Occidental Petroleum (2): Topping Chevron’s Bid For Anadarko, Buffett’s Preferred Investment

Occidental Bids Anadarko Petroleum (APC)

Having grown into the No.1 operator in Permian in 2018Q4, Occidental definitely don’t want give that title back to Chevron.

While acquiring Anadarko is an add-on for Chevron, it’s much more financially challenging for Occidental.

Source: Chevron

Occidental produces at a similar scale as Anadarko. So it’s presumably an acquisition that would double its size.

But Occidental moved decisively. It offered $76.00 per share for Anadarko on April 24, 12 days after Chevron’s announcement, with ~17% premium over the $65 per share agreement. Taking into account the stock price movement, Occidental’s deal presents a ~20% premium.

Occidental’s offer also has more cash component (50/50) – $38.00 in cash and 0.6094 shares of Occidental common stock per Anadarko share, valuing Anadarko at $57 billion.

Occidental also argues a $3.5 billion free cash flow improvements through synergies and capital reduction, compared with Chevron’s $2 billion / year synergies.

Occidental actually tried to acquire Anadarko earlier in April, according to the press release later on.

It is unfortunate that Anadarko agreed to pay a break up fee of $1 billion, representing approximately $2 per share, without even picking up the phone to speak to us after we made two proposals during the week of April 8 that were at a significantly higher value to the transaction you were apparently negotiating with Chevron.

We noted to you on April 8 that our due diligence is complete. As you are aware, our financial advisors are BofA Merrill Lynch and Citi, and our legal advisors are Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, and we and they are available to discuss any aspect of our proposal. We and our advisors have reviewed your merger agreement with Chevron. We are separately sending to you and your legal advisors a form of merger agreement on that basis which we would be prepared to enter into, subject to our agreeing to the disclosure schedules to be attached, together with a copy of our financing commitment letter.

Financing The Acquisition

Acquisition of this size is difficult for Occidental, especially as it offers much more cash than stocks.

In 2018, Occidental generated $7,669 million operating cash flows with $(4,975) million CapEx. It also paid $(2,374) million in cash dividend and bought back $(1,248) million stocks.

On its balance sheet as of the end of 2018, it had $3,033 million cash, and $10,317 million long-term debt.

On April 30, $10 billion financing was secured as Buffett came on board.

Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. has committed to invest a total of $10 billion in Occidental. The investment is contingent upon Occidental entering into and completing its proposed acquisition of Anadarko. Berkshire Hathaway will receive 100,000 shares of Cumulative Perpetual Preferred Stock with a liquidation value of $100,000 per share, together with a warrant to purchase up to 80.0 million shares of Occidental common stock at an exercise price of $62.50 per share.

The preferred shares also have a dividend rate of 8% per year.

As WSJ describes, the investment “is straight out of Warren Buffett’s playbook“. During and after the financial crisis, Berkshire acted as a lender of last resort for blue-chip companies including Goldman Sachs, General Electric and Bank of America.

Occidental marks Berkshire’s largest purchase of preferred shares; the 2013 Heinz deal has $8 billion preferred stocks and other securities.

Berkshire’s Preferreds | Source: WSJ

Mr. Buffett and Occidental have some shared history.

Mr. Buffett’s first stock purchase was three shares of Cities Service preferred stock when he was 11 years old. Occidental’s chief executive, Vicki Hollub, started her career at Cities Service, which was later acquired by Occidental. Cities Service is now called CITGO Petroleum Corp. and owned by Venezuela’s Petróleos de Venezuela SA.

「News of the Week」New York State Curve Flattening, Stock Market Up

On Tuesday (April 7), Gov. Andrew Cuomo projected that the state is reaching a plateau in coronavirus hospitalizations due to strict social distancing measures.

“To the extent that we see a flattening or a possible plateau, that’s because of what we’re doing and we have to keep doing it,” Mr. Cuomo said. (WSJ)

three day hospitalizations
Source: Cuomo press conference, Axios

The S&P 500 on Thursday (April 9) closed out its best four-day streak since 1974, up 11.9% (Dow up 12%). (CNBC)

CH 20200409_dow_best_weeks_close.png

Occidental Petroleum (1): Permian, Chevron Bid For Anadarko Petroleum

Occidental Petroleum (OXY) has been one of the most watched stock since 2019. Its stock lost ~80% compared with the start of 2018 and lagged behind Chevron and the industry later on.

