Series A-5: What problems are these companies facing in hiring talents, conducting trials or launching products?

 

  • Talents

The lack of talents has been a well-recognized problem for China’s biotech industry[1]. China lacks seasoned experts with at least 10 years’ industry experience, say insiders. Companies are especially keen on experience in translational medicine, early-stage clinical trials and antibody manufacturing. Start-up biotech firms need experienced managers at every level, from clinical trials to drug manufacturing processes, to help build their companies[2].

 

This path from multinational drug company to biotech is clearly seen in the bios of many of the more ambitious start-up founders. Returnees with a few years under their belt in China and an ability to effectively navigate the system are far more valuable to employers than new arrivals. It becomes fairly common that multinational biopharma firms are finding themselves battling Chinese biotechnology startups to attract talent38,[3]. Those startups flush with cash from venture-capital financing are willing to pay top dollar (and upsides with options).

 

  • Trials

In terms of conducting trials, a historical lack of clinical research infrastructure in China has led to problems adhering to Good Clinical Practice, the international gold standard for maintaining ethical and quality standards in clinical trials. As an example, nearly all clinical research sites in China are hospitals, as there are no private practices. Because of that, clinical trial participants are treated exactly the same way as regular patients. That’s a problem because study staff — who are regular hospital employees — don’t have experience complying with Good Clinical Practice, putting the trial’s integrity, not to mention patient protection, at risk[4],[5].

 

Meanwhile, the rapid growth of Wuxi AppTex (and its affiliated Wuxi Biologics) has made itself one of the largest CRO/CMO players in the world[6], helping to facilitate drug discovery/development/manufacturing globally.

 

  • Launches

 

As most Chinese biotech startups are still in the r&d stage, only a few were approved recently. The most relevant example here might be the PD-1/PD-L1 space.

 

CFDA has long been seen as “slow” in terms of new drug approvals. A 2016 discussion quoted that usually a new drug needs 5-10 years for approval[7].

 

However, for the recent domestic PD-1 drugs for cancer, the approval speed was amazingly fast. Junshi won the first made-in-China PD-1 drug approval by NMPA (formerly CFDA) in December 2018[8]. Ten days later, the second PD-1 drug by Innovent was approved[9]. Each took 284 and 255 days respectively[10].

 

Two foreign PD-1 drugs, Merck’s Keytruda and Bristol-Myers Squibb’s Opdivo, were approved earlier in 2018. During 18Q3, Keytrude and Opdivo recorded ¥150 and ¥190 million in sales respectively[11].

 

Junshi started its sales in February 2019 and recorded nearly ¥80 million in the first quarter[12]. Innovent’s PD-1 launched its sales in March 2019 and finished the first quarter with $9.9 million in revenue, both of which are deemed as successful in media reports[13].

[1] https://www.kornferry.com/institute/download/download/id/17053/aid/219

[2] https://www.huamedicine.com/upload/down/5870180130135508.pdf

[3] https://www.ft.com/content/d3a2de0e-6fbb-11e8-92d3-6c13e5c92914

[4] https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/03/china-clinical-trials-infrastructure-transparency/

[5] http://www.appliedclinicaltrialsonline.com/running-clinical-research-china

[6] https://explorebiotech.com/top-cros-usa-contract-research-organization/

[7] http://journal.healthpolicy.cn/html/20160304.htm

[8] https://endpts.com/junshi-wins-the-race-for-first-made-in-china-pd-1-approval-as-execs-reap-394m-ipo-harvest/

[9] https://endpts.com/china-greenlights-second-homegrown-pd-1-in-10-days-as-innovent-celebrates-its-first-drug-ok-with-eli-lilly/

[10] https://www.bjcancer.org/Html/News/Articles/9321.html

[11] https://www.yicai.com/news/100135300.html

[12] https://xueqiu.com/8965749698/125984469

[13] https://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/2019-05-06/doc-ihvhiews0153982.shtml

Series A-4: Are companies building drugs for the Chinese market or the western/US market?

Mostly Chinese.

 

According to IMS, China’s spending in medicine has been growing fast, reaching $137 billion in 2018[1].

 

 

Another research database shows that in 2018, China’ exports in medicine was $17.4 billion[2] and imports was $29.6 billion[3].

 

Although they might use different sources/measures, we could roughly estimate that in 2018, non-import medicine consumption was 137-29.6 = 107.4 billion and domestic medicine production was 107.4+17.4 = 124.8 billion.

