US hyperscalers drawdown from peak

 

Company Peak close Subsequent bottom close Peak-to-bottom drawdown
Oracle (ORCL) $328.33 — Sep. 10, 2025 $140.27 — Jul. 2, 2026 −57.3%
Microsoft (MSFT) $542.07 — Oct. 28, 2025 $352.83 — Jun. 25, 2026 −34.9%
Meta (META) $790.00 — Aug. 12, 2025 $525.72 — Mar. 27, 2026 −33.5%
Amazon (AMZN) $274.99 — May 6, 2026 $227.01 — Jun. 25, 2026 −17.4%
Alphabet (GOOGL) $402.62 — May 13, 2026 $337.39 — Jun. 26, 2026 −16.2%

Technically meta was not a hyperscaler.

FCF turning negative and shifting to memory makers is the biggest concern.

The Rise and Fall of Gold: From the Asian Financial Crisis to 2013

Gold’s journey is a textbook of financial / world history. The cycle developed in stages: the end of a long bear market, the monetary response to the dot-com crash, China’s commodity boom, the 2008 financial crisis, the Eurozone debt crisis, and finally the reversal of the crisis-era gold trade.

Chapter 1: The Asian Financial Crisis

The metal averaged roughly $332 per ounce in 1997, fell below $300 during 1998, and remained depressed through the end of the decade.

At first glance, this appears strange. A financial crisis should seemingly increase demand for a safe asset such as gold. What happened exactly?

What is the nature of this crisis? Asian banks and corporations across the region had borrowed heavily in dollars, often at short maturities. When foreign capital suddenly left, local currencies collapsed and borrowers urgently needed dollars to repay their debts. The IMF describes how a sudden reversal of capital flows pushed Asian currencies into a downward spiral and left many dollar borrowers insolvent.

That created intense demand for the dollar itself and dollar rose dramatically against asian currencies. Because gold is quoted internationally in dollars, dollar strength placed downward pressure on the USD gold price. The crisis also weakened incomes and jewelry demand across important Asian gold-consuming markets.

Western central-bank behavior added further pressure. During the 1990s, European reserve managers sold or lent substantial amounts of gold. The World Gold Council says persistent official selling helped push gold toward $250 per ounce and eventually led to the 1999 Washington Agreement, which limited coordinated sales.

Plus, this was a period with high Fed interest rate. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) raised the intended federal funds rate to 5.5% in March 1997 and held it steady for over a year. As the crisis caused a “flight to safety” and threatened the US economy through spillovers like the Long-Term Capital Management collapse, the Fed cut rates three times between September and December 1998 by a total of 0.75% – but still not low as compared with periods after dot-com bubble burst.

Yet gold did not necessarily fail as a safe asset for Asian households. The correct measure was not simply gold in dollars, but gold in local currency:

Local gold price = USD gold price × local-currency price of the dollar.

If gold declined 10% in dollars while a local currency lost 50% of its value, gold would still rise sharply in that local currency. Someone who already owned gold before the devaluation could preserve purchasing power even though the international dollar price of gold was falling.

The problem was timing. Once a currency had collapsed, gold immediately became much more expensive locally. Households facing unemployment, debt repayments or bank failures often needed to sell existing gold for liquidity rather than buy more. Gold was therefore effective insurance for those who held it before the crisis, but it was not a cheap hedge that everyone could purchase after the panic had begun.

The Asian crisis showed that “safe haven” is a relative concept. During a scramble for dollar liquidity, the dollar can outperform gold internationally. At the same time, gold can still protect investors against the collapse of their own currency.

Chapter 2: The Dot-Com Bubble Burst

A first institutional turning point came on September 26, 1999, when European central banks announced the Washington Agreement on Gold. The agreement followed concern that uncoordinated central-bank sales were “destabilising the market, driving the gold price sharply down.”

However, gold did not immediately enter a sustained bull market. U.S. technology stocks were booming, the dollar remained strong, and the Federal Reserve was tightening monetary policy.

When the dot-com bubble peaked in March 2000, gold traded at approximately $285–290 per ounce. Rather than rallying immediately as technology shares collapsed, gold continued to weaken.

The Fed raised the federal-funds target to 6.0% on March 21, 2000, and then to 6.5% on May 16. High cash yields and a strong dollar made non-yielding gold relatively unattractive.

