China core CPI has been running near 1% for more than 12 month

China Aug core CPI stood at 1% yoy, the 13th month of running near 1% since Aug 2025.

What were the drivers and policies?

From late 2025 to first half of 2025, trade-in subsidies boost final demand.

Anti-revolution was a focus. On July 1, 2025, Xi chaired the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting. It explicitly called for governing disorderly low-price competition and facilitating an orderly exit of outdated capacity. Plus, the July 30 Politburo meeting went further calling to deal with disorderly competition and conduct capacity governance in key industries.

But in the second half of 2025, there was still contribution from previous metals (Jul 2025: gold and platinum jewelry contributed ~0.22ppt to headline CPI), which should be more of a one-off boost.

From Sep 2025 to 2026, China started and expanded government interest subsidy.

Interest and mortgage rates after housing crisis in Japan, US, HK

 

Property bust Policy/short rate response Mortgage rate
US 2006–09 Fed funds cut to 0–0.25% Dec. 2008 No major reduction during crisis, but later declined to 3–4%
Japan 1990s BOJ adopted near zero policy rate in Feb. 1999 Government housing loans reached 2% in late 1998
Hong Kong 1997–2003 Initially rates went UP, not down, because of HKD peg pressure; reached Different subsidized schemes; can be 0% up to certain point for first home buyers

 


Japan

Japan’s property bubble peaked around 1990–91, but the BOJ took a long time to reach zero.

In the four years between 1991 and 1995, the official discount rate was cut from 6 percent to 0.5 percent. Before 1994 financial-market deregulation, the discount rate was the principal policy instrument. Deposit and lending rates were administratively linked to it.

On February 12, 1999, the BOJ changed its operating guideline to push the uncollateralized overnight call rate “as low as possible.” It said it would initially aim for around 0.15%, then induce a further decline.

By May 1999, the actual overnight call rate was about 0.03%, which the BOJ itself described as “virtually zero percent” after taking brokerage fees into account.

Meanwhile, the mortgage rate was cut continuously to 2% in last 1998 and kept under 3% for a long time.


US

US housing peaked around mid 2006 (Case-Shiller National Index peaked in July 2006). Total housing starts peaked earlier in January 2006 at 2.273 million, and February 2006 was the first down month at 2.119 million. The financial system is still functioning normally; Fed funds remains 5.25%.

On April 2, 2007, New Century files bankruptcy – subprime origination itself is breaking. Soon afterward, mortgage securities suffer widespread downgrades and nonprime mortgage funding dries up.

During June–July 2007, Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed. Mortgage losses are visibly migrating from homeowners/lenders into structured-credit investors.

On September 18, 2007, Fed starts cutting rates by 50bps, from 5.25% to 4.75%.

Fed also did 50 bps cut in Dec 2007, 75 bps emergence cut in Jan 2008, another 50 bps before end of Jan 2008, 75 bps cut in Mar 2008 (as Bear Stearns itself went into trouble and merged into JP Morgan), 25 bps cut in Apr 2008. At that point, Fed fund rate target became 2%.

On December 16, 2008, Fed reached Fed reaches effective ZLB by targeting 0-0.25%.

It took 2.5 years from the peak of housing price.

On the mortgage rate side, in 2008 during the acute Lehman/AIG crisis, mortgage rates were still roughly 6–6.5%.

However, that collapsed to 3.3% in 2012.


HK

From October 1997 to July 2003, property prices fell by 66%.

Source: link

 

Event Date Property price
Bubble peak Oct. 1997 R&VD residential index = 172.9 (1999=100)
Asian crisis / HKD attack Oct. 1997 Rates spike; property selloff begins
1998 Very sharp first leg down
1999–2002 Continued deflation / recessionary adjustment
SARS Mar–Jun 2003 Final leg of weakness
Bottom July 2003 ~66% below Oct-1997 peak
Recovery begins H2 2003 Prices rebound rapidly

Hong Kong was a different story as it’s interest rate is not independent, so it doesn’t have as much flexibility to cut rates.

But HK did have other programs to support homebuyers to essentially subsidize mortgages.

Scheme Started Who it targeted Form of subsidy
Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) 1988, expanded sharply in 1998 PRH tenants / lower-middle-income households 0% interest government loan, or non-repayable monthly mortgage subsidy
Home Starter Loan Scheme (HSLS) Apr 1998 First-time middle/lower-income buyers Low-interest government down-payment loan, up to HK$600k / 30% of property
Mortgage Subsidy Scheme (MSS) Sep 1998 Certain redevelopment/clearance households buying HOS/PSPS Mortgage subsidy up to HK$162k over 6 years
Buy or Rent Option (BRO) Jul 1999 Eligible PRH applicants choosing ownership instead Mortgage subsidy up to HK$162k over 6 years
Home Assistance Loan Scheme (HALS) Jan 2003 Replacement/consolidation scheme 0% loan or monthly mortgage subsidy

 

The Home Purchase Loan Scheme existed before the crash, from 1988, but Hong Kong massively expanded it in 1998.

It offered an interest-free government loan alongside the bank mortgage. Before the crisis:

  • private-housing / White Form families: HK$400k at 0%
  • public-housing / Green Form tenants: HK$600k at 0%
  • repayment could extend up to 20 years

Alternatively, borrowers could choose a non-repayable monthly subsidy instead of the loan.

 

Then in July 1998, after property prices had collapsed, the Housing Authority increased the annual quota from 4,500 to 10,000 and added larger/flexible loan options.