 

Therefore, 86% of Chinese drug companies’ production was for the domestic market while 14% was for exports in 2018.

 

For the more modern (or newly funded) innovative biotech/drug companies in China, they are targeting the global markets. Usually they will divide the commercial rights by regions and retain the greater china rights while sell the rest (another source of funding). Some innovative drug candidates’ global rights ex china have already been licensed/acquired by western/US pharmaceutical companies. Most Chinese biotech companies don’t have the capability to develop/commercialize outside the greater china area.

[1] https://www.iqvia.com/institute/reports/the-global-use-of-medicine-in-2019-and-outlook-to-2023

[2] http://s.askci.com/news/maoyi/20190624/1150071148256.shtml

[3] http://s.askci.com/news/maoyi/20190625/1430421148825.shtml

Series A-2: What diseases are they working on?

UBS summarized in its China’s biotech report – “Oncology: A driving force for innovation in Chinese biotech”.

An article by Pharmacodia in 2017 said the top 3 therapeutic areas for biologics in China are cancer, rheumatoid arthritis (RA), hepatitis B virus (HBV)[1].

Another bluebook in 2017 outlined the five focus areas for China’s biotechnologies[2]: 1) vaccines, 2) mAb and protein drugs for cancer, cardiovascular, neurodegenerative, diabetes, autoimmune diseases, 3) diagnostics and screening for major diseases, 4) gene therapies, cell therapies, 5) regenerative medicine

China suffers from an unusually high incidence of cancer, which has been the country’s leading cause of death since 2010. Nearly all companies (five out of six) went onto HKSE in 2018 are investing in oncology (except for Hua Medicine focusing on diabetes).

Among all the cancers, lung cancer is the most targeted disease due to the high incidence rate in China.

Globally, oncology is also the No.1 focus for the overall industry, accounting for more than 1/3 of the total pipeline, according to a 2018 report[3].

To develop cancer treatments, biotech companies usually focus on developments in mAbs (monoclonal antibodies), immuno-oncology, CAR-T therapies, etc.

Other breakthrough researches & developments including Qinghaosu (or Artemisinin), discovered by the team led by Youyou Tu to fight malaria.

[1] http://classic.hsmap.com/news_info/4080.html

[2] https://hsmap.com/static/bluebook.pdf

[3] https://pharmaintelligence.informa.com/resources/product-content/sitecore/shell//~/media/informa-shop-window/pharma/files/pdfs/pharma-rd-annual-review-webinar-2018-slides.pdf

Teva (4): Acquisition

Understanding Teva’s genes

[an excerpt from Knowledge@Wharton: Changing the Prescription for Israel’s Teva]

The (generic drug) industry began to consolidate during the 1960s and 1970s, and Teva emerged as the largest and most dynamic firm in the sector, thanks primarily to Eli Hurvitz, who served as CEO from 1976 to 2002 and as chairman from 2002 to 2010.

Opportunity knocked on Teva’s door when the U.S. Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984. The legislation created incentives for generic drug companies to challenge other firms’ patents, even before they expired, with the goal of reducing the cost of drugs in the U.S. Hurvitz positioned Teva to use Hatch-Waxman as its springboard to becoming a major player in the generics sector.

“Teva succeeded in its strategy,” says Steven Tepper, an Israeli analyst who has been following Teva for many years. “It not only worked really hard at getting its production costs down, it also developed considerable expertise in the legal aspects of the generic drugs business — how to be the first to file for generic versions of patented drugs [the law awarded a period of exclusivity to the first generic version, during which time profit margins would be higher], and how to manage the testing and licensing process. Later, Teva became adept at acquiring other companies and integrating them into the group.”

The strategy worked so well that today, Teva is the largest generic drug company in the world. Achieving this designation was a conscious decision on the part of Teva’s leadership: It was achieved via a series of large acquisitions over a five-year period, beginning with IVAX, an American rival bought for US$7.4 billion in January 2006; Barr (also in the U.S.) for US$7.46 billion in December 2008; German company Ratiopharm in March 2010 for US$5 billion, and Cephalon in May 2011 for US$6.8 billion.

