Regulation – shiqiv.com

Purpose of Regulation

We had an interesting discussion today on the purpose of regulation. The case in point was the banking and securities regulation in 1933 & 1934.

Three key purposes:

1/ To ensure fairness, leveling the playing field – e.g. information disclosure, less friction

2/ To manage externalities – e.g. systematic risks or spillover effects

3/ To build public confidence – although it may create some enduring wedges as well

On the third point, the banking or securities act is not the perfect example; but in healthcare/drug, FDA seems to deliver a better outcome.

Also today, China’s State Administration for Market Regulation issued statement on fines over grocery group buying companies.

In the long run, good regulations are helping the industry grow – it encourages balanced growth, instead of growth at all cost.

Proposed Law in Japan For FinTech

Found this proposed law in Japan very interesting – for Financial Services Intermediary Business operator (FSIBO).

It’s basically a single registration system that allows 4 types of major fintech services: Banking / Lending / Securities / Insurance, as long as it’s an intermediary business.

It’s like a law for Ant Group…

Or for PayPay (backed by SoftBank).

To list a few details here:

FSIBO is not required to be sponsored by a principal institution

A FSIBO is required to make a security deposit at a public deposit office before commencing its services to secure the payment of potential damages to its clients.

FSIBO can offer only those conventional products or services that do not need a sophisticated explanation to the clients

The FSIBO must disclose fees or remuneration to be received from financial institutions or other matters upon clients’ request. The FSIBO is generally prohibited from receiving deposit from clients in relation to its intermediation service with financial institutions.

FSIBO is subject to further requirements depending on the financial sector where the FSIBO provides its services

Facebook – Not An Easy Business

Facebook blocked all news content in a Australia on Thursday – users cannot share news links and Facebook Pages of media account are taken down.

This is in response to Australian government’s proposed law, which requires payment deals between media outlets and tech companies over content.

This is also one day after Google stroke a deal with News Corp, the media giant. Under the proposed law, Google will need to pay for news content if they appear in search results.

1/ Why Google and Facebook chose different routes (at least for now)?

I think their ad business are fundamentally different.

Facebook ads is seen on Facebook platforms, but Google ads is seen on both Google products and third-party websites.

Google is enabling third-party advertisers (think about the ads on newspaper’ website) to make money, e.g. AdSense. They are partners, and this network of advertisers is valuable to Google.

Facebook’s ads is sold by getting to know users better and letting users stay on its platforms longer. Traffic is important to Facebook, so news is important as a form of content that users want to see. However, Facebook also thinks it is giving media outlets traffic in return. More important, ads sold by Facebook is not relying on those media outlet.

2/ What content should be on social media?

Instagram is in a purer form of social media, so does Twitter. They are usually gravitating towards certain types of contents. On the other hand, products such as Facebook’ main app are aggregating all kinds of “feeds” as long as they can drive traffic.

I think the two types are both here to stay.

Another related issue is how to regulate contents, which has been an increasingly important issue in the US and globally.

“Regulate more” or “regulate less”?

I think either way more regulatory interventions (government) is most likely inevitable.

If platforms regulate less, regulators may think Section 230 is providing to much protection and platforms are not doing enough for their social responsibility.

If platforms regulate more, regulators might think they have too much power, which is also risky. And as they moderate more, it costs more and they may be challenged more often on their decisions.

“Public square” is not easy. “Digital living room” is where Facebook may find more flexibility in contents.

Paying for news might be one of the solutions to navigate some content risk, e.g. fake news, misinformation. However, fake news or misinformation might be the traffic driver that Facebook values.

PBOC’s Draft On Payment Regualtion

The most important clause is the definition of “dominant position” in the national e-payment market – over 50%, or over 2/3 for two companies, or over 3/4 for three companies.

The new regulation is only for nonbank payment service providers, like AliPay, WeChat Pay, etc.

The the most obvious outcome?

1/ In offline markets, it’s time for Meituan payment to grow.

2/ Meanwhile other internet companies will first grow their payment services within their ecosystem online. To name a few: JD payment, Pinduoduo payment, ByteDance’s payment, Kuaishou’s payment, Baidu’s Duxiaoman, Bilibili’s payment, etc.

3/ Traditional banks will be benefited. They can partner with internet companies and grow users. Related services can be provided via those internet companies, such as credit card, small loans, etc.

