, China CPI was just 0.2% in Oct and mostly flat or negative yoy before Oct 2025.

Within that, 贵金属饰品 probably contributed 0.3% or more, as gold and silver prices are up significantly.

Thus, China real interest rate is probably around 1.5% or more or long term and 1.1% for short term, which would be similar to the US right now.

Potential 30% decline in new long-term debt

According to PBOC, till Nov 2025, China residents’ long-term debt only increased 1.27 trillion rmb, compared with 1.95 trillion rmb last year.

If Dec 2025 can add 0.3 trillion like last year, it would be ~1.57 trillion rmb, thus down 30% yoy for 2025 vs 2.25 trillion in 2024.

We have already seen 3-year of consecutive decline new this number.

2021: 6.0759 trillion

2022: 3.0566 trillion (-50% yoy)

2023: 2.5507 trillion (-17% yoy)

2024: 2.25 trillion (-12% yoy)

2025: 1.57 trillion (for illustration, -30%)

This is the new additional long-term debt that households are taking, mostly related to mortgages.

This could be negative number.

Existing home prices continue to decline since Apr 2025

Following the previous post on decline in new home sales, here is an update for existing home prices in tier-1 cities in China.

Seven-month of MoM price decline across existing homes in Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen.


Previous notes on existing home prices

Home price continues to fall in June in China

China’s home price continued to weaken MoM

Existing home price index near flattish in Feb 2025 across tier-1 cities

 

China’s ability to add electricity generation capacity

YTD (2025 Nov), China produced electricity generation equipments of 327 GW.

In 2024, that figure was 284 GW.

In 2023, that figure was 234 GW.

Much of this is exported.

But this shows the industrial power – the ability to add new power capacity.

This scale is similar to Japan’s installed base.

Total generating capacity in Japan came to 318.6 GW at the end of fiscal 2022. This consisted of 47.5% thermal power (15.9% coal, 24.8% LNG, and 6.8% oil), 10.4% nuclear power, 15.4% hydro, and 26.0% renewables (excluding hydro).

JEPIC 2024

This is more than many countries installed electricity capacity.

Accelerated yoy decline in new residential sales in China

Previously, since 2024 policy shift (“Sep 24”), China’s housing market has stabilized for 6 month (Oct 2024 to Mar 2025).

However, since Apr 2025, that trend has reversed. Monthly new residential sales saw accelerated decline again.

 

Oct 2025 and Nov 2025 implied monthly new residential sales is down 26% and 28% yoy, vs -1% in the first quarter of 2025.

Several obvious reasons

  • deteriorating macro / increasing uncertainty after US tariff
  • no meaningful policy supply
  • high base in 4q24

How do interest rates move during wars?

Interest rate should go up.

Several factors are moving the interest rates up during wars.

  • Governments are borrowing more to fund the war; thus rates are higher
  • Production is impacted thus inflation should be higher
  • Currency can be weaker, as people are moving money to safer places, plus the fear of gov printing money. The higher interest rate is needed to compensate for the FX risk

During WWI, UK interest rose.

Consol (Long-Term Bond) Yields in the United Kingdom moved up as the war progressed:

1913: 3.4275%

1914: 3.4823%

1915: 3.8580%

1916: 4.3165%

1917: 4.5823%

1918: 4.4287%

1919: 4.6372%

However, other factors also play an role. For example, as governments want to keep borrowing costs low, interest rates can be depressed.

During WWII, US effectively ran yield-curve control: the Fed supported Treasury prices to keep yields from rising too much. Fed “assisted the Treasury in this effort by implementing a form of yield curve targeting, capping interest rates at several points along the yield curve: from 3/8 percent on T-bills to 2½ percent on long-term bonds.”