“Levin was instrumental in bringing Michael Hayden to Teva as head of R&D, and together they formulated a corporate strategy for Teva that distinguished it from its competitors and also explains why Teva had to acquire either Mylan or Allergan,”

“Levin and Hayden sought to marry Teva’s proven capabilities in the efficient production of generic drugs with the company’s in-house R&D capabilities, themselves enhanced by a series of acquisitions. The goal is to turn generic drugs into specialty products, for instance by giving them a special formulation or method of application — something that doesn’t change the essence of the drug, but de-commoditizes it and allows for a higher price, higher margins and hence greater profitability.”

– Steven Tepper, pharma and biomed analyst at Migdal Capital Markets and regarded as a top Israeli analyst in this sector

The environment for Teva in 2015

[Knowledge@Wharton: Why Teva Paid $40.5 Billion for Allergan’s Generic Business]

    • The number of ‘ethical’ or proprietary drugs coming off patents in the next few years is going to be much smaller than has been the case over the past decade or so
    • The drug producers are facing a rapid process of concentration among their main buyers — especially in the critical U.S. market, where there are now three dominant companies. This, in turn, is forcing the manufacturers to consolidate their ranks, so as to better match the greater bargaining clout of their customers. The entire pharma industry is caught up in a whirlwind of enormous deals. Data from Thomson Reuters shows that as of July 23 — prior to Teva’s Allergan acquisition — M&A deals in the health care industry so far this year totaled almost $400 billion and were up some 80% over the equivalent period of 2014
    • With Copaxone’s patents going to expire, Teva needs to find supports to drive the growth or to make-up the hole – manage the “patent cliff” and the stock price

There were three acquisition targets: Sandoz (Novartis), Mylan and Actavis (Allergan).

First proposal: Mylan

On April 21, 2015, Teva proposed to acquire mylan for $82.00 per share in cash and stock. ($40 billion acquisition, 50 percent cash and 50 percent stock)

Just two weeks before, Mylan made an offer to acquire Perrigo with a 25% premium, which failed later in November.

A timeline compiled by Reuters.

April 8, 2015: Mylan offers to buy Perrigo for about $29 billion in cash and stock in a move that some analysts suggested was an effort to help fend off a $40 billion acquisition by larger rival Teva Pharmaceuticals Industries

April 24, 2015: Mylan goes hostile with a sweetened bid of $60 plus 2.2 Mylan shares, valuing Perrigo at $31 billion; Perrigo rejects offer

April 27, 2015: Mylan rejects Teva’s offer

April 29, 2015: Perrigo rejects Mylan’s second raised bid of $75 and 2.3 Mylan shares for every Perrigo share, or $34.1 billion

April 29, 2015: Teva sends letter to Mylan’s Board

July 23, 2015: Dutch foundation linked to Mylan adopts poison pill in efforts to block takeover by Teva, citing potential job losses

July 27, 2015: Teva drops its hostile pursuit of Mylan, decides to buy Allergan Plc’s generic business in a deal worth $40.5 billion

Aug. 13, 2015: Mylan lowers the percentage of Perrigo shares it needs to control the company to just over 50 percent from its original plan of 80 percent

Sept. 14, 2015: Mylan launches a tender offer in a move to lure Perrigo investors to support its take-over efforts

Sept. 17, 2015: Perrigo recommends shareholders to reject Mylan’s tender offer, which was set to expire on Nov. 13, saying it substantially undervalued the company

Oct. 22, 2015: Perrigo announces its plans to lay off 6 percent of its global workforce and buy back shares worth $2 billion

Nov. 13, 2015: Mylan fails $26 billion bid in tender offer as it was unable to secure at least half of Perrigo’s shares

After Mylan’s acquisition of Perrigo failed, Mylan shares were up about 10 percent at $47.39 in premarket trading, while Perrigo’s were down 9.3 percent at $141.99.

Teva said its offer should be more attractive to Mylan shareholders than the proposed purchase of Perrigo, representing a 48 percent premium to the company’s share price before speculation of a deal surfaced on March 10. When Teva made the proposal, Mylan shares were up 8.9 percent at $74.12 in afternoon Nasdaq trading, while Teva rose 2.0 percent to $64.55 on the New York Stock Exchange. Perrigo fell 2.2 percent to $193.79. (Reuters)

Plan B: Allergen

On July 27, 2015, Teva made an offer to buy Allergan’s generics unit with $33.75 billion in cash and Teva shares valued at $6.75 billion (close to 10% stake in Teva).