Gold eventually fell toward approximately $256–260 per ounce in Mar/Apr 2001. Gold bottoms about 13 months after the Nasdaq peak, not at the same time.Its delayed response demonstrated that gold is not simply the inverse of technology stocks. The initial bursting of an equity bubble was insufficient to produce a gold bull market while monetary policy remained restrictive.

Chapter 3: Fed Easing, 9/11, China’s WTO Entry, and China-Led Commodity Cycle

The decisive monetary shift came in 2001. As the technology downturn spread into the wider economy, the Fed began cutting rates in January 2021. The federal-funds target fell from 6.5% in late 2000 to 1.75% by December 2001, and later reached 1% in June 2003.

Gold began recovering as investors anticipated lower returns on cash, weaker economic growth and an eventual decline in the dollar. Lower nominal and expected real rates begin reducing the opportunity cost of holding gold. The market starts anticipating a sustained easy-money regime.

 

Fed decision date Cut New target Gold AM fix Gold PM fix
Jan. 3, 2001 −50 bp 6.00% $269.00 $267.15
Jan. 31, 2001 −50 bp 5.50% $266.20 $264.50
Mar. 20, 2001 −50 bp 5.00% $262.60 $261.55
Apr. 18, 2001 −50 bp 4.50% $260.10 $258.85
May 15, 2001 −50 bp 4.00% $268.05 $266.60
Jun. 27, 2001 −25 bp 3.75% $276.00 $274.80
Aug. 21, 2001 −25 bp 3.50% $276.95 $276.30
Sep. 17, 2001 −50 bp 3.00% $291.00 $293.25
Oct. 2, 2001 −50 bp 2.50% $291.10 $291.65
Nov. 6, 2001 −50 bp 2.00% $278.90 $278.95
Dec. 11, 2001 −25 bp 1.75% $272.60 $272.20

The September 11 attacks increased safe-haven demand and prompted additional monetary easing.

In 2001, gold held above its April 2001 low but remained only around the high-$270s at year-end.

A second structural change arrived when China joined the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2001. The WTO later described the accession as a “pivotal event,” noting that accession-related reforms contributed to China’s economic transformation and modernization.

China’s WTO entry did not cause a one-day surge in gold. Its importance was prospective. Financial markets began anticipating years of export growth, foreign investment, factory construction, infrastructure spending and urbanization.

That expectation was especially powerful for oil, copper, iron ore and other industrial commodities. Gold’s relationship was less direct, but it participated in the broader commodity allocation as investors began treating commodities as a distinct asset class.

From 2002 through 2008, gold rose every calendar year on a year-end basis.

Year Annual average Year-end price Year-end return
2002 $310 $342.75 +24.0%
2003 $363 $417.25 +21.7%
2004 $410 $435.60 +4.4%
2005 $445 $513.00 +17.8%
2006 $604 about $636 +24%
2007 $695 about $836 +32%
2008 $872 about $870 +4%

From 2002 onward, gold rose alongside the commodity supercycle. It benefited from Chinese growth, a weakening dollar, higher energy prices, geopolitical uncertainty and an expanding investor allocation to commodities.

The launch of exchange-traded gold products also made the market more accessible. SPDR Gold Shares began trading in the United States in November 2004, allowing investors to gain gold exposure without directly storing bars or coins.

This period cannot simply be described as one of continuously falling interest rates. The Fed raised the federal-funds target from 1% in 2004 to 5.25% in June 2006. Gold nevertheless continued rising because dollar weakness, commodity inflation and investment demand remained supportive.

Chapter 4: The 2008 Global Financial Crisis, The 2011 Eurozone Debt Crisis

The 2008 Global Financial Crisis then changed the nature of the bull market. Gold initially declined during the most intense liquidation as investors sold assets to raise cash. But the collapse of major financial institutions, near-zero policy rates and large-scale central-bank asset purchases turned gold from a commodity-cycle investment into a hedge against systemic and monetary risk. Investors became concerned that quantitative easing, government deficits and rapidly expanding central-bank balance sheets could eventually weaken paper currencies.

The European sovereign-debt crisis and the 2011 downgrade of U.S. government debt reinforced demand for monetary insurance.

On April 23, 2010, Greece formally requested EU-IMF assistance.