OXY vs. XLE & CVX Jan 2018 – Apr 2020 | Source: Yahoo Finance, author

[XLE is State Street’s Energy Select Sector ETF fund; see its top holdings here]


Permian Oil Production

The Permian, the biggest shale basin in the US, has been one of the biggest drivers of a shale oil boom that helped make US the biggest oil producer in the world, ahead of Saudi Arabia and Russia.

Source: EIA

According to the March 2020 productivity report, output from the Permian basin of Texas and New Mexico, is expected to rise 38,000 bpd to a record 4.79 million barrels per day (bpd) in April 2020.

Texas continues to produce more crude oil than any other state or region of the United States, accounting for 41% of the US total in 2019.

Source: EIA
Source: EIA

As mentioned in Occidental’s 2019 annual report, Permian accounts for more than 30% of the total United States oil production; Occidental has a leading position in the Permian Basin, producing approximately 10% of the total oil in the basin.


Chevron Bids For Anadarko Petroleum (APC)

As the competition in Permian intensifies, with Occidental and Chevron two leading operators, companies are looking for M&A opportunities.

Anadarko Petroleum is the 11th largest operator in Permian Basin; its Permian production (127 mboe/d) accounted for ~18% of its 2018Q4 production of 701 mboe/d. [Occidental Acquisition Proposal Presentation April 2019]

A graphic with no description

Chevron, another major player in Permian, announced its acquisition agreement with Anadarko on April 12, 2019.

Chevron was the No.1 in 2018 whole year production in Permian, but lost that seat to Occidental in 2018Q4 as shown above. Growth by acquisition seems to be the way to go for Chevron.

Occidental Wins Battle for Anadarko as Chevron Exits Bidding - WSJ
Source: WSJ

The total enterprise value of the transaction is $50 billion. Anadarko’s equity is valued at $33 billion, or $65 per share. Based on Chevron’s closing price on April 11th, 2019 and under the terms of the agreement, Anadarko shareholders will receive 0.3869 shares of Chevron and $16.25 in cash for each Anadarko share. (75% stock and 25% cash)

[Read more on Chevron’s acquisition presentation]

Jumia And Africa E-commerce (4): Citron, Net Merchandize Value

About one month after Jumia’s IPO, the famous short research Citron published a short report.

Their first major short thesis is based on a Confidential Investor Presentation for investors in October 2018, which presents a discrepancy between Jumia’s IPO filing.

    • The active customers & merchants as of 2017 are 2.1 million and 43 thousand in the Confidential Investor Presentation while in the IPO filing are 2.7 million and 53 thousand.
      • no difference in 2018 numbers
      • they might used different definition for “active”
      • another possibility is consolidation calculation – if a user used multiple Jumia services (online shopping, travel, food, etc.), they could have been double counted. In the October 2018 presentation, they might deduct the duplicated accounts

Cirton also emphasized on omitting a metric in IPO – net merchandize value (NMV).  Since GMV doesn’t take into account returns/cancellations, which is ~41% of the GMV in 2017, this could be material in evaluating the business.

Another lever is failed delivery. Taking all these into account, GMV probably is not a very good indicator at this stage of Africa’s e-commerce. This also explains the hight fulfillment expenses. As the infrastructure in Africa improves over time, it could be better.

In Jumia’s IPO documents, it only mentions “in 2018, orders accounting for 14.4% of our GMV were either failed deliveries or returned by our consumers. ”

In the 2019 20-F, it says “we have also experienced a decrease in the rate of cancellations, failed deliveries and returns as a percentage of our GMV from approximately 35% in 2018 to 32% in 2019.”

So around 20.6% of Jumia’s 2018 GMV is cancelled.

Actually, in Jumia’s 2019 Q2 call with analysts, it says “it has identified instances where orders were placed and then subsequently canceled“.

However, when NMV provides an important information about Jumia’s operation, after all its revenue and expenses won’t change.

Buffet’s Shareholder Letter In Feb 2020

While the market is volatile and uncertainty is ahead, I went back to read Buffet’s 2019 annual shareholder letter, issued in February 2020.