「News of the Week」Luckin Coffee Fraud

On April 2, the company’s board announced that a preliminary investigation indicates that the “aggregate sales amount associated with the fabricated transactions from the second quarter of 2019 to the fourth quarter of 2019 amount to around RMB2.2 billion ($314 million).” Luckin’s stock price crashed.

Luckin Coffee Press Release

WSJ – Luckin, Rival to Starbucks in China, Says Employees Fabricated 2019 Sales; Stock Plummets

FT – Luckin Coffee apologises for alleged fraud

TechCrunch – Luckin Coffee’s board initiates investigation into $300M potential fraud

WSJ – Ernst & Young Says It First Found Accounting Issues at Luckin

Dots to connect: more scrutiny for US-listed Chinese companies, investigations into underwriters / lawyers / equity research analysts / auditors, trust issues, the need for Citron & short-sellers, fundamental value of this coffee chain business, internal governance for corporates in China, etc.

Delivery System (1): Manpower, Horsepower & USPS

When the current coronavirus (COVID-19) hit the world and people prepare to stay at home for weeks, some of the social infrastructures are receiving increased attention.

The delivery system is a very good one to start. As uber not only provides uberEATS but also grocery delivery, Walmart / Target / CVS increasingly focus on delivery, etc., I will try to review the development of US delivery system recently and what is implied for the future.

Pre-industrialization: The Origin And Natural Power

The origin of United States Postal Service (USPS) can be dated back to 1775 when Benjamin Franklin was promoted as the first postmaster general.

In 1778, the US Constitution, Article I, Section Eight, known as the Postal Clause, says “The Congress shall have Power to establish Post Offices and post Roads”. This explains the importance of the postal system and its position as a government branch nowadays.

In 1792, the Postal Service Act was signed into law, which established the United States Post Office Department, the predecessor of the USPS.

In the early days, mails were mainly carried by manpower and horsepower. In 1785, the Continental Congress authorized the Postmaster General to award mail transportation contracts to stagecoach operators, in effect subsidizing public travel and commerce with postal funds. Despite their higher costs and sometimes lower efficiency, stagecoach proposals were preferred over horseback.

The Philadelphia Stage Coach (about 1800) | Source: https://peterpappas.com

to be continued…

「News of the Week」Court Rules: Privately Operated Internet Platforms Free To Censor Content They Don’t Like.

WSJ – Tech Platforms Aren’t Bound by First Amendment, Appeals Court Rules

Despite YouTube’s ubiquity and its role as a public-facing platform, it remains a private forum, not a public forum subject to judicial scrutiny under the First Amendment

– Circuit Judge M. Margaret McKeown

Dots to connect: internet platforms’ products that operate like government, possible platforms with political views, regulation vs. indirect influence on tech firms, etc.

「News of the Week」Zuckerberg Ready For Facebook To Pay More Tax In Europe

Reuters – Zuckerberg ready for Facebook to pay more tax as welcomes rules review

Venturebeat – Zuckerberg ‘accepts’ that Facebook may have to pay more tax in Europe

Reuters – Treat us like something between a telco and a newspaper, says Facebook’s Zuckerberg

Dots to connect: global tax reform for tech companies, tech companies go beyond countries/regions, potential indirect trade war in digital world, tech ultimately benefits as it can balance between nations, the leading companies may make it hard for others to expand globally and follow suit, social medias as media & telecom companies, UK’s digital taxes, etc.

End of Decade Thoughts (1): An Increasingly Divided United States

This is a series about what we have seen in the past decade.

An Increasingly Divided United States

Three aspects:

1. The 2008 financial crisis provided a great opportunity for those who had equity while made many others in debt work years to recover. And the tax reform exacerbated the process.

– When we entered the past decade, prices were cheap for a lot of equities, but only for those who can buy.

– Differences were then created when the economy recovered – those who held equities enjoyed it.

– On the other hand, those who can’t buy didn’t share the growth (in any bull markets like stock, housing, etc.)

