PetroChina A-Share IPO

 

Chapter 1 – The World’s Fastest-Growing Economy

At the beginning of the 21st century, China was transforming faster than any major economy in modern history.

After joining the WTO in 2001, factories spread across the country. Steel mills, cement plants, highways, airports and apartment towers appeared almost overnight. GDP grew at roughly 10–14% annually. Millions of people bought cars for the first time. Every additional factory required electricity; every truck consumed diesel; every construction site demanded asphalt.

China’s oil consumption reflected this transformation.

Between 2000 and 2007, Chinese oil demand nearly doubled, growing from roughly 4.8 million barrels per day to over 7.5 million barrels per day. China became the second-largest oil consumer in the world after the United States.

At the same time, global supply struggled to keep pace.

Years of underinvestment following the late-1990s oil collapse left little spare production capacity. Geopolitical risks—including the Iraq War, unrest in Nigeria, and concerns about Iran—added further uncertainty. Commodity investors began describing the period as the beginning of a “commodity supercycle.”

Crude oil rose relentlessly:

  • 2002: around US$20–30/bbl
  • 2004: above US$40
  • 2005: above US$60
  • 2006: around US$70
  • Mid-2007: above US$75
  • July 2008: eventually reaching US$147/bbl

To many investors, there seemed to be only one conclusion:

China would continue growing forever.

Oil prices would continue rising forever.

Therefore, oil companies would become permanently more profitable.


Chapter 2 – The Perfect National Champion

Among Chinese companies, none symbolized this story better than PetroChina.

Unlike many newly listed private companies, PetroChina represented ownership of China’s most strategic industry.

It controlled massive upstream oil reserves, pipelines, refineries and distribution assets.

To domestic investors, buying PetroChina meant buying China’s economic miracle itself.

The company had already listed H-shares in Hong Kong in 2000 and ADRs in New York.

However, most mainland investors could not easily purchase overseas shares.

The A-share IPO therefore became something entirely different:

For the first time, ordinary Chinese investors could own what many considered the country’s most valuable enterprise.

Demand became extraordinary.


Chapter 3 – The Bubble Already Existed

By late 2007, Chinese equities were already experiencing one of history’s largest valuation bubbles.

The Shanghai Composite had risen from roughly 1,000 points in mid-2005 to more than 6,000.

Retail investors opened brokerage accounts at record speed.

Newspapers discussed stocks on front pages.

Taxi drivers and university students debated IPO allocations.

People queued outside brokerage offices.

Mutual funds sold out within hours.

There was widespread belief that the Chinese government would never allow the stock market to fall significantly.

Liquidity flooded into every large IPO.


Chapter 4 – Valuation Lost Contact With Reality

Internationally, oil companies remained reasonably valued despite high oil prices.

Approximate valuation before the PetroChina A-share IPO:

Company Forward P/E (approx.)
ExxonMobil 10–12×
Chevron 9–11×
BP 9–10×
Shell 9–11×
Total 9–11×

Investors largely assumed oil prices would eventually normalize.

Chinese investors reached a completely different conclusion.

The PetroChina A-share IPO was priced at RMB16.70.

On its first trading day:

  • Open: RMB48.60
  • Intraday high: RMB48.62
  • Close: RMB43.96

At the day’s high, PetroChina briefly became the world’s largest listed company by market capitalization, exceeding US$1 trillion.

Yet the underlying business had not changed.

The same oil fields.

The same refineries.

The same earnings.

Only the market where investors traded the shares had changed.

The implied valuation was estimated at roughly 45–60× earnings depending on methodology—roughly four to six times the multiple of global oil majors.

This was not because PetroChina was dramatically more profitable than ExxonMobil.

It was because investors believed China’s growth would remain extraordinary forever.


Chapter 5 – Scarcity Meets National Optimism

Several forces reinforced one another.

China’s GDP was booming.

Oil prices were making new highs almost every month.

The Shanghai market itself was already euphoric.

Mainland investors had limited investment alternatives.

PetroChina represented both national pride and perceived scarcity.

Many investors believed:

“If China’s economy doubles again, PetroChina must also double.”

Few asked the more important question:

“What if today’s profits already assume exceptionally high oil prices?”

The distinction between a great company and a great investment disappeared.


Chapter 6 – The Peak

On November 5, 2007, PetroChina reached its all-time A-share high during its first minutes of trading.

It would never revisit that price.

Only months later, the global financial crisis began unfolding.

Oil prices collapsed from US$147 to below US$40.

Commodity profits normalized.

Shanghai Composite Index fell by more than 70%.

PetroChina’s valuation gradually converged toward international oil majors.

The company remained one of China’s largest and most important enterprises.

The business largely survived.