  • pro forma revenues of approximately $26 billion and combined EBITDA of approximately $9.5 billion anticipated in 2016.
  • No shareholder vote required at Teva or Allergan
  • Mylan shares fell nearly 14% to $57.03 Monday, while Perrigo gained 3.8% to $193.67.
  • For Allergan, the Teva deal provides it with cash to pay down debt and allows the company to focus more on lucrative brand-name drugs.

[WSJ: Teva to Buy Allergan Generics for $40.5 Billion]

Source: Teva Presentation

Teva Presentation of Actavis Acquisition

Question: how to finance the deal…

According to Teva’s Q2 2015 result,  at June 30, 2015

    • cash and investments: $2.8 billion.
    • short-term debt: $3.0 billion
    • senior notes and loans: $9.5 billion

Shared Bikes In China (5)

So how many shared bikes are needed?

Beijing is the city in focus.

In April 2017, Beijing (北京市交通委) published a guideline (draft for consultation) to regulate shared bikes. [A usage survey conducted at that time in Beijing]

Beijing had around 700k shared bikes by April 2017, and more than 1.6 million by September 2017. (numbers are for registered bikes, not including non-registered)

The number of shared bikes reached its largest in September 2017 (2.35 million; then new deployments were suspended). Other cities also set the cap (Shanghai 1.5 million, Guangzhou 0.9 million, Nanjing 0.45 million).

The number declined to 1.91 million by August 2018, which was the second hard limit set by City of Beijing. (mobike 0.699, ofo 0.907, other 7 companies 0.3)

It was expected that the cap would continue to decline. From January to May 2019, only 1.2 million of the 1.91 million bikes are used at least once.

Other cities have downsized the number of shared bikes as well: main area in Chengdu 1.8 million -> 0.75 million; Shenzhen 0.89 -> 0.6 million

Beijing has a population of more than 21 million: so on average every shared bike will cover 11 people. (using 1.91 million here)

Shared Bikes In China (4)

After Series E…

By and large, the financing activities paused (as described in part 2) in the bike-sharing space. And the $3 billion valuation for both mobike and ofo was not attractive. Capital markets were developing way ahead of the business.

What is more, the economic model was still in the “testing stage” (to put it nicely).

M&A?

The most obvious way to end the war and to make the industry profitable was a merger between ofo and mobike.

The investors were familiar with the merger between Didi and Kuaidi in 2015, with Tencent-backed Didi’s name surviving.

Similar talks must have been held for several times, especially in the summer of 2017. But before a merger, there would probably be a winner.

Investors from both sides probably have been talked about this privately for long. In June 2017, a discussion between Xiaohu Zhu (GSR Ventures), ofo’s backer from Series A, and Pony Ma (Tencent), mobike’s lead investors for Series D&E, was leaked and posted on the internet.

They were trying to claim ofo and mobike as the No.1 bike-sharing company respectively.

Discussion between GSR and Tencent leaders | Source: tech.sina.com.cn

Meanwhile,  both CEOs were saying a merger was not possible (6/29).

The first public comments from investors on the merger might be in September 2017 when Xiaohu Zhu said a merger is the way to profitability.

ofo CEO vs. Investors

Didi (with veto power) sent a team to ofo in July 2017, including an executive vice president.

In September 2017, ofo launched its mini-program on WeChat (said to be directed by Didi’s team), which made Ant Financial shocked and angry. (Ant Financial’s Alipay and WeChat’s WePay are the duopoly in mobile payment)

It was said that Ant Financial asked ofo to close its mini-program, then Ant Financial would provide additional financing.

Didi’s team lost their access at ofo in November 2017. And ofo’s mini-program became not available anymore.

At the end of 2017, ofo CEO had the last conversation with Xiaohu Zhu (GSR Ventures) about the merger. One month after the last attempt, Xiaohu Zhu sold his position to Ali, together with his veto power.

At the beginning of 2018…

several things became clear:

Then…

Alibaba led a Series F of $866 million for ofo in March 2018.

Meituan acquired mobike for $2.7 billion in April 2018.

Alibaba led a round of nearly $700 million for Hellobike in April 2018.

In fact, Alibaba has bought out Didi’s controlling position from ofo and made Hellobike its main force in bike-sharing.


The duopoly fueled by capital was again overpowered by capital.

Read more on Hellobike (June 2018)

Shared Bikes In China (3)

Those who can raise money are raising big

When most bike-sharing startups are facing difficulties on the capital market, the ones who had more prestigious backers seemed fine, namely ofo and mobike.

