Chinese companies share-based compensation (2)

See previous Chinese companies share-based compensation (1)

 

Baidu ($BIDU)

2023

FCF: 25,424 mn rmb

SBC: 6,345 mn rmb, or 25% of FCF

Note: FCF improved over the last two years

 

iQiyi ($IQ), a subsidiary of Baidu

2023

FCF: 3,315 mn rmb

SBC: 637 mn rmb, or 19% of FCF

Note: 1) FCF turned positive in 2023. 2) Capex defined by mgmt is narrow – only “fixed assets”; note that acquisition of intangible assets is higher than acquisition of fixed assets.

iQiyi does say that “Capital expenditures are incurred primarily in connection with construction in process, computers and servers.”

Chinese companies share-based compensation (1)

It’s important to calculate FCF ex-SBC.

SBC is a real cost of business and equity holders should be aware of the dilution.

Sometimes, buyback is smaller of SBC so shouldn’t be touted too much. Net buyback is more important.

This is a series of posts. Starting with Kuaishou and Bilibili.

Side note: FCF/Capex is defined by companies if they present, which could be subject.

Kuaishou (HK.1024)

2023

FCF: 15,881 mn rmb

SBC: 3,570 mn rmb, or 22% of FCF

Note: SBC has down as stock prices are down. FCF improved; was negative in 2022

Bilibili ($BILI)

2023

FCF: -1,033 mn rmb (negative FCF)

SBC: 1,133mn rmb (as FCF is negative, SBC is making it more negative)

Note: SBC is flattish over past 3 years. FCF improved over 2022 (-6,611 mn rmb), but still negative in 2023.

Stock prices are telling stories

There seems to be a more diverse purposes of stock prices theses days.

And trading prices are really interesting political/geopolitical storytellers.

Here are some recent examples:

1/ $DJT: This is obvious as the name of the company indicated. The financial obligation that Trump is facing also makes the market cap important.

 

2/ $META: This is partially an indicator of TikTok ban sentiment/probability I feel.

 

3/ $INTC: Bringing back high-end semi mfg to the US.

 

One could argue that the prices are moving based on narratives, rather than earnings; however, it’s true that different policies could change companies’ fundamentals in a big way.

Ukraine, NATO, Rolls-Royce

I haven’t posted anything on this issue.

One logic that was less discussed:

Back in 2014, NATO leaders agreed to increase spending towards 2% of their GDP on defense within a decade.

But this hasn’t been achieved.

Here is 2023 number

And previously, for example

2021

2018

US may feel it’s less willing to over-spend for the long run.

And it’s mostly a question for European countries. How much they should spend on defense?

Europe’s overall economy and finance situation doesn’t seem very strong, compared to the US.

Maybe the GFC created too large a problem that took years to truly recover.

Ukraine may be the catalyst that really makes EU leaders to rethink about defense.

Rolls-Royce stock has been more than tripled in 2023! And continue to rise in 2024.

Of course, the end of covid helped a lot.

But Rolls-Royce is indeed a very important defense company for EU.

Defense segment op. profit is 35% of the total, up 30% in 2023, with 14% op. margin.

2024 guidance: underlying operating profit between £1.7bn and £2.0b!

That’s 25% growth if hit the upper end.

2023 NOPAT £1.4bn -> 2024 of £1.7bn? or $2.1bn?

Then it’s at above ~20x NOPAT, not cheap but can still go up.

Nio real net cash position (21q4 – 23q4)

Interest charting…

if we exclude restricted cash, and cash borrowed from WC, and recent equity injection, here is Nio’s quarterly end net cash position.

What’s the problem?

  • declining/pressure gross profit level (GP per car x volume) due to fierce competition & macro backdrop doesn’t support strong demand
  • increasing opex & capex (autonomous driving, chips, international expansion, new sub-brand, battery swap stations etc.) with a limited gross profit level.

Netflix: there is a lot to like

Besides a single quarterly earnings beat, there are many things investor like. Netflix can appeal to both defensive and offensive investors.

1/ a stable positive FCF

For several quarters in a row, Netflix has delivered $1.5bn+ FCF/qtr, and expects 2024 FCF to be ~$6bn. Positive FCF is crucially important in today’s high-interest rate environment.

Btw, Netflix doesn’t need massive capex and doesn’t worry about utilization etc. However, Netflix does need to spend on contents.

This FCF is built upon a $17bn cash spend budget on content for 2024.

If not for the $1B in delayed spending due to the WGA and SAG-AFTRA strikes, 2024 FCF should be $7bn.

$7bn with 4-5% required fcf yield implies a $140-175bn market cap, which was where Netflix was trading at in 2023.

2/ growing TAM

Investors like an expanding TAM – like Amazon’s flying wheel model.

Internationalization was the first step: 2012 Netflix had <5mn paid subscriptions (incl. Canada).

By the end of 2023 (in 11 years), Netflix has ~180mn paid members outside of US & Canada – a more than 36-fold increase.

Now, Netflix has pretty interesting upside in non-video streaming businesses: such as ads and gaming.

“It’s a $600B+ opportunity revenue market across pay TV, film, games and
branded advertising — and today Netflix accounts for only roughly 5% of that addressable market”

2023q4 Netflix letter to shareholders

3/ Shareholder return

2023Q1 buyback: $400mn

2023Q2 buyback: $645mn

2023Q3 buyback: $2.5bn

2023Q4 buyback: $2.5bn

Its capital allocation strategy:

The first priority for our cash is to reinvest in our core business
and to fund new opportunities like gaming and ads, followed by selective acquisitions;

Target maintaining minimum cash equivalent to roughly two months of revenue (e.g., about $5.4B based on Q1 revenue).

