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The future of robotics, nuclear power and space
Why humanoid?
Nuclear power could be safer when robotics can do the dangerous work instead of human beings.
The deign of most nuclear sites is for human beings to operate, so a humanoid robot is needed, i.e. a hand to open the door, or type, or operate machines with different buttons (haven’t been a nuclear site; just imagining).
Why autonomous?
Autonomous is important when robots are too far away, or it’s unrealistic for human to operate it all the time.
Imagine sending robots to search for certain things around a base when the human needs to do other things – autonomy is crucial.
Imagine sending robots to other planets with no humans to collect something – can’t remote control either.
China’s property ownership costs – that’s also a rent (or property tax)
China’s property assets are based on leases – typically 70 years for residential, 40 years for commercial and 50 years for industrial.
If you think about the lease and the renewal of a lease, that is the holding cost of owning a property asset in China, just like you need to think about property tax , insurance, HOA etc. in the US.
The renewal price is linked to the benchmark land price.
Here is an example of “benchmark land price” in Shanghai for 2026.
E.g. for a 40 years lease apartment / 公寓 , which is considered “office” rather than residential, the price would be 25,130 per sqm every 40 years (2026 price, highest level), or 628 rmb/sqm/year, or $7.8/sqm/month.
That is like the rent. The rent of the land.
Or it’s like the property tax.
e.g. SF condo, newly purchased ~$1,030–1,150/sf = ~$11,100–12,400/m²
with 1.1827% of assessed value -> ~$10.9–12.2/m²/mo
Very similar.
Follow the crowd
The crowd is right 80% of the time.
Contrarianism is useful but overrated as a concept.
China core CPI has been running near 1% for more than 12 month
China Aug core CPI stood at 1% yoy, the 13th month of running near 1% since Aug 2025.
What were the drivers and policies?
From late 2025 to first half of 2025, trade-in subsidies boost final demand.
Anti-revolution was a focus. On July 1, 2025, Xi chaired the Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission meeting. It explicitly called for governing disorderly low-price competition and facilitating an orderly exit of outdated capacity. Plus, the July 30 Politburo meeting went further calling to deal with disorderly competition and conduct capacity governance in key industries.
But in the second half of 2025, there was still contribution from previous metals (Jul 2025: gold and platinum jewelry contributed ~0.22ppt to headline CPI), which should be more of a one-off boost.
From Sep 2025 to 2026, China started and expanded government interest subsidy.
Revenue per GW for traditional internet/hyperscaler companies vs leading AI labs
| Company | Period | Revenue | Electricity consumed | Avg. GW consumed | Revenue / avg. GW |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Google / Alphabet | CY2025 | $402.8bn | ~44 TWh | ~5.0 GW | ~$80bn/GW |
| Microsoft | FY2025 | $281.7bn | 37.03 TWh | 4.23 GW | ~$66.7bn/GW |
| Meta | CY2024 | $164.5bn | 18.42 TWh | 2.10 GW | ~$78.2bn/GW |
Meta’s ESG report for 2025 hasn’t released yet.
Source: ChatGPT and companies’ ESG reports
This compares to OpenAI and Anthropics $10bn/GW to $30bn/GW.
| Latest annualized revenue | Current/live compute | ARR per GW | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anthropic | ~$65bn | ~2–3 GW est. | ~$22–33bn/GW |
| OpenAI | ~$40bn | ~3–4 GW est. | ~$10–13bn/GW |
Interest and mortgage rates after housing crisis in Japan, US, HK
| Property bust | Policy/short rate response | Mortgage rate | |
|---|---|---|---|
| US | 2006–09 | Fed funds cut to 0–0.25% Dec. 2008 | No major reduction during crisis, but later declined to 3–4% |
| Japan | 1990s | BOJ adopted near zero policy rate in Feb. 1999 | Government housing loans reached 2% in late 1998 |
| Hong Kong | 1997–2003 | Initially rates went UP, not down, because of HKD peg pressure; reached | Different subsidized schemes; can be 0% up to certain point for first home buyers |
Japan
Japan’s property bubble peaked around 1990–91, but the BOJ took a long time to reach zero.
In the four years between 1991 and 1995, the official discount rate was cut from 6 percent to 0.5 percent. Before 1994 financial-market deregulation, the discount rate was the principal policy instrument. Deposit and lending rates were administratively linked to it.
On February 12, 1999, the BOJ changed its operating guideline to push the uncollateralized overnight call rate “as low as possible.” It said it would initially aim for around 0.15%, then induce a further decline.
By May 1999, the actual overnight call rate was about 0.03%, which the BOJ itself described as “virtually zero percent” after taking brokerage fees into account.
Meanwhile, the mortgage rate was cut continuously to 2% in last 1998 and kept under 3% for a long time.
US
US housing peaked around mid 2006 (Case-Shiller National Index peaked in July 2006). Total housing starts peaked earlier in January 2006 at 2.273 million, and February 2006 was the first down month at 2.119 million. The financial system is still functioning normally; Fed funds remains 5.25%.
On April 2, 2007, New Century files bankruptcy – subprime origination itself is breaking. Soon afterward, mortgage securities suffer widespread downgrades and nonprime mortgage funding dries up.
During June–July 2007, Bear Stearns hedge funds collapsed. Mortgage losses are visibly migrating from homeowners/lenders into structured-credit investors.