The valuation did not.


Epilogue – The Last Buyer

The PetroChina A-share IPO remains one of history’s clearest examples of the difference between a wonderful company and a wonderful stock.

Almost every part of the bullish narrative proved true:

  • China continued becoming a global economic superpower.
  • Oil demand continued growing for years.
  • PetroChina remained enormously profitable.
  • The company remained strategically indispensable.

Yet investors who purchased at the IPO peak suffered enormous long-term losses because they paid a valuation that assumed an almost perfect future.

The lesson was never that PetroChina was a poor business.

The lesson was that even the greatest businesses can become poor investments when narrative, liquidity, scarcity and optimism combine to overwhelm valuation.

That distinction continues to echo in every market cycle—from technology in 2000, to Chinese equities in 2007, to other periods when investors begin believing that “this time is different.”

Xiaomi buybacks and share sales in history

Xiaomi has been doing buybacks with stock price falling, e.g.

June 22 bought back 6.42m shares for HK$152mn, avg. price at HK$23.68

June 23 bought back 8.44m shares for HK$193mn, avg. price at HK$22.86

People joked that Xiaomi is quite good at buying and selling its own shares.

How good is Xiaomi?

1/ When Xiaomi stock was at more depressed levels (2022 & 2023), it didn’t buy back more aggressively.

In 2021, Xiaomi bought back at avg. HKD 24.5 per share; spent about 8.4bn HKD.

In 2023, when Xiaomi stock is only half of 2021 buyback price, Xiaomi spent 1.5bn HKD in buyback, which is 18% of 2021 in dollar amount.

The number of shares bought back decreased year over year from 2021 to 2023: 344mn -> 235mn -> 127mn.

2/ Xiaomi is good at selling.

The company sold 800 million shares at HK$53.25 each in March 2025; raised $5.5 billion.

In Dec 2020, Xiami sold 1.0bn Class B shares at HK$23.70 per share, plus $855 million through seven-year, zero-coupon convertible bonds, raising $4 billion in total.

Be careful – when Xiaomi resumed buybacks in late 2025 and stepped up in 2026, it’s good but it doesn’t mean much – it could be like 2021.

 

 

Small cap value could outperform

Given the recent bubble-like feeling, it’s useful to see where to hide if this is like dot-com era.

How did small cap value outperform?

1/ less crowded

Small cap value are less exposed to dot-com exuberance. Less impacted by fund inflow/outflow. Less exposed to leverage.

2/ interest rate cuts

In 2001, Fed cuts Fed funds rate target from 6.50% in 2000 to 1.75% in Dec 2001.

Small caps benefits more from rate cuts, as large caps already enjoyed low funding costs.

3/ cheap

Small cap value is better than small cap (Russell 2000) likely due to more margin of safety and little multiple downside (less dream value).

Year IWN / small-cap value Russell 2000
2001 +12.9% +2.5%
2002 -11.4% -20.5%

Solar, Baijiu, and Banks

From 2021 to today,

Solar in aggregate went from 3 trillion rmb to 2 trillion rmb;

Baijiu in aggregate went from 5.4 trillion rmb to 2.4 trillion rmb.

These two sectors along lost 4 trillion rmb in market cap.

Guess who gained?

Banks in aggregate went from 10 trillion rmb to 14 trillion rmb in market cap, gaining 4 trillion rmb in about 4.5 years.

Solar and Baijiu are more private companies.

Banks are more SOEs.

Solar is a representation of how involution destroyed value;

Baijiu is a representation of how declined consumption/macro pressured stocks.

Value trap and being contrarian

Consensus can be right for a long time — ride it while reflexivity is reinforcing it, but be ready to turn contrarian near the inflection point.

It is not “always go against consensus.”

George Soros says the crowd is right 80% of the time.

“Most of the time I am a trend follower … Only at an inflection point are we rewarded.”

His key idea is reflexivity: market prices are shaped by investor bias, and those prices can then affect fundamentals, creating boom-bust loops. So the contrarian opportunity is when the market’s “prevailing bias” has gone too far and starts to reverse.

Being contrarian for most of the time is dangerous.


Being contrarian in investing for too long can be dangerous.

On the upward trend, if you are against the trend and short the stocks, Tiger Mgmt is a case in point – Tiger Management, run by Julian Robertson, effectively shut down in March 2000, right as the dot-com bubble was peaking.

Robertson was acting like a classic contrarian:

  • “These internet stocks are absurdly overvalued.”
  • “Eventually fundamentals will matter.”

Both statements were true.

But Soros would likely argue that Robertson fought the trend too early. A reflexive bubble can become much larger than valuation alone would justify.

On the downward trend, if you are against the trend and long the stocks, there is a term called “value trap”.