[More letter could be found here]


Some ket takeaways:

  • Berkshire’s earnings has 3 components (operating earnings, realized capital gains, unrealized capital gains) and indeed becomes more volatile under the new accounting rule
  • The 3 criteria for purchases/investments:
    1. First, they must earn good returns on the net tangible capital required in their operation.
    2. Second, they must be run by able and honest managers.
    3. Finally, they must be available at a sensible price.
  • Per the accounting rules, earnings from controlled companies fully flow into “operating earnings”; but for noncontrolled companies, only the dividend portion of their earnings is reflected in Berkshire’s operating earnings.
  • There is a large part of companies’ value that is embedded in their retained earnings
    • some may argue the changes in stock prices (thus the unrealized gains) capture it; but it’s a poor reflection I think.
    • “Overall, the retained earnings of our investees are certain to be of major importance in the growth of Berkshire’s value.”
  • “What we see in our holdings, rather, is an assembly of companies that we partly own and that, on a weighted basis, are earning more than 20% on the net tangible equity capital required to run their businesses. These companies, also, earn their profits without employing excessive levels of debt.”
  • “In all, I estimate that it will take 12 to 15 years for the entirety of the Berkshire shares I hold at my death to move into the market.”
  • “It would be an interesting exercise for a company to hire two “expert” acquisition advisors, one pro and one con, to deliver his or her views on a proposed deal to the board – with the winning advisor to receive, say, ten times a token sum paid to the loser. Don’t hold your breath awaiting this reform: The current system, whatever its shortcomings for shareholders, works magnificently for CEOs and the many advisors and other professionals who feast on deals. A venerable caution will forever be true when advice from Wall Street is contemplated: Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”
  • Board independence is unlikely to be real for many companies.
  • Berkshire is going to repurchase shares when price-to-value discount is meaningful and Berkshire is left with ample cash; but, value is somewhat subjective.

Live stream for the annual meeting on May 2nd: https://finance.yahoo.com/brklivestream

Reading Notes For Thomas J. Barrack’s Medium Posts

Two of Mr. Barrack’s recent posts:

March 22 – Preventing Covid-19 From Infecting the Commercial Mortgage Market

March 28 – Unpacking the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) to Support Small and Medium Sized Real Estate Tenants and Owners


  • Depressed revenues will increasingly depress, and when combined with hiccups in the credit markets, borrowing costs will continue to skyrocket, further compounding the inability of businesses to support jobs.
  • Without jobs, Americans will be unable to make payments on their mortgages, rent, credit cards, and automobiles; to acquire goods and services; and, to spend money at restaurants and coffee shops and in support of the gig economy
  • … loan repayment demands are likely to escalate on a systemic level, triggering a domino effect of borrower defaults that will swiftly and severely impact the broad range of stakeholders in the entire real estate market, including property and home owners, landlords, developers, hotel operators and their respective tenants and employees.
  • At a moment when liquidity is essential to avert public panic and to facilitate investments that respond to rapidly-changing and unprecedented economic conditions, the real estate financing market is in danger of inciting a liquidity freeze.
  • In particular, the banks, mortgage REITs and debt funds must agree on a collaborative solution — implemented with the reinforcement and support of federal government policy — to ensure stability moving forward.
  • Among other measures that may be taken, a key element will be averting rushed and widespread margin calls and other “mark-to-market” measures for a period of time under the real estate whole loan and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) repurchase agreements that lenders rely on to provide liquidity in the market.
  • In recent years, publicly-traded mortgage REITs and debt funds have taken on an increasing role in providing commercial real estate financing. This increase is due in part to federal regulatory measures taken in response to the 2008 financial crisis, as financial regulations taken at that time were designed to reduce exposure of banks to certain categories of commercial mortgages, such as construction or bridge loans, by making these loans more expensive from a capital perspective and imposing more stringent and burdensome underwriting standards.
  • Repurchase financing arrangements, through which banks purchase a portfolio of commercial mortgage loans from mortgage REITs or debt funds who agree to buy back the loans at a future date, have enabled banks to provide liquidity for commercial real estate borrowers while complying with the new regulations. Repurchase facilities also offer banks protection through the cross-collateralization of a diverse loan pool that spans multiple asset classes, mitigating exposure in the event of a downturn in a particular segment of the commercial real estate market.
  • Central to the fundamental credit structure of repurchase arrangements is each bank’s ability to “mark-to-market” the loans or CMBS the bank is financing and require the mortgage REIT or debt fund to satisfy any resulting “margin call” by partially paying down the advances on the affected loans
  • it is imperative that real estate lenders are not forced by their financing sources to meet their borrowers with rigidity during this time of heightened need. Under most repurchase arrangements, bank consent is required for mortgage REITs and debt funds to grant material waivers, concessions and modifications requested by their borrowers in order to adapt to the changing economic landscape, ultimately enabling a return to pre-pandemic operations.
  • From January 2008 to January 2009, hotel occupancy dropped to less than 60%. Currently, in the dawning hours of the COVID-19 crisis, hotel occupancy rates are approaching 0% and are likely to remain at those levels for the foreseeable future. Even assuming an optimistic estimate of 25% hotel room occupancy in the coming months, job losses are projected to total between 2.8 and 3.5 million — a roughly eight-fold increase compared to the 2008 financial crisis.
  • If unchecked, margin calls will take hold of the repurchase financing market and the liquidity constraints of lenders will force borrowers and their tenants to divert scarce capital resources towards loan and rent payments — a particularly grave concern in a pandemic context when capital must be allocated towards ensuring that businesses stay solvent and that health-related needs are met.
  • Faced with an unimaginable economic catastrophe, the White House, Congress, Federal Reserve, FDIC and supporting regulatory institutions can work to mitigate this crisis by bringing the banks, public REITs and private debt funds together to reach a solution that provides the liquidity necessary to sustain the commercial real estate market and broader economy.

