Below is the chart for Jumia’s performance in terms of GMV.
A spike in 2018Q4 just before IPO is controversial..
Although with the “artificial” growth in 18Q4, the trend looks good
The more worrying part is the slowdown in GMV growth – especially when Jumia is still has a long way to go
Jumia’s full year 2019 GMV is €1.1 billion, up 33% compared to 2018.
Comparatively, Pinduoduo’s GMV in the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2018 was RMB471.6 billion (US$268.6 billion), an increase of 234% from RMB141.2 billion in the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2017.
Combined with Jumia’s annual active customer base, we can see the GMV per AAC declining over time.
In its Q4 press release, Jumia says “we have reduced promotional intensity and consumer incentives on lower consumer lifetime value business. While most product categories experienced GMV growth in the 20 to 50% range, phones and consumer electronics contracted by approximately 20% on a year-over-year basis. This aspect of the business mix rebalancing will likely continue to negatively impact GMV development over the next two quarters.”
Source: Jumia 2019Q4 Presentation
“…we have increased our focus on everyday product categories such as Fast Moving Consumer Goods (“FMCG”), fashion, beauty and personal care as well as digital services which provide affordable entry points into the Jumia ecosystem…”
We could also see that Pinduoduo’s GMV per active buyer is a little bit insane..
approx. annual GMV per active buyer = $268.6 billion / 418.5 million = $641.8
Jumia is at ~€180 in 2019, using annual GMV divided by ending AAC.
To compare it with consumers’ e-commerce purchase across the globe..
Jumia was offering 13,500,000 ADR shares with an IPO range of $13 to $16 per share and priced at $14.5 per share.
Mastercard Europe SA has agreed to purchase €50.0 million of shares in a concurrent private placement at the same price.
As of December 31, 2018, Mobile Telephone Networks Holdings (Pty) Ltd (“MTN”), Rocket Internet SE (“Rocket”) and Millicom International Cellular SA (“Millicom”) own respectively 31.28%, 21.74% and 10.15% of the Company.
Other shareholders are AEH New Africa eCommerce I GmbH (8.86%), AXA Africa Holding SAS (6.06%), Atlas Countries Support S.A. (6.06%), Chelsea Wharf Holdings S.à r.l. (5.51%), CDC Group (4.04%), Rocket Investment Funds (3.48%) and Goldman Sachs (2.83%).
Africa has one of the most digitally connected populations on the planet, with 400 million internet users.
Comparatively, say China has three times the number of internet users (1.2bn), Jumia would have 12 million or 18.3 million respectively.
Pinduoduo, a relatively new e-commerce platform in China, said its Active buyers in the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2018 were 418.5 million, an increase of 71% from 244.8 million in the twelve-month period ended December 31, 2017.
We are talking about totally different stages of e-commerce. Low penetration means more education and infrastructure are needed while potential upside is large.
In the future where Fintech firms dominate, established companies are reacting with three main strategies:
Cut costs for legacy business lines – like what we said in a previous post Banking Headcount Cut
Consolidate with other legacy companies to gain more market share and thus more say/power, further cutting expenses and trying to get more economy of scale – like what we said in the last post From TD Ameritrade To E-Trade: A Wave Of Consolidation
Acquire Fintech startups or replicate what they are doing – like the title of this post Buy & Be FinTech
Plaid is a Fintech firm that enables a lot of other Fintech apps & digital transaction based businesses, providing underlying APIs. It counts Venmo, Robinhood, Coinbase, Acorns, etc. as customers.
Credit Karma lets people check their credit scores, shop for credit cards and loans, file taxes and more. It had close to nearly $1 billion revenue in 2019, growing at 20%.
The company started out originally in 2007 providing free credit scores, later extending that to full credit reports. Credit Karma’s launch of a financial planning tool in 2013 drew a direct comparison to Intuit’s Mint. And since then, Credit Karma has launched other products that directly rival Intuit, for example a free tool to help people file their taxes. These not only represented direct competition, but a disruptive threat, since Credit Karma’s products skewed younger and were built on a “free” premise (offering the products at no charge and instead making money off showing users and selling relevant, related products). The fact that Credit Karma partners with so many other financial services providers also means it’s sitting on a huge data trove that it leverages to build and personalize products, representing a data science angle for Intuit here, too. [TechCrunch]
Meanwhile, besides the notable acquisitions of Fintechs, companies are building similar services by themselves.
By mimicking the experiences/apps offered by startups, established players are essentially becoming Fintechs themselves, thus evolving internally and embracing the future more positively.
Following the underlying trend of growing Fintech companies grabbing more customers & market shares (also discussed in a previous post about job cuts in banks), traditional financial service providers such as brokerage firms are thinking about their future.
And one answer is to consolidate the industry with mega M&As.
The press release also says, “on expenses, current estimates are for approximately $1.8 to $2 billion run-rate expense synergies, which represents approximately 18-20% of the combined cost base” – a $2 billion cut in headcount and operating budget.