After meeting those needs, we anticipate returning cash to stockholders through share repurchases.

Can you invest in Chinese stocks these days?

Chinese companies’ stock price dropped sharply in the recent months, which seems to be an opportunity for entry. Should people take it?

We need to address a few questions.

Why the drop?

On the surface, China’s economy is entering a slow/no growth mode, with a deteriorating global business environment (especially towards China).

More recently, the sell-off accelerated as many retail investors were “forced” to deleverage. It’s not obvious, but on the personal finance level:

1) home prices declines triggered deleverage, where most Chinese families store most of their wealth. Especially for those who had taken out home equity in the forms of loans when housing prices were peaking in 2021, refinancing at similar level is nearly impossible now. To fill the gap, they need to sell other assets, or to give up the house for auction. Those who had bought stocks using the home equity are likely to suffer big losses in this process.

2) many high-yield investment products have stopped functioning, which may indicate potential meaningful loss in income and principle (those products are likely to have links to real estate developers or equity markets). If people were dependent on those investment products, it’s could cause troubles in personal finance which leads to deleverage.

Therefore, the buying power directly or indirectly built upon people’s home loans or purchases of investment products is liquidating.

 

Why bother to buy? 

1/ Their are still unique companies / business models / edges that’s hard to find elsewhere.

e.g. CATL is still the most efficient and large-scale battery producer, with profits. There are geopolitical concerns but CATL is also building capacities overseas. If the edge in production over others can sustain, and it can grow overseas in a way that local authorities endorse, it looks to be an investable business.

More specifically, the criteria I would argue is that its products or services are incrementally positive to the global economy, or is unique on the global stage, not just among Chinese peers.

In another word, some companies are still a valuable part of global economy, so investors don’t necessarily need to be interested in China, and may choose to hedge some beta/macro risk.

2/ Valuation has come close to global standard.

When you can easily get a 4%+ risk-free rate in savings, it requires a much higher rate for Chinese equities to be attractive.

Depending on risk appetite, 15x p/e implies 6.7% earnings yield, and 12x implies 8.3% earnings yield.

E.g. CATL is around 15x LTM p/e, although we need to see if it’s sustainable as battery prices dropped pretty dramatically. The point is if it’s a normalized 15x p/e for a globally unique business and is growing, it does offer some value to a portfolio.

MSCI China 2023 EPS growth expectation vs. reality

MSCI China EPS in CNY terms from 2023 Q1-Q3 is 1.08, 1.23, 1.25, growing 3.85%, 1.65%, 2.46% yoy.

While reversing the downtrend in 2022, the growth is less than expected. Even with 23q4 current expectation of 9% growth yoy, MSCI China EPS growth is ~4.3% for the full-year 2023.

What was the expectation at the end of 2022 / early 2023?

Let’s take a look:

UBS (Nov/Dec 2022) – “We expect significant easing in COVID-19 restrictions in the second quarter. We forecast earnings growth of 15%-20% for MSCI China, which would be underpinned by lower commodity prices, improved economic growth and lower asset write-downs,”

Morgan Stanley (EPS growth in 2023: 12% -> 13% -> 16%) – for 2023 YE MSCI China Index target, in Nov 2022 report it was 59; raised to 70 in Dec 2022; raised again to 80 in Jan 2023

Goldman Sachs (Dec 2022) – “revise up our earnings forecasts to 13% from 8%” (the link is a report in Jan 2023 but revision is made in Dec 2022.

Citi (Jan 2023) – “expects earnings per share for the MSCI China index to grow 15% year-over-year in 2023. ”

The outcome is the big miss in earnings. We are like to see ~2% 2023 EPS growth in reality vs. expectation of ~15% at the beginning of the year

 

 

Commercial real estate problems summary

A good summary from Rob Stuckey, head of Carlyle’s U.S. real estate funds, on US office building weakness, from Insights and Indicators podcast by Carlyle:

  1. Already weak before pandemic
    • oversupplied
    • low operating margin
    • high correction to GDP / exposure to macro cyclicality
  2. Secular trend of work-from-home / technology trend

Factors to value real estate

  • demand drivers (macro/GDP, demographics)
  • technology
  • operating margin (high maintenance/recurring capital expenditure)
  • tenant stickiness (demand ever increasing)

 

Tesla SOTP… $360bn?

Two biggest component would be electric vehicles and AI.

EV: BYD is <$100bn; BYD delivered higher profits than Tesla; BYD also has energy storage business

AI Models (FSD): OpenAI is <$100bn; latest valuation appeared to be $86bn

AI Chips: AMD is ~$160bn. Tesla should be years behind in terms of external revenue profits (as a business) etc. Let’s just use $160bn, as Tesla has some other business.

Then it sums up to be $360bn = $100bn + $100bn + $160bn

Last time I checked (before earnings), it’s more than doubling that number…


Robots? Boston Dynamics was $1.1bn back in Dec 2020.

Charging? ChargePoint ($CHPT) is ~$1bn market cap.

If someone wants to add ride-hailing services I mean Lyft is <$5bn, not significant.

Even additionally add Enphase and First Solar, which were ~$13bn and $16bn, still not big enough to move the needle.

Insurance could be big. However, if it’s not good enough/taking over now, why it should be in the future? It shouldn’t be a futuristic thing; auto insurance has a history of over 100 years.


$400bn or lower sounds about right.