In July 2011, euro-area leaders accepted private-sector participation in a second Greek rescue—effectively acknowledging that sovereign bondholders could take losses. This restructuring was widely seen as “voluntary” in name only. Eurozone governments and the IMF made it clear that Greece would default completely without this deal – private banks and investors faced total loss if they refused to participate.. Mainstream financial institutions were heavily pressured by their own national governments to accept the terms.

Soon afterward, yields on Italian and Spanish debt surged, forcing the ECB to resume bond purchases on 7 August 2011. This was the more powerful moment for gold. The crisis was no longer about whether tiny Greece could repay its debts; it was about whether Italy, Spain, European banks and the euro itself could survive.

On August 5, 2011, Standard & Poor’s cut the United States’ long-term sovereign rating from AAA to AA+, the first such downgrade by S&P. Gold surged above $1,770 within days.

By September 2011, gold had risen to almost $1,900 per ounce, with the intraday price briefly reaching approximately $1,921.

In noticeable decline of gold price in later part of 2011 can be explained by crowded positions, some of the worst sovereign fears temporarily easing and Feb extending the maturity of its bond holdings.

As volatility increased, CME raised the collateral required to hold gold-futures positions. A September 23 notice raised speculative initial margin on standard gold futures from $9,450 to $11,475 per contract, effective September 26, 2011. Leveraged traders therefore had to contribute more cash or close positions, intensifying the late-September fall.

During autumn 2011, European leaders advanced a second Greek rescue, bank-recapitalization plans and a larger proposed Greek haircut. Those measures did not solve the crisis, but periodically reduced immediate tail risk. Gold fell on September 15 after European leaders reiterated their commitment to keeping Greece in the euro, encouraging a temporary shift from safe havens into risk assets.

The Fed’s QE2 Treasury-purchase program ended in June 2011. In September, the Fed announced Operation Twist—extending the maturity of its bond holdings—but it did not initially expand the balance sheet in the same way as QE1 or QE2.

Year Annual average Year-end close Annual return
2008 $871.96 $869.75 +4.0%
2009 $972.35 $1,087.50 +25.0%
2010 $1,224.53 $1,420.25 +30.6%
2011 $1,571.52 $1,531.00 +7.8%

In Feb 2012, the subsequent Greece restructuring abandoned the voluntary facade entirely. Greece retroactively inserted laws forcing all bondholders to accept losses if a majority agreed. This forced mechanism triggered insurance payouts (Credit Default Swaps), proving the financial markets viewed it as an involuntary default.

The Greek debt crisis stabilized in mid-2012 from a market standpoint – the acute panic that threatened to destroy the Eurozone was stopped when European Central Bank (ECB) President Mario Draghi famously declared that the ECB would do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro.

Gold price rose by ~9% in 2012.

Chapter 5: Gold Collapsed in 2013

Gold remained elevated in 2012, but its underlying investment thesis was weakening. The banking system was stabilizing, the U.S. economy was recovering and the large inflation surge feared after quantitative easing had not materialized.

In 2013, investors began anticipating that the Federal Reserve would reduce its bond purchases. Expectations of tapering pushed Treasury and real yields higher, increasing the opportunity cost of owning an asset that pays no interest.

At the same time, confidence in the U.S. recovery improved and equities rallied. Gold was no longer required to provide the same degree of crisis insurance.

Selling through exchange-traded funds magnified the move. Western investors who had accumulated gold during the post-2008 crisis began liquidating positions. Strong buying of jewelry, bars and coins in China and India absorbed large quantities of physical metal, but could not fully offset institutional ETF selling.

Gold ended 2013 down approximately 28%, ending a 12-year sequence of annual gains.

Epilogue

The 2013 decline represented the reversal of the forces that had driven the bull market.

Gold had benefited first from the end of central-bank selling, then from Fed easing and dollar weakness, then from China’s commodity cycle, and finally from fears surrounding the global financial system and unconventional monetary policy.

In 2013, those conditions reversed: real yields rose, confidence recovered and investors began dismantling the crisis-era gold trade.

The complete cycle can therefore be understood in five stages:

1997–1999: Asian currency crisis, dollar strength and central-bank selling depressed gold in USD terms, although gold still protected many local-currency holders.

2000–2001: The dot-com bubble burst, but gold remained weak until the Fed moved decisively from tightening to easing.

2001–2007: China’s WTO accession, dollar weakness and the commodity supercycle supported a broad gold bull market.