  • the first week of April will be America’s first payment cycle since the implementation of our ambitious Health response and the first time the vast majority of interest, rental, and other payment obligations will be unmet by Americans and American businesses alike.
  • The Federal Reserve has many roles in the economy, but none of them is to take on credit risk.
  • Here’s how: The Federal Reserve will insist that Treasury contribute money from its new pot of $454 billion to a joint Fed-Treasury lending fund. The Treasury’s contribution you can think of as “equity” — that is, Treasury will stand in a “first loss” position on every loan made to corporate America. The Fed will contribute the “leverage” — the money that will help make loans but which is never put at actual risk. The loan fund will then make loans to businesses.
  • The overall size of the Fed-Treasury loan fund depends on how much risk-averse Fed money will be supplied for every dollar Treasury contributes.
  • Liquidity is how easily a business can convert a thing of value into cash. A liquidity problem is when that conversion process encounters friction.
  • This non-bank capital is critical to the support of consumer lending (installment, credit card, student, and auto loans), business lending, and real estate financing (i.e., commercial real estate (CRE) not guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie).
  • The lender either directly or indirectly bundles, or securitizes, the book of loans and sells different slices of the overall revenue stream from the bundled loans. These slices are called ABS — asset- backed securities — because they are securities that are backed by assets (which are the loan revenue streams).
  • Investors in these ABS are insurance companies, banks, asset managers, pension funds, and other large institutional investors. Their investments — especially investments by regulated entities like insurance companies — are in the investment grade tranches of these ABS (BBB and higher).
  • How do investors in ABS get the money to buy the ABS? Often by entering into liquidity transactions called repurchase agreements (or “repos”) with banks, who advance the cash to the investors and hold the ABS as collateral. The investor promises to repay the repo loan upon maturity (technically this is a sale-and-repurchase but it is viewed as a loan), which is usually short term (but is often rolled over into a new repo loan).
  • Imagine what happens to the value of ABS collateral (including commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS) when: (i) students stop paying back loans; (ii) consumers stop paying down credit card or installment debt; (iii) mall tenants stop paying rent; (iv) nobody is paying to stay in hotels; etc. Two things happen: one, the ABS loses actual value (but on a big scale, not much value as it is only one month of payment missed); but two, and much bigger, nobody wants to buy those securities when the underlying contracts are not performing.
  • The market asks “who knows how long people will continue to not pay?” Values plummet, not because the underlying assets are not healthy (they are) but because there is a complete loss of confidence in these securities by the market.
  • Plummeting ABS values means plummeting repo collateral values, which means margin calls and repo foreclosures.
  • What is desperately needed is two actions: (i) for the Fed to step in and create a market for investment grade ABS and CMBS at pre-COVID advance rates to restore confidence and pricing in the market; and (ii) a margin call holiday or forbearance period (described below).
  • America needs the immediate cooperation and support from our banking sector from JP Morgan to Wells Fargo, who need corresponding regulatory relief, in order to successfully combat COVID-19.
  • In order for lenders to grant American businesses a “time-out” by forbearing rent payments, they need to be able to get forbearances from their lenders, the banks and other forms of credit such as commercial mortgage backed securities. Furthermore, these banks need to grant real estate lenders in the non-bank sector a “mortarium” on repo margin calls.