Series D

mobike raised $215 million Series D led by Tencent in January, with Ctrip and Huazhu joining as new investors; Foxconn and Temasek also came onboard later, adding at least another $85 million (the round aka “friends of Sequoia China and Hillhouse”)

ofo came with a $450 million Series D led by DST in March (the round aka “Didi’s investors”); in April, ofo also took some money from Ant Financial while collaborating in 0 deposits for users who have credit scores (Sesame scores) over 650.

Unique Angles?

This was the first time Ali officially invested in this field. I guess they felt the valuation was too high. While Tencent had mobike and Didi had ofo, Ali needed to  find its unique angle and set its footprint in the space. Sesame scores is one of Ant Financial’s unique offering in the market place; yet ofo might be the first time users felt the tangible benefits of high Sesame scores.

Tencent had its unique angle as well: Mini-programs 小程序 in WeChat. mobike launched its mini-program in February 2017.

Meanwhile, Didi integrated ofo’s service into its app in April 2017.

(Besides, there are battles between payments, cloud computing, data and traffic)

Series E

The crazy financing has made ofo and mobike the clear winners at that time. I guess most investors believed that who had the most money would win the game.

ofo has Didi which is big, but mobike’s Tencent is one of the deepest pockets in China. When Ant Financial only provided a minority funding to ofo (as Didi was the biggest investor), some may felt that Ali was still not determined to join the race – then mobike would win.

mobike raised $600 million Series E in June, led by Tencent, valued at $2.4 billion pre-money.

Now, if ofo didn’t get Ali on board, it would almost certainly be outgrown, despite its entrance into 100 cities in May was one month earlier than mobike (June).

Not surprisingly, ofo came with $700 million Series E in July, led by Alibaba, valued at $2.3 billion pre-money.

Meanwhile, both companies were aiming to enter into 200 cities globally.

When mobike and ofo sucked up nearly all the resources in the space, other startups were falling rapidly (see the previous post).


However, the financing activities won’t help to eliminate many problems come with those station-free bikes.

 

to be continued…

Shared Bikes In China (2)

Cash and Deposits

At first, nearly all bike-sharing startups take deposits, usually ranging from ¥99 to ¥299.

The deposits are hard cash for startups; they are like life-time membership fees if the companies survive and users keep using the apps.

To put it another way, deposits are indefinite free borrowings.

Deposits and investors’ money are fundamentally different (in accounting), but both are actually (viewed as) cash sitting in the bank for startups.

Some may compare this model with gym memberships. When users pay upfront, gyms use the cash in expansion and operation.

Just invest (or borrow) and open one gym first, then one can use the membership fees collected to subsidize the opening of the second gym..  bike-sharing companies can use the deposits collected in one city to subsidize the expansion into the next city, to pay back any loans, to pay employees’ salaries…

Then comes the problems… for those startups that are not well-funded.


Closures in 2017

In June 2017, the first startup, Wukong Bicycle 悟空单车, announced to stop its operation.

Started in Chongqing, Wukong Bicycle has another layer of to collect operation cash – “operation partners” who would pay Wukong Bicycle an upfront fee to claim profits for a certain number of shared bikes. To be honest, “operation partners” are not treated as partners as Wukong can profit from selling bikes to them and management fees. Its “alternative fund raising” was a little concerning.

By the summer of 2017, more reports about the closure of bike-sharing companies ignited the concerns from users. When users were asking their deposits back, the real cash crunch came/intensified.

In November of 2017, it was reported that most of the bike-sharing startups have problems with their deposits. [60多家共享单车停运用户押金之痛难解 – 证券日报]

The largest of them (in 2017) was bluegogo 小蓝单车, which had raised ¥400 million. It started as a supplier for bike-sharing companies but then decided to enter the race. It had achieved a No.3 position in the space but things (financing) went south in June 2017.

As mentioned previously, it was acquired by Didi at the beginning of 2018.

Read more on 还原短命小蓝单车的365天 – 36氪  小蓝单车生死故事 – 36氪

Not a coincidence, an even broader problem in China emerged in 2017: P2P financing.


Meanwhile, the top-tier companies seemed to live well with millions of dollars raised on the capital markets.

Many required 0 deposits to entice users (and accelerated the failures of smaller players that reply on deposits).