By 1999–2000 the enhanced options were:

  • Green Form: HK$800k at 0% over 13 years, or HK$600k over 20 years
  • White Form: HK$500k at 0% over 14 years, or HK$400k over 20 years

Alternatively:

  • Green Form: HK$5,100/month for 4 years
  • White Form: HK$3,400/month for 4 years

and those monthly subsidies did not have to be repaid.

An interesting perspective on China’s investment and consumption from Shan Weijian

The full interview is here.

Shan’s overarching thesis is that China’s consumption potential hasn’t been fully released.

He argued that China’s property problem was a drag, but housing price looks stabling, citing 2026 Jan to May Shanghai housing price up.

Further, he argued that nation wide housing rental yield is 2.8% and is meaningfully higher than China’ sovereign debt yield, which makes housing interesting as an asset class.

The argument on cost of construction has some merit, but that includes cost of land.

The part of 买涨不买跌 and 卖跌不卖涨 is a bit confusing to me as this is more short-term psychology influencing supply demand but not fundamentals.

I have a different opinion.

I think to housing has stabilized is probably pre-mature.

Some positive drivers can be short-lived, such as

– a good A-share stock market in 1H2026 (CSI300 17.66% in 2025 and 7.55% in 1H26, STAR50 60.86% in 2025 and 64.25 in 1H26)

the large number of IPOs in HK and A-share,

– policy driven demand – such as “Shanghai seven measures” in Feb 2026; Shanghai gov recently introduced new measures to support housing market.

—-

Assume housing stabilization is true, which definitely has positive impact on consumption, it doesn’t necessarily mean consumption will be up.

There are many other factors, including confidence in the job market and income level, savings for retirement and healthcare, culture etc.

—-

However, I do sense that Chinese gov is doing more to stabilize housing price and consumption, although policy is not at a stimulating level.

And I do agree Chinese gov has more capacity / more policy in the toolbox.

Bond yield becomes a topic? looks fine for Europe

Benchmark 10-year yield ranges:

Period Germany Italy Spain Background
Late 1970s–1980s 6–11% 10–14% 11–14% High inflation and nominal growth
Early 1990s peak ~9% 14.2% 14.0% Currency/ERM crisis
2000–07 3–5% 3.5–5.5% 3.5–5.5% Euro convergence
2011–12 crisis peak ~2% 7.3% ~7.6% Euro break-up/default risk
2020–21 low −0.8% 0.45% Around 0% ECB QE and pandemic policy
August 2026 3.26% 4.08% 3.72% Fiscal expansion, inflation and supply

How did European stocks perform?

 

Year STOXX Europe 600 price return Total return Broad environment
1988 +22.2% +25.4% Growth and yields rising
1989 +24.5% +28.0% Reunification optimism
1990 −17.8% −15.3% Bund yields/rates peak; recession fears
1991 +12.5% +15.8% Partial recovery
1992 +1.6% +5.8% ERM currency crisis
1993 +35.9% +40.7% Rate cuts and collapsing yields

 

Index 2011 2012
STOXX Europe 600 price −11.3% +14.4%
STOXX Europe 600 total return −8.6% +18.2%
Germany DAX −14.7% +29.1%
Italy −25.2% +7.8%
Spain IBEX −13.1% −4.7%

Note that 2011-12 is different – one key evidence is German yield yield was falling, while now it’s rising in 2026. Note that 2012 stock increased due to euro-breakup crisis being contained.

Germany’s 10-year yield has increased from about 2.86% at end-2025 to 3.26%, or roughly +40 bp YTD.

Year-end Germany Italy Spain STOXX 600 price return
2008 3.05% 4.47% 3.86% −45.6%
2009 3.14% 4.01% 3.80% +28.0%
2010 2.91% 4.60% 5.37% +8.6%
2011 1.93% 6.81% 5.50% −11.3%
Jul-12 1.24% 6.00% 6.80% Crisis peak
2012 year-end 1.30% 4.54% 5.34% +14.4%

 

Governments, tax, shareholders

Isn’t governments the invisible shareholder of all corporations?

Say tax is 25% , essentially gov will take 25 of 100 profit before tax, and the rest $75 are called profit after tax and is distributed to shareholders.

Does it sound odd?

Isn’t governments essentially a permanent 25% shareholder of the company, and the ratio is net by itself.

How convenient.

Btw, shareholders are should give their shares a 25% hair cut.. if they own 50% of a company, they just own 37.5% in case of 25% tax.

Nvidia and BTC

Following the previous post that Nvidia is the central bank, Nvidia also has an interesting relation with BTC.

As Nvidia and compute technology improve, miners buy newer and more expensive machines to stay competitive. Because everyone can access the same better technology, the advantage is quickly competed away through higher hash rates and mining difficulty.

As a result, miners collectively spend more capital to compete for the same fixed amount of new Bitcoin. Higher industry-wide mining costs mean miners require higher BTC prices to justify that investment, creating upward pressure on the Bitcoin price.

The better the Nvidia mining revenue, the higher the BTC price!

In previous mode: larger nominal economy + more dollars + higher price level -> higher nominal gold price

How similar!

Nvidia is the central bank

Token is an asset.

Your account has a number – the number of tokens you can use.

Those tokens can be used to do anything. You either get what you want from tokens, or you make something out of tokens and sell / exchange it for other stuff.

It’s an asset that is so versatile that is like “money”.

In accounting, money is an asset.

In economy, money is the medium of exchange.

Tokens are like money in those regards.

Token factories are like banks.

The factory prints tokens with electricity.

Nvidia’s servers, at the frontier, determines the speed of inflation.

If Nvidia’s next gen servers are too good and sells cheap, token can be printed fast! Thus the token on hand can be depreciated.

In that sense, Nvdia is like Fed that controls inflation.