REITs Coronavirus Responses Roundup

Park Hotels & Resorts (PK)

    • March 9 – Withdraws 2020 Outlook
    • March 16 – Business Update
      • Withdraw guidance
      • Suspend and scale down operations
      • Draw $350 million from revolving credit facility
      • Pay one consistent dividend ($0.45/share), suspend all other dividends until year-end
      • Cancel / defer $130 million of $200 million CapEx
    • March 26 – Additional Update
      • Draw $650 million revolving credit facility
      • Alternative sources of revenue from applicable government authorities and hospitals such as providing temporary lodging for first responders, other medical personnel, military personnel, displaced guests and residents of communities where Park’s hotels are located
    • 2019 Q4 Presentation

Starwood Property Trust (STWD)

    • March 13 – Update
      • withdrawn its full year 2020 outlook
    • March 20 – Actions to Mitigate Impact of COVID-19
      • Currently all of Apple Hospitality’s hotels remain open and operational; implemented cost elimination and efficiency initiatives at each of the Company’s hotels by reducing labor costs and tempering certain services and amenities.
      • Postpone all non-essential capital improvement projects planned for 2020; a reduction of approximately $50 million in capital improvements
      • Suspend monthly distributions
      • Has recently drawn on its credit facility and currently has approximately $300 million of cash on hand. Current availability on the Company’s revolving credit facility is $145 million. The Company has no scheduled debt maturities for the remainder of the year and approximately $34 million in scheduled maturities in 2021.
      • Executive pay cut
    • 2020 Feb Presentation

Apollo Commercial Real Estate Finance (ARI)

    • March 25 – Open letter to stockholders & Investor Presentation
      • Pay one consistent dividend ($0.4/share)
      • ARI has secured borrowing facilities with six counter-parties with remaining terms ranging from six months to over three years, assuming the exercise of our extension options
      • ARI holds only two positions in commercial real estate securities totaling $68 million, neither of which are financed
    • 2019 Q4 Presentation

TPG Real Estate Finance Trust (TRTX)

    • March 18 – Declare Cash Dividend and Company Update
      • Consistent dividend ($0.43/share)
      • More than half of liabilities are comprised of term financings, including CLO’s
      • Less exposure to hotel (13%) and retail (0.6%), less than the 22% average of mREIT peers
    • March 23 – Update
      • Postpone previously announced Q1 dividend for one quarter, payable on July 14, 2020 to stockholders of record as of June 15, 2020
      • CRE debt securities portfolio – as of March 22, 2020, has an aggregate face amount of approximately $960 million, pledged as collateral under daily mark-to-market secured revolving repurchase facilities in the amount of approximately $760 million. Fluctuations in the value of CRE debt securities portfolio, including as a result of changes in credit spreads, have resulted in the Company being required to post cash collateral with its lenders under such facilities
      • If the requirements to post additional cash collateral continue to be material, there is no certainty that the Company will be in a position to continue to fund such payments.
    • 2019 Q4 Presentation

KKR Real Estate Finance Trust (KREF)

「News of the Week」Stock Market Worst Week Following Fed’s Zero Interest Rate Move

The worst week for Dow Jones Industrial Average and S&P 500 since 2008 financial crisis (Oct 2008).

Fed cut rates to near-zero the weekend before, lowering federal-funds rate to a range between 0% and 0.25%.

Dots to connect: QE, easing from central banks around the world, inflation on the way, bond issuing in low-interest-rate environment, another round of asset bubble(?) when recover, etc.