Actually, China Consumers Association (CCA) encouraged bike-sharing companies to charge 0 deposits in December 2017.

 

 

to be continued..

Shared Bikes In China (1)

A History

ofo

The battle between 70+ bike-share startups (or the battle between their colors) could be traced back to the summer of 2014, when ofo (wikipedia) was started by students at the Peking University in Beijing.

Source: play.google.com

ofo initially focused on bicycle tourism before deciding on bicycle sharing. At first, it was only doing campus bike sharing. In May 2015, the team appropriated the investment fund for purchasing new bicycles and enticing PKU students to partake in bicycle sharing. [PKU news] [¥9 million seed/angel]

Shared bikes became crazy in 2016. ofo took off in 2016 with ¥15 million Series A in January led by GSR Ventures 金沙江创投 and followed by Dongfang Hongdao 东方弘道, then Series A+ of ¥10 million in April and Series B of “tens of millions” USD led by Matrix China 经纬中国 in June.

Yet the fund raising didn’t stop there. ofo raised another $130 million led by Didi (C-1), Coatue (C-2), and funds affiliated with Xiaomi (C-2) in October 2016, officially marching into city businesses instead of focusing on universities.

mobike

Two major differences were separating ofo and its main competitor mobike at the beginning stage: 1) mobike focused on cities from day 1 while ofo was for universities at first 2) the locks

mobike | Source: wikipedia

The first generation of ofo bikes has an unchanged passcode sent to users while mobike’s are unlocked by wireless communications between the phone, servers and the bike. mobike also uses GPS from the beginning.

ofo 1st Gen. | Source: tianjimedia.com
See the source image
mobike 1st Gen. | Source: eastday.com

Nowadays, shared bike companies are using similar product (lock) strategies for safety, management and data. [read more about smart lock technologies involved]

mobike raised its Series A of $3 million in October 2015 led by Joy Capital 愉悦资本, Series B of $10 million in August 2016 led by Panda Capital 熊猫资本, Series C of $100 million in September led by Warburg Pincus and Hillhouse Capital.


By the 2016 holiday season..

both ofo and mobike finished with their Series C with nine figures, while many other startups were just launching their services and raised their Series A, including bluegogo which would became the third largest service provider before went bankrupt and later acquired by Didi.

Image result for bluegogo
Source: crunchbase

At that time, another startup Hellobike 哈罗单车 which would be threatening to the first-movers, was also just preparing to launch its bikes (started with 2nd/3rd tier cities) and just finished its Series A with GGV.

Image result for hellobike
Source: crunchbase

The frequency of fund raising is probably the most remarkable part of the history (to me).

I actually wish that something similar won’t be happening again…

Businesses, investors, users/citizens and regulators all need some time to really think over.

For bike-sharing startups, they were going to feel something different in 2017…

 

to be continued…

Hupu And Toutiao (ByteDance)

Today Toutiao acquired 30% of Hupu for ¥1.26 billion, valuing it at ¥4.2 billion.

Formed in 2004, Hupu provides marketing planning, sports events marketing and management, as well as events management. It also operates businesses such as offline eSports events, e-commerce and gaming co-operation. It owns Hupu.com, the sports site with the most page views in China, a retail site for trending sports gear, and the app for Shihuo.cn. More than 30 million users had registered on its websites and apps as of March. [yicaiglobal]

虎扑

A History

Hupu has been active in the capital market for a while.

It was pursuing an IPO in 2016 on the Chinese stock market with a revenue of ¥200 million in 2015.

[Hupu IPO Prospectus]

Before its IPO efforts, Hupu finished its Series C of ¥100 million in 2014 led by Greenwoods (景林) and Series D of ¥240 million in 2015 led by Guirenniao.

Then in 2017, Hupu’s IPO didn’t go through as planned..

..which led to a round of ¥618 million led by CICC (also the underwriter for Hupu’s IPO).

Toutiao + Hupu

Ways to cooperate:

    1. ads – precisely targeting a community with above-average purchasing power and distinguished tastes & shopping categories/habits
    2. video – Hupu’s sports video capabilities/rights/viewers will have synergies with Toutiao’s video infrastructure and recommendations; plus, Hupu will be one of Toutiao’s efforts to march into sporting business
    3. e-commerce: direct sale, and with the help from ads and video; Douyin’s video can lead to shopping on Hupu’s e-commerce platforms