TD Ameritrade had a LTM revenue of $5.665B as of 2019Q3, thus receiving a roughly 4.6x revenue multiple. Or taking the revenue declines into account, it represents a 5.0x NTM revenue ($5.2 billion) multiple. Also, it’s around $2,167 per client account.
Combined platforms will have $3.1tn client assets, 8.2 million retail client relationships and accounts, and 4.6 million stock plan participants. E*TRADE has over 5.2 million client accounts with over $360 billion of retail client assets.
Similarly, the acquisition price represents a 4.5x LTM revenue multiple. Also, it’s $2,500 per retail client account.
China’s EV maker NIO (NYSE: NIO) 蔚来汽车 signed framework agreements with Hefei’s city government on a fundraising of more than 10 billion yuan ($1.42 billion) and new manufacturing facilities. NIO plans to establish NIO China headquarters, further expand its operations and deepen its relationship with local ecosystem partners in Hefei. NIO’s stock surged more than 30% on Tuesday morning. // NIO | Reuters
Naixue’s Tea, one of the biggest bubble tea chains in China, has filed IPO in the US to raise as much as $400 million. Naixue has over 230 stores in China. The fast growing coffee chain Luckin Coffee (NASDAQ: LK) with over 4,500 locations is valued at around $10bn. Naixue was valued at over ¥6bn in its March 2018 financing round. // Bloomberg | STCN
PepsiCo Inc (NASDAQ: PEP) has agreed to buy Chinese snack brand Be & Cheery (百草味) for $705 million from local jujube maker Haoxiangni (SHE: 002582). Be& Cheery sells snacks from nuts to dried fruits mainly on Chinese e-commerce platforms. // Reuters | Pepsico
Hillhouse Capital 高瓴资本 just launched its independent venture capital fund of ¥10bn. The new fund, called GL Ventures, will invest in both U.S. dollars and yuan in chunks ranging from 3 million yuan to $30 million. GL Ventures will focus on four areas: biomedicine and medical devices, software services and initiatives in tech innovations, consumer internet and technology, and emerging consumer brands and services. // 36Kr | Caixin
On Feb 24, ByteDance’s Feishu (飞书) announces free access to all organizations. Feishu is a Slack-like remote collaboration platform developed by ByteDance, with features including video conferencing, online shared doc, group chats, calendar & other team management tools, etc. // Feishu | cntechpost
In 2019Q4, that number has grown to 502,600 (almost 4x). But the year-over-year growth rate has dropped to single digit.
One slowly growing number is the gross dollar value per order, which was $30.74 in 2017Q1 and $33.56 in 2019Q4.
The per order value could implies that group buying (>1; friends gathering, small corporates/teams, etc.) is probably a major purchasing behavior on GrubHub. It’s also a natural choice when people can “split” the overhead (all sorts of fees).
The average order value increases by ~10% in two years and could continue to grow if more business users order food deliveries.
Of the GMV, GrubHub only takes commission, delivery and others as fees (revenues). That “take-rate” has increased from 17.4% in 2017Q1 to 22% in 2019Q4.
The increase could be due to the increased marketing spending by restaurants. See a brochure for Grubhub pricing. But eventually, the take-rate will be reflected in foods’ prices and split with consumers.
That increase is good for the company but consumers may feel that food delivery has become more expansive while what they are buying is not better.
Cross major marketplace platforms, due to the delivery part of business, those food delivery companies might take a bigger % of the GMV as revenues.
The most concerning part of the costs is called “Operations and Support”, which grew from 38% in 2017Q1 to 56% in 2019Q4.
A large part of that increase is due to the shift from independent contractors to GrubHub employees – on which regulators and other gig economy companies spent a lot of efforts.
Food delivery is still a very competitive space and market share needs to be won city by city. Compared with ride-hailing, which two big players remain in the US, we might see a few more players competing without major consolidation in the near term.
Another private equity firm Symphony Technology Group (STG) just announced the acquisition of RSA from Dell for $2.075 billion in cash. STG partnered with Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan Board and AlpInvest Partners in the deal.
Earlier this month, Forescout was to be acquired by Apax and its partner Crosspoint Capital for $33 per share in an all-cash transaction valued at $1.9 billion.
The purchase price represents a premium of approximately 30% over Forescout’s closing share price of $25.45 on October 18, 2019, the last full trading day prior to the release of the 13-D filings by Corvex Management L.P. and Jericho Capital Asset Management L.P. on October 21, 2019, which disclosed they had formed a partnership to approach Forescout and accumulated a combined 14.5% ownership in the company.
Forescout recorded fourth quarter revenue of $91.3 million, compared to $84.7 million in the fourth quarter of 2018 (+8% growth); full year revenue of $336.8 million, compared to $297.7 million in the full year 2019 (+13% growth).