2008–2011: The financial crisis, quantitative easing and sovereign-risk concerns transformed gold into monetary insurance.

2013: Rising real yields and improving confidence triggered ETF liquidation and the collapse of the crisis-era trade.

Year Annual average Year-end close Annual return
1997 $331.02 $287.05 −22.2%
1998 $294.24 $288.70 +0.6%
1999 $278.98 $290.25 +0.5%
2000 $279.11 $272.65 −6.1%
2001 $271.04 $276.50 +1.4%
2002 $309.73 $342.75 +24.0%
2003 $363.38 $417.25 +21.7%
2004 $409.72 $435.60 +4.4%
2005 $444.74 $513.00 +17.8%
2006 $603.46 $635.70 +23.9%
2007 $695.39 $836.50 +31.6%
2008 $871.96 $869.75 +4.0%
2009 $972.35 $1,087.50 +25.0%
2010 $1,224.53 $1,420.25 +30.6%
2011 $1,571.52 $1,531.00 +7.8%
2012 $1,668.98 $1,664.00 +8.7%
2013 $1,411.23 $1,204.50 −27.6%

Large IPO’s impact on peers

PL and ASTS peaked about 2 weeks before SpaceX IPO.

Micron peaked about 2 weeks before SK Hynix ADR listing.

Samsung peaked about 3 weeks before SK Hynix ADR listing.

It’s interesting, isn’t it?

I looked it up for other similar events.

Visa was different.

Mastercard stock rose with Visa debut.

PetroChina A-Share IPO

 

Chapter 1 – The World’s Fastest-Growing Economy

At the beginning of the 21st century, China was transforming faster than any major economy in modern history.

After joining the WTO in 2001, factories spread across the country. Steel mills, cement plants, highways, airports and apartment towers appeared almost overnight. GDP grew at roughly 10–14% annually. Millions of people bought cars for the first time. Every additional factory required electricity; every truck consumed diesel; every construction site demanded asphalt.

China’s oil consumption reflected this transformation.

Between 2000 and 2007, Chinese oil demand nearly doubled, growing from roughly 4.8 million barrels per day to over 7.5 million barrels per day. China became the second-largest oil consumer in the world after the United States.

At the same time, global supply struggled to keep pace.

Years of underinvestment following the late-1990s oil collapse left little spare production capacity. Geopolitical risks—including the Iraq War, unrest in Nigeria, and concerns about Iran—added further uncertainty. Commodity investors began describing the period as the beginning of a “commodity supercycle.”

Crude oil rose relentlessly:

  • 2002: around US$20–30/bbl
  • 2004: above US$40
  • 2005: above US$60
  • 2006: around US$70
  • Mid-2007: above US$75
  • July 2008: eventually reaching US$147/bbl

To many investors, there seemed to be only one conclusion:

China would continue growing forever.

Oil prices would continue rising forever.

Therefore, oil companies would become permanently more profitable.


Chapter 2 – The Perfect National Champion

Among Chinese companies, none symbolized this story better than PetroChina.

Unlike many newly listed private companies, PetroChina represented ownership of China’s most strategic industry.

It controlled massive upstream oil reserves, pipelines, refineries and distribution assets.

To domestic investors, buying PetroChina meant buying China’s economic miracle itself.

The company had already listed H-shares in Hong Kong in 2000 and ADRs in New York.

However, most mainland investors could not easily purchase overseas shares.

The A-share IPO therefore became something entirely different:

For the first time, ordinary Chinese investors could own what many considered the country’s most valuable enterprise.

Demand became extraordinary.


Chapter 3 – The Bubble Already Existed

By late 2007, Chinese equities were already experiencing one of history’s largest valuation bubbles.

The Shanghai Composite had risen from roughly 1,000 points in mid-2005 to more than 6,000.

Retail investors opened brokerage accounts at record speed.

Newspapers discussed stocks on front pages.

Taxi drivers and university students debated IPO allocations.

People queued outside brokerage offices.

Mutual funds sold out within hours.

There was widespread belief that the Chinese government would never allow the stock market to fall significantly.

Liquidity flooded into every large IPO.


Chapter 4 – Valuation Lost Contact With Reality

Internationally, oil companies remained reasonably valued despite high oil prices.

