Can you invest in Chinese stocks these days?

Chinese companies’ stock price dropped sharply in the recent months, which seems to be an opportunity for entry. Should people take it?

We need to address a few questions.

Why the drop?

On the surface, China’s economy is entering a slow/no growth mode, with a deteriorating global business environment (especially towards China).

More recently, the sell-off accelerated as many retail investors were “forced” to deleverage. It’s not obvious, but on the personal finance level:

1) home prices declines triggered deleverage, where most Chinese families store most of their wealth. Especially for those who had taken out home equity in the forms of loans when housing prices were peaking in 2021, refinancing at similar level is nearly impossible now. To fill the gap, they need to sell other assets, or to give up the house for auction. Those who had bought stocks using the home equity are likely to suffer big losses in this process.

2) many high-yield investment products have stopped functioning, which may indicate potential meaningful loss in income and principle (those products are likely to have links to real estate developers or equity markets). If people were dependent on those investment products, it’s could cause troubles in personal finance which leads to deleverage.

Therefore, the buying power directly or indirectly built upon people’s home loans or purchases of investment products is liquidating.

 

Why bother to buy? 

1/ Their are still unique companies / business models / edges that’s hard to find elsewhere.

e.g. CATL is still the most efficient and large-scale battery producer, with profits. There are geopolitical concerns but CATL is also building capacities overseas. If the edge in production over others can sustain, and it can grow overseas in a way that local authorities endorse, it looks to be an investable business.

More specifically, the criteria I would argue is that its products or services are incrementally positive to the global economy, or is unique on the global stage, not just among Chinese peers.

In another word, some companies are still a valuable part of global economy, so investors don’t necessarily need to be interested in China, and may choose to hedge some beta/macro risk.

2/ Valuation has come close to global standard.

When you can easily get a 4%+ risk-free rate in savings, it requires a much higher rate for Chinese equities to be attractive.

Depending on risk appetite, 15x p/e implies 6.7% earnings yield, and 12x implies 8.3% earnings yield.

E.g. CATL is around 15x LTM p/e, although we need to see if it’s sustainable as battery prices dropped pretty dramatically. The point is if it’s a normalized 15x p/e for a globally unique business and is growing, it does offer some value to a portfolio.

MSCI China 2023 EPS growth expectation vs. reality

MSCI China EPS in CNY terms from 2023 Q1-Q3 is 1.08, 1.23, 1.25, growing 3.85%, 1.65%, 2.46% yoy.

While reversing the downtrend in 2022, the growth is less than expected. Even with 23q4 current expectation of 9% growth yoy, MSCI China EPS growth is ~4.3% for the full-year 2023.

What was the expectation at the end of 2022 / early 2023?

Let’s take a look:

UBS (Nov/Dec 2022) – “We expect significant easing in COVID-19 restrictions in the second quarter. We forecast earnings growth of 15%-20% for MSCI China, which would be underpinned by lower commodity prices, improved economic growth and lower asset write-downs,”

Morgan Stanley (EPS growth in 2023: 12% -> 13% -> 16%) – for 2023 YE MSCI China Index target, in Nov 2022 report it was 59; raised to 70 in Dec 2022; raised again to 80 in Jan 2023

Goldman Sachs (Dec 2022) – “revise up our earnings forecasts to 13% from 8%” (the link is a report in Jan 2023 but revision is made in Dec 2022.

Citi (Jan 2023) – “expects earnings per share for the MSCI China index to grow 15% year-over-year in 2023. ”

The outcome is the big miss in earnings. We are like to see ~2% 2023 EPS growth in reality vs. expectation of ~15% at the beginning of the year

 

 

Commercial real estate problems summary

A good summary from Rob Stuckey, head of Carlyle’s U.S. real estate funds, on US office building weakness, from Insights and Indicators podcast by Carlyle:

  1. Already weak before pandemic
    • oversupplied
    • low operating margin
    • high correction to GDP / exposure to macro cyclicality
  2. Secular trend of work-from-home / technology trend

Factors to value real estate

  • demand drivers (macro/GDP, demographics)
  • technology
  • operating margin (high maintenance/recurring capital expenditure)
  • tenant stickiness (demand ever increasing)

 

Tesla SOTP… $360bn?

Two biggest component would be electric vehicles and AI.

EV: BYD is <$100bn; BYD delivered higher profits than Tesla; BYD also has energy storage business

AI Models (FSD): OpenAI is <$100bn; latest valuation appeared to be $86bn

AI Chips: AMD is ~$160bn. Tesla should be years behind in terms of external revenue profits (as a business) etc. Let’s just use $160bn, as Tesla has some other business.

Then it sums up to be $360bn = $100bn + $100bn + $160bn

Last time I checked (before earnings), it’s more than doubling that number…


Robots? Boston Dynamics was $1.1bn back in Dec 2020.

Charging? ChargePoint ($CHPT) is ~$1bn market cap.

If someone wants to add ride-hailing services I mean Lyft is <$5bn, not significant.

Even additionally add Enphase and First Solar, which were ~$13bn and $16bn, still not big enough to move the needle.

Insurance could be big. However, if it’s not good enough/taking over now, why it should be in the future? It shouldn’t be a futuristic thing; auto insurance has a history of over 100 years.


$400bn or lower sounds about right.