On September 18, 2007, Fed starts cutting rates by 50bps, from 5.25% to 4.75%.
Fed also did 50 bps cut in Dec 2007, 75 bps emergence cut in Jan 2008, another 50 bps before end of Jan 2008, 75 bps cut in Mar 2008 (as Bear Stearns itself went into trouble and merged into JP Morgan), 25 bps cut in Apr 2008. At that point, Fed fund rate target became 2%.
On December 16, 2008, Fed reached Fed reaches effective ZLB by targeting 0-0.25%.
It took 2.5 years from the peak of housing price.
On the mortgage rate side, in 2008 during the acute Lehman/AIG crisis, mortgage rates were still roughly 6–6.5%.
However, that collapsed to 3.3% in 2012.
HK
From October 1997 to July 2003, property prices fell by 66%.
Source: link
| Event | Date | Property price |
|---|---|---|
| Bubble peak | Oct. 1997 | R&VD residential index = 172.9 (1999=100) |
| Asian crisis / HKD attack | Oct. 1997 | Rates spike; property selloff begins |
| 1998 | — | Very sharp first leg down |
| 1999–2002 | — | Continued deflation / recessionary adjustment |
| SARS | Mar–Jun 2003 | Final leg of weakness |
| Bottom | July 2003 | ~66% below Oct-1997 peak |
| Recovery begins | H2 2003 | Prices rebound rapidly |
Hong Kong was a different story as it’s interest rate is not independent, so it doesn’t have as much flexibility to cut rates.
But HK did have other programs to support homebuyers to essentially subsidize mortgages.
| Scheme | Started | Who it targeted | Form of subsidy |
|---|---|---|---|
| Home Purchase Loan Scheme (HPLS) | 1988, expanded sharply in 1998 | PRH tenants / lower-middle-income households | 0% interest government loan, or non-repayable monthly mortgage subsidy |
| Home Starter Loan Scheme (HSLS) | Apr 1998 | First-time middle/lower-income buyers | Low-interest government down-payment loan, up to HK$600k / 30% of property |
| Mortgage Subsidy Scheme (MSS) | Sep 1998 | Certain redevelopment/clearance households buying HOS/PSPS | Mortgage subsidy up to HK$162k over 6 years |
| Buy or Rent Option (BRO) | Jul 1999 | Eligible PRH applicants choosing ownership instead | Mortgage subsidy up to HK$162k over 6 years |
| Home Assistance Loan Scheme (HALS) | Jan 2003 | Replacement/consolidation scheme | 0% loan or monthly mortgage subsidy |
The Home Purchase Loan Scheme existed before the crash, from 1988, but Hong Kong massively expanded it in 1998.
It offered an interest-free government loan alongside the bank mortgage. Before the crisis:
- private-housing / White Form families: HK$400k at 0%
- public-housing / Green Form tenants: HK$600k at 0%
- repayment could extend up to 20 years
Alternatively, borrowers could choose a non-repayable monthly subsidy instead of the loan.
Then in July 1998, after property prices had collapsed, the Housing Authority increased the annual quota from 4,500 to 10,000 and added larger/flexible loan options.
By 1999–2000 the enhanced options were:
- Green Form: HK$800k at 0% over 13 years, or HK$600k over 20 years
- White Form: HK$500k at 0% over 14 years, or HK$400k over 20 years
Alternatively:
- Green Form: HK$5,100/month for 4 years
- White Form: HK$3,400/month for 4 years
and those monthly subsidies did not have to be repaid.
Where are China bulls?
David Tepper was a prominent China bull in 2024.
What happened afterwards? Seem that he has been selling continuously and has mostly exited. His recent add in Baidu is still smaller than his other China sales.
Ray Dalio / Bridgewater similar, even faster exit.
| Position | 4Q24 shares | 1Q25 shares | 2Q25 | Latest 2Q26 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| BABA | 0.255m | 5.660m | 0 | 0 |
| PDD | 1.247m | 1.743m | 0 | 0 |
| BIDU | ~0.197m | 2.076m | 0 | 0 |
| JD | 0 | 2.787m | 0 | 0 |
| FXI | 1.082m | 0.691m | 0 | 0 |
| KWEB | no meaningful disclosed position | — | — | — |
Source: ChatGPT
Li Lu / Himalaya is more of a long term investor. He recently added PDD and TME.
E-commerce vs express profit pool in US and China
US
| 2024 | 2025 | YoY | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon North America OP | $25.0bn | $29.6bn | +19% |
| eBay + Etsy OP | ~$2.0bn | ~$2.2bn | +10% |
| Other e-commerce (Wayfair/Chewy etc.) | ~$0.5bn | ~$0.5bn | ~flat |
| E-commerce total OP | ~$27.5bn | ~$32.3bn | +17% |
| UPS U.S. Domestic Package OP | ~$4.4bn | ~$3.9bn | -10% |
| FedEx domestic/express proxy OP | ~$4.8bn | ~$4.9bn | ~flat |
| Delivery total OP | ~$9.2bn | ~$8.8bn | -4% |
| E-commerce / Delivery | ~3.0x | ~3.7x | ↑ |
China is like 10x.
PDD + BABA + JD retail already 350bn rmb profit.
And express side is 35bn, combining ZTO, YTO, STO, SF, Yunda, JT China.
China E-commerce were more profitable relatively to delivery.





