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Investing in China: common fallacy

A common fallacy, especially in the past, is to find a US asset in the similar industry and use it as a reference for valuation.

Why this is less useful, especially in rmb assets?

To put it simply,

asset value = earnings power (e.g. EPS) x multiple (e.g. P/E)

Then we look at these two components:

1/ Industry dynamics can be vastly different.

Demand side can be very different – e.g. work from home has never been a thing in China vs. only ~24% of workers don’t WFH in 2022 in the US.

Supply sides can also be very different in terms of entry barriers, the level of competition etc.

There are just too many different things, thus the projection based on a US company’s past is usually not a good reference.

2/ valuation can be vastly different.

 

Partially, difference in multiple is reflecting terminal growth,  etc., therefore it’s similar to the first point, which is about fundamentals.

Additionally, If you think about bond prices – US treasury yield vs. China gov bond yield, they are on two diverging roads.

What’s good though? Assets in China can produce less correlated return vs. US assets, therefore providing additional benefits to a portfolio.

[Reading Buffett] 1999

The “best source of new customers is the happy ones we already have” & the “best source of new business is word-of-mouth recommendations”.

At Berkshire, repurchases are not for stemming a decline in Berkshire’s price. Instead, it represents an attractive use of the company’s money.

Buffett didn’t like those repurchases that simply pump up stock prices.

Enron – not alone

Recently finished the book The Smartest Guy In The Room.

Shockingly, you could find many of Enron’s problems in other industries in China during the go-go era (property):

1/ focus on doing projects/deals with early monetization. less focus on the real economics over the entire horizon

2/ lots of off balance sheet financing

3/ weak audit; can’t put a check on mgmt

4/ mgmt takes more early profits out, with potential conflict of interests in the form of SPV, etc.

It’s also similar in WeWork!

The same playbook. Remember that Adam Neumann owns some buildings WeWork leases.

No need to be Buffett

Most people think Buffett’s investment skills are GOAT.

They try to replicate but it’s extremely hard.

Actually, even if people can invest like Buffett, they can’t replicate his success. There are other contributors that are less obvious.

  1. most people don’t have low-cost capital. Your margin account is priced at above prime rate.
  2. most people don’t have more bullets each year, as Buffett’s insurance business (float) is growing each year giving him more money to invest and add to his positions. Thus, when he can buyout the company if needed, most other people can’t.
  3. most people don’t have access to mgmt. When you are Buffett, other people offer you the information in a very accessible manner. And if you are big enough, you become a board member.
  4. most people don’t have enough tax knowledge. Buffett is obsessed with lowering tax legally.

 

[Reading Buffett] 1997

Be happy about lower stock prices, as you are a net saver & investor!

Oh USAir stock can be up like crazy? From $4 to $73!

S&P Index is Buffett’s biggest competitor, and it doesn’t have double tax – Berkshire needs to pay tax on the corporate level for gains or dividends.

[Reading Buffett] 1995

Berkshire’s competitive advantages explained: 1) massive capital to absorb big losses, 2) embracing uncertainty/volatility for higher return (no mistake calculation).

Buffett talked about difficulties faced by Buffalo News, World Book, etc., which is likely due to this paradigm shift towards online.

Berkshire shall create Class B shares in 1996, with 1/30 of economic interests and 1/200 of votes of Class A.

[Reading Buffett] 1994

When doing capital allocations, managers should focus on increasing intrinsic value per share –  however, “in contemplating business mergers and acquisitions, many managers tend to focus on whether the transaction is immediately dilutive or anti-dilutive to earnings per share.”

Besides, major acquisitions can be “a bonanza for the shareholders of the acquiree; they increase the income and status of the acquirer’s management; and they are a honey pot for the investment bankers and other professionals on both sides.”

Option rewards for managers and return cash to shareholders can conflict.