– Thus, more wealth inequalities were created. Supporting evidences could be found for a graph

Series C-2: Overview of Brazil Electricity System (2)

Organization structure

History

Before the 1990s reforms, Brazil’s electricity can be characterized by 3 phases[1]:

private ownership with minimal regulatory control (until 1930);
private ownership with poor regulation (from the 1930s to the1940s);
state ownership with centralized control (from the 1950s to the first half of the 1990s)

In the early 1990s, the Brazilian electric sector was characterized by: (i) centralization of operation and planning; and (ii) vertically integration of transmission, distribution and generation of the sector[2].

Privatization: 1990s reforms

In 1995, a major transformation of the existing regulatory framework entered into effect to foster competition10:

Private participation in the electricity sector
Creation of a new market model in generation and commercialization. The figure of Independent Power Producer and the concept of Free Consumer, was created.

From 1996 – 1998, a project to restructure the sector defined the new conceptual and institutional framework to be implemented for the Brazilian Electric Sector10:

De-verticalization of the electric power companies.
Competition in the segments of generation and commercialization.
The State will keep under control distribution and transmission of electric power, considered to be natural monopolies.
Creation of a regulating agency, ANEEL (1996).
Creation of an operator for the national electric system, ONS (1998).
Creation of an operator for the commercial market, MAE (1998).

The energy crisis of 2001 – 2002[3]

Whilst the reforms of the late 1990s were a bold attempt to overhaul the failing system which preceded it, serious issues remained in the sector which the initial reforms failed to address. Growth in capacity continued to lag far behind growth in demand, and the country relied heavily on hydroelectric generation for 80 per cent of its electricity. Delays continued in the expansion of the sector due in part to the uncertainty in the definition of pass-through prices which complicated pricing mechanisms. After a few years in which average rainfall had been significantly lower than expected, reservoirs were depleted, and strict demand reduction programs had to be implemented by the Crisis Management Board, established and led by President Cardoso in June 2001. The Board had powers to implement emergency measures such as special tariffs, compulsory rationing and blackouts. Additionally, the government established a quota system based on historical and target consumption levels, and a corresponding bonus and penalty scheme whereby consumers were rewarded or penalized according to whether they fell within or exceeded their quota.

The government’s goal to reduce consumption by 20 per cent was achieved, and the quota system proved so effective that the government paid out over US$200 million in bonuses to residential, industrial and commercial consumers. Additionally, the government succeeded in avoiding blackouts and brownouts during the crisis. The response to the crisis was successful in reducing consumption and conserving resources. The biggest losers in the crisis were generators and distributors who inevitably experienced significantly reduced revenues.

The 2004 model

Following the energy crisis in 2001-2, and the election of the new administration led by Luiz Inàcio Lula de Silva in 2003, there was some speculation that the initial reforms of the late 1990s might be rolled back. As the reforms of the 1990s were so closely followed by the energy crisis, there was widespread criticism and skepticism of the new model, and some expectation that the sector would be fully regulated and effectively returned to government control. However, contrary to these expectations, the new administration continued to seek long-term private investment into the sector, and to introduce more competition into the market to drive efficiency that would protect the interests of captive consumers. The institutions established by the reforms of the 1990s were preserved and in many cases strengthened, and further reforms were implemented, including the introduction of energy auctions, to consolidate and improve the new model11.

In 2004, the Brazilian government implemented a new model for the electricity sector. One of the main components of the new electricity model was the creation of two energy trading markets, as showed in the figure: a Regulated Contracting Environment (RCE) where a pool of distributors buys power from generators in public auctions under set prices and a Free Contracting Environment (FCE) where free consumers and generators can freely negotiate their own bilateral contracts[4].

This hybrid approach to government involvement splits the sector into regulated and unregulated markets for different producers and consumers. This approach allows for both public and private investment in new generation and distribution projects. Under the plan, Eletrobrás was formally excluded from privatization efforts. In August 2017, the Brazilian government announced its intention to divest its controlling stake in Eletrobrás. The sale will not include Eletronuclear (a nuclear power company owned by Eletrobrás) or the Itaipu hydroelectric dam6.

According to a Reuters report in Feburary 2019, Eletrobrás manages power plants that generate about a third of Brazil’s electricity needs. It also controls power transmission lines that account for half the electricity transported throughout the country. The privatization likely will happen through a capitalization plan in which new shares would be offered to investors in a process that would dilute the largest shareholder, the Brazilian government, to such a level that it will no longer hold a controlling stake[5].