Sometimes the crowd is right: the business is structurally deteriorating, ROIC is falling, or the terminal value is lower than historical multiples suggest.


For value traps, the key question is not “is it cheap?” but:

What changes the prevailing trend?


In the case of investing and cigar butt investing like what Warren Buffett did in his early days, he bought near/below liquidation value.

In addition, he had an exit path.

Cigar-butt investing often worked through liquidation, tender offers, buybacks, asset sales, control pressure, or mean reversion. It was not “this bad business will become great.”

So Buffett avoided value trap with asset/liquidation value protection + catalyst/control.


That is even harder in China, as there is little space for an activist in China investing.

Top buyers of gold

Central banks buying gold is a theme for bull investors in gold.

But that doesn’t automatically become a reason to buy. Several things to know before buying.

1/ Who exactly are buying?

I looked it up.

In 2025,

Biggest central bank buyer Poland: 102 ton

2nd place Kazakhstan: 57 ton

3rd place Azerbaijan: 53 ton

Down the list: Brazil, Turkey, China, India, etc.

Surprisingly, most developed countries are not on the list.

European central banks are net sellers.

2/ Net-net, are they buying more

In 2025, they actually bought less than 2024, about 20% lower in tons.

3/ Why do they buy?

The interesting surge happened in 2022.

This coincides with US kicked Russia out of SWIFT etc.

This explains the difference – if you are a retail investor living in OCED countries, you probably don’t need to buy gold vs. some central banks must buy gold to de-risk.

Munger said before, gold is “a great thing to sow into your garments if you’re a Jewish family in Vienna in 1939.”

If you are not trying to relocate out of a turbulent country, there is probably not much reason to buy gold.

$SOXX rebalance

$SOXX will rebalance quarterly.

Its top 5 positions have capped weight at 8% and the remaining will be capped at 4%.

During the quarter, if some stocks run too hot, it could have a larger weight than the cap.

This will create excessive selling as companies like Marvell has heavy weight in $SOXX now but needs to be at 4%.

The rebalance will take effect on Jun 18, 2026.

Other companies like $MU will also need to be sold to reduce weight.

The unusual inflow

In recent 2 weeks, US stocks especially tech/QQQ went straight up, before the AVGO disappointing earnings.

There is an unusual capital inflow that accelerated.

It’s not just FOMO after fabulous run in April and May.

China’s recent crackdown also played an role – as Chinese investors investing overseas fear that they can’t add/buy for the next two years, they rushed to buy a lot!

And they are more likely to chase high beta stocks, leveraged ETFs.

That’s a problem in the short run.

And a correction should normalize this.

These investors can still sell according to rules; they can also buy/add when being abroad.

The end of a cycle of liquidity for Chinese ADR and overseas listed companies

Investors rediscovered China mostly after the policy shift in Sep 2024.

However the ADRs and overseas listed companies still sold off in the subsequent month and the “924” effect nearly reversed.

The second wave of enthusiasm came with the famous “DeepSeek moment” in Feb 2025.

However, the entire world including Chinese ADR and overseas listed companies sold off with Trump’s liberation day in Apr 2025.

The current cycle is the third one and it plays out longer.

While the previous two cycles are fundament driven (policy and tech), the third cycle is a liquidity one I believe.

The most obvious sign is the near zero HIBOR (HK over night interest rate), starting in May 2026.

Meanwhile, there are various short-form videos, social media posts and anecdotes about mainland Chinese people go to HK to open bank accounts and brokerage accounts.

The troubling sign emerged probably when IBKR rejected mainland Chinese to open accounts in Oct 2025.

The Chinese ADRs and overseas listed companies peaked about that time with subsequent AI bubble worries etc.

As the stocks had risen for quite a few months and are at quite elevated levels, it also took time for it to come down.

Iran war accelerated this.

And the Futu/Tiger/LongBridge news in May 2026 marks the end of the cycle.

While it can take some time for remaining selldown to happen, it seems still manageable and valuation is not demanding.

The memory shock to investing

The explosive rise in memory prices has profound impact.

One is in investing and valuation framework – you now have several memory names (like SK Hynix, Micron, SanDisk) that is trading at single-digit or 10x current year P/E with expected high earning growth into the future.

And these companies are large enough to absorb tons of capital.

The indirect impact? Other companies’ valuation now looks absurd!

The previously dirty cheap companies lose investors. For 10x P/E, you can buy memory names with much stronger growth!

If the only reason to long is undervalued, then it becomes harder to justify the buy.

Additionally, those companies with reasonable moat, single digit growth, 20-30x p/e also lose – 2-3x PEG looks absurd now.

This hits many consumer or healthcare names.

No delta, no acceleration in growth = no interest.