Approximate valuation before the PetroChina A-share IPO:

Company Forward P/E (approx.)
ExxonMobil 10–12×
Chevron 9–11×
BP 9–10×
Shell 9–11×
Total 9–11×

Investors largely assumed oil prices would eventually normalize.

Chinese investors reached a completely different conclusion.

The PetroChina A-share IPO was priced at RMB16.70.

On its first trading day:

  • Open: RMB48.60
  • Intraday high: RMB48.62
  • Close: RMB43.96

At the day’s high, PetroChina briefly became the world’s largest listed company by market capitalization, exceeding US$1 trillion.

Yet the underlying business had not changed.

The same oil fields.

The same refineries.

The same earnings.

Only the market where investors traded the shares had changed.

The implied valuation was estimated at roughly 45–60× earnings depending on methodology—roughly four to six times the multiple of global oil majors.

This was not because PetroChina was dramatically more profitable than ExxonMobil.

It was because investors believed China’s growth would remain extraordinary forever.


Chapter 5 – Scarcity Meets National Optimism

Several forces reinforced one another.

China’s GDP was booming.

Oil prices were making new highs almost every month.

The Shanghai market itself was already euphoric.

Mainland investors had limited investment alternatives.

PetroChina represented both national pride and perceived scarcity.

Many investors believed:

“If China’s economy doubles again, PetroChina must also double.”

Few asked the more important question:

“What if today’s profits already assume exceptionally high oil prices?”

The distinction between a great company and a great investment disappeared.


Chapter 6 – The Peak

On November 5, 2007, PetroChina reached its all-time A-share high during its first minutes of trading.

It would never revisit that price.

Only months later, the global financial crisis began unfolding.

Oil prices collapsed from US$147 to below US$40.

Commodity profits normalized.

Shanghai Composite Index fell by more than 70%.

PetroChina’s valuation gradually converged toward international oil majors.

The company remained one of China’s largest and most important enterprises.

The business largely survived.

The valuation did not.


Epilogue – The Last Buyer

The PetroChina A-share IPO remains one of history’s clearest examples of the difference between a wonderful company and a wonderful stock.

Almost every part of the bullish narrative proved true:

  • China continued becoming a global economic superpower.
  • Oil demand continued growing for years.
  • PetroChina remained enormously profitable.
  • The company remained strategically indispensable.

Yet investors who purchased at the IPO peak suffered enormous long-term losses because they paid a valuation that assumed an almost perfect future.

The lesson was never that PetroChina was a poor business.

The lesson was that even the greatest businesses can become poor investments when narrative, liquidity, scarcity and optimism combine to overwhelm valuation.

That distinction continues to echo in every market cycle—from technology in 2000, to Chinese equities in 2007, to other periods when investors begin believing that “this time is different.”

Xiaomi buybacks and share sales in history

Xiaomi has been doing buybacks with stock price falling, e.g.

June 22 bought back 6.42m shares for HK$152mn, avg. price at HK$23.68

June 23 bought back 8.44m shares for HK$193mn, avg. price at HK$22.86

People joked that Xiaomi is quite good at buying and selling its own shares.

How good is Xiaomi?

1/ When Xiaomi stock was at more depressed levels (2022 & 2023), it didn’t buy back more aggressively.

In 2021, Xiaomi bought back at avg. HKD 24.5 per share; spent about 8.4bn HKD.

In 2023, when Xiaomi stock is only half of 2021 buyback price, Xiaomi spent 1.5bn HKD in buyback, which is 18% of 2021 in dollar amount.

The number of shares bought back decreased year over year from 2021 to 2023: 344mn -> 235mn -> 127mn.

2/ Xiaomi is good at selling.

The company sold 800 million shares at HK$53.25 each in March 2025; raised $5.5 billion.

In Dec 2020, Xiami sold 1.0bn Class B shares at HK$23.70 per share, plus $855 million through seven-year, zero-coupon convertible bonds, raising $4 billion in total.

Be careful – when Xiaomi resumed buybacks in late 2025 and stepped up in 2026, it’s good but it doesn’t mean much – it could be like 2021.

 

 

Small cap value could outperform

Given the recent bubble-like feeling, it’s useful to see where to hide if this is like dot-com era.

How did small cap value outperform?

1/ less crowded

Small cap value are less exposed to dot-com exuberance. Less impacted by fund inflow/outflow. Less exposed to leverage.

