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Higher tax for wealthy in US and China

This has become a hotter topic lately as some attributes the stock decline to it.

On the China side, people are increasingly aware of the additional off-shore trust tax (2026年21号离岸信托公告 & 15号配套征管文件). The rules are effective as of July 24, 2026. For individuals covered by the rules, the principal tax rate is 20%, generally applied to gains, dividends and when transferring assets into an offshore trust.

On the US side, California wealth tax is being discussed. Proposition 40 would impose a one-time 5% wealth tax on California billionaires, including the value of their stocks, private businesses, investment portfolios and other taxable assets, as of Dec 31, 2026. It is on the November 3, 2026 ballot, targeting people who were California residents on January 1, 2026. A simple majority is required to pass Proposition 40, and it is subject to interaction with Props 41 and 42, which prohibit the change in tax.

The implications of higher taxes are profound here.

1/ Additional taxes cause market liquidity crunch – few people keep a lot of cash on the sideline.

2/ The market value is arbitrary. Lowering the market value / stock price will do the job. This creates additional downside risks.

3/ To me, tax is not something that should be easy to change. It’s part of the social fabric or “contracts”. This incentives people to do other unnecessary things.

However, we also need to realize that taxing wealth that ordinary income taxes do not fully capture is a thing that needs more attention.

I assume this may be a direction that many other places may welcome and try to duplicate.

Meanwhile, we might need innovative ways to tax other than ordinary income, or lower the tax on ordinary income to bridge the gap.

Ken might have picked the wrong fight

Sure, AI might be in a bubble.

But AI giants today can crush big guys in financial industry.

Companies like Citadel and Citadel Securities compete with peers on talents and infra.

Infra is more influenced by compute and thus controlled by AI giants.

Talents will gradually be competed away by better AI models, support by AI giants.

So it does seem to me that if AI giants want to support someone that is friendlier towards AI, the can tilt the lanscape.

Local governments in China investing

1/

The relationship between a company’s management and local political leaders can be a material, underappreciated investment factor in China.

A. Political connections have measurable economic value

Mechanism Benefit of strong relationships Risk when relationships weaken
Bank financing Easier credit coordination and refinancing Tighter credit, higher funding costs
Local infrastructure Faster power, land and construction coordination Delays and additional capex
Government contracts Better access to investment and procurement opportunities Lost orders or weaker contract pipeline
Subsidies More favorable funding allocation Reduced grants and incentives
Problem resolution Faster coordination among multiple agencies Administrative delays
Competition Better access to scarce local resources Competitors gain priority
Financial distress Potential help coordinating restructuring Creditors become less accommodating

B. Leadership turnover could be catalysts.

A study found that local Party secretary turnover increased firm-specific stock crash risk, particularly among private and less transparent companies.

Meanwhile, officials may be promoted, and thus benefit supported companies more; or officials move across country so that companies get into different markets etc.

2/

Forces and relationships between local governments can create interesting phenomenon.

Every city has an incentive to compete for investment, even though they would collectively benefit from less expansion. Even an industry is oversupplied or has low return, a city gets the investment, jobs, tax base and industrial ecosystem.

Other dynamics include local protectionism. A listed company can have superior products and lower costs yet lose procurement contracts because a local government wants to support employers and taxpayers in its jurisdiction. This is particularly relevant to municipal SOE purchasing, government IT, buses, public-sector vehicles and some types of industrial equipment.

Tencen’t market share in China gaming

Back in 2022, Tencent’s domestic gaming revenue is 124bn rmb (recognized revenue), vs China market gaming revenue of 266bn rmb.

Plainly speaking, Tencent’s market share in China gaming is 47%. In reality, there could be about 9 month of mismatch, as Tencent books grossing first and recognizes it later.

This number dropped to 42% in 2023, as Tencent’s domestic gaming revenue only grew 2.3% in 2023.

In 2025, the number improves to 47% again.


The drivers

1/ The new Banhao/gaming license suspension in 2021 benefited existing gaming.

2/ NetEase Eggy Party was a massive breakout hit in 2023.

3/ Genshin Impact / Mihoyo shock is actually not that severe. Mihoyo’s Zenless Zone Zero doesn’t seem to be as successful as Genshin Impact in 2020.

4/ Tencent’s Delta Force is a strong new franchise.


However, for how long will HoK (currently No.1 grossing game for Tencent; and No.1 in China) will keep the lead is another question for Tencent.

Honor of Kings is a 2015 mobile game. When look at iOS grossing by SensorTower, HoK Jan to Aug cumulative grossing is not growing – it was 1.2-1.3 bn USD in 2022-24, but was only ~1bn USD in 2025/26.

More broadly, will Tencent’s evergreen games combined gain market share?

At least it’s hard for now, as the m/s is approaching 50%.

The future of robotics, nuclear power and space

Why humanoid?

Nuclear power could be safer when robotics can do the dangerous work instead of human beings.

The deign of most nuclear sites is for human beings to operate, so a humanoid robot is needed, i.e. a hand to open the door, or type, or operate machines with different buttons (haven’t been a nuclear site; just imagining).

Why autonomous?

Autonomous is important when robots are too far away, or it’s unrealistic for human to operate it all the time.

Imagine sending robots to search for certain things around a base when the human needs to do other things – autonomy is crucial.

Imagine sending robots to other planets with no humans to collect something – can’t remote control either.

China’s property ownership costs – that’s also a rent (or property tax)

China’s property assets are based on leases – typically 70 years for residential, 40 years for commercial and 50 years for industrial.

If you think about the lease and the renewal of a lease, that is the holding cost of owning a property asset in China, just like you need to think about property tax , insurance, HOA etc. in the US.

The renewal price is linked to the benchmark land price.

Here is an example of “benchmark land price” in Shanghai for 2026.

E.g. for a 40 years lease apartment / 公寓 , which is considered “office” rather than residential, the price would be 25,130 per sqm every 40 years (2026 price, highest level), or 628 rmb/sqm/year, or $7.8/sqm/month.

That is like the rent. The rent of the land.

Or it’s like the property tax.

e.g. SF condo, newly purchased ~$1,030–1,150/sf = ~$11,100–12,400/m²

with 1.1827% of assessed value -> ~$10.9–12.2/m²/mo

Very similar.

China core CPI has been running near 1% for more than 12 month

China Aug core CPI stood at 1% yoy, the 13th month of running near 1% since Aug 2025.

What were the drivers and policies?

From late 2025 to first half of 2025, trade-in subsidies boost final demand.

Anti-revolution was a focus. On July 1, 2025, Xi chaired the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting. It explicitly called for governing disorderly low-price competition and facilitating an orderly exit of outdated capacity. Plus, the July 30 Politburo meeting went further calling to deal with disorderly competition and conduct capacity governance in key industries.

But in the second half of 2025, there was still contribution from previous metals (Jul 2025: gold and platinum jewelry contributed ~0.22ppt to headline CPI), which should be more of a one-off boost.

From Sep 2025 to 2026, China started and expanded government interest subsidy.