2/ interest rate cuts

In 2001, Fed cuts Fed funds rate target from 6.50% in 2000 to 1.75% in Dec 2001.

Small caps benefits more from rate cuts, as large caps already enjoyed low funding costs.

3/ cheap

Small cap value is better than small cap (Russell 2000) likely due to more margin of safety and little multiple downside (less dream value).

Year IWN / small-cap value Russell 2000
2001 +12.9% +2.5%
2002 -11.4% -20.5%

Solar, Baijiu, and Banks

From 2021 to today,

Solar in aggregate went from 3 trillion rmb to 2 trillion rmb;

Baijiu in aggregate went from 5.4 trillion rmb to 2.4 trillion rmb.

These two sectors along lost 4 trillion rmb in market cap.

Guess who gained?

Banks in aggregate went from 10 trillion rmb to 14 trillion rmb in market cap, gaining 4 trillion rmb in about 4.5 years.

Solar and Baijiu are more private companies.

Banks are more SOEs.

Solar is a representation of how involution destroyed value;

Baijiu is a representation of how declined consumption/macro pressured stocks.

Value trap and being contrarian

Consensus can be right for a long time — ride it while reflexivity is reinforcing it, but be ready to turn contrarian near the inflection point.

It is not “always go against consensus.”

George Soros says the crowd is right 80% of the time.

“Most of the time I am a trend follower … Only at an inflection point are we rewarded.”

His key idea is reflexivity: market prices are shaped by investor bias, and those prices can then affect fundamentals, creating boom-bust loops. So the contrarian opportunity is when the market’s “prevailing bias” has gone too far and starts to reverse.

Being contrarian for most of the time is dangerous.


Being contrarian in investing for too long can be dangerous.

On the upward trend, if you are against the trend and short the stocks, Tiger Mgmt is a case in point – Tiger Management, run by Julian Robertson, effectively shut down in March 2000, right as the dot-com bubble was peaking.

Robertson was acting like a classic contrarian:

  • “These internet stocks are absurdly overvalued.”
  • “Eventually fundamentals will matter.”

Both statements were true.

But Soros would likely argue that Robertson fought the trend too early. A reflexive bubble can become much larger than valuation alone would justify.

On the downward trend, if you are against the trend and long the stocks, there is a term called “value trap”.

Sometimes the crowd is right: the business is structurally deteriorating, ROIC is falling, or the terminal value is lower than historical multiples suggest.


For value traps, the key question is not “is it cheap?” but:

What changes the prevailing trend?


In the case of investing and cigar butt investing like what Warren Buffett did in his early days, he bought near/below liquidation value.

In addition, he had an exit path.

Cigar-butt investing often worked through liquidation, tender offers, buybacks, asset sales, control pressure, or mean reversion. It was not “this bad business will become great.”

So Buffett avoided value trap with asset/liquidation value protection + catalyst/control.


That is even harder in China, as there is little space for an activist in China investing.

Top buyers of gold

Central banks buying gold is a theme for bull investors in gold.

But that doesn’t automatically become a reason to buy. Several things to know before buying.

1/ Who exactly are buying?

I looked it up.

In 2025,

Biggest central bank buyer Poland: 102 ton

2nd place Kazakhstan: 57 ton

3rd place Azerbaijan: 53 ton

Down the list: Brazil, Turkey, China, India, etc.

Surprisingly, most developed countries are not on the list.

European central banks are net sellers.

2/ Net-net, are they buying more

In 2025, they actually bought less than 2024, about 20% lower in tons.

3/ Why do they buy?

The interesting surge happened in 2022.

This coincides with US kicked Russia out of SWIFT etc.

This explains the difference – if you are a retail investor living in OCED countries, you probably don’t need to buy gold vs. some central banks must buy gold to de-risk.

Munger said before, gold is “a great thing to sow into your garments if you’re a Jewish family in Vienna in 1939.”

If you are not trying to relocate out of a turbulent country, there is probably not much reason to buy gold.

$SOXX rebalance

$SOXX will rebalance quarterly.

Its top 5 positions have capped weight at 8% and the remaining will be capped at 4%.

During the quarter, if some stocks run too hot, it could have a larger weight than the cap.

This will create excessive selling as companies like Marvell has heavy weight in $SOXX now but needs to be at 4%.

The rebalance will take effect on Jun 18, 2026.

Other companies like $MU will also need to be sold to reduce weight.