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Bridgewater’s alpha return after 2018

2019: flat

The firm’s flagship Pure Alpha strategy was essentially flat in 2019, with Pure Alpha 18 Percent, the more leveraged version, falling 0.5 percent for the year, according to an investor in the funds. The less leveraged version, Pure Alpha 12 percent, gained 0.5 percent for the year.

2020: -7.6%

Bridgewater Associates’ flagship Pure Alpha fund lost 7.6% in 2020, while the firm’s All Weather fund was up over 10%.

Pure Alpha 12% Strategy fund, which went from posting a 0.29% return in 2019 to suffering a loss of -10.63% in 2020. Furthermore 2020 also wiped out two years of returns on their Pure Alpha 18% Volatility Strategy.

2021: 8%

Performance of Bridgewater’s flagship global macro fund Pure Alpha 18% Vol fund was up 7.95% in 2021 compared with a loss of 12.6% in 2020. The firm’s All-Weather 10% Vol risk-parity strategy returned 11.57% in 2021 and 9.5% in 2020.

2022: 9.4% (6% through Nov)

The Pure Alpha fund tumbled about 13% in the fourth quarter through November, cutting its year-to-date gain to 6%.

Pure Alpha II tumbled in October and November 2022 after having been up 22%. It ended that year up 9.4%.

2023: -7.6%

Bridgewater Associates’s flagship hedge fund lost 7.6% last year, with all of the drop coming in the last two months of 2023, according to people familiar with its performance. The losses for the world’s biggest hedge fund corresponded to the biggest two-month gain in global bonds since at least 1990 and a roughly 14% gain in US shares. The Pure Alpha II fund was up 7.5% through October before dropping about 14% in the following two months.

The firm’s long-only All Weather fund returned 10.6% last year, one of the people said.

 

What did Japan’s housing price look like during 1990s housing bubble?

Price-to-income ratio

The average price of a new 70 sqm apartment in 1990 in Tokyo was 107,660,000 Yen, or 1,538,000 Yen/sqm, while the average annual income was 5,940,000 Yen. Before the bubble, the average price-to-income ratio in 1985 was 8.08.

Financial Times article (https://www.ft.com/content/2ba1cb74-f598-3a4e-9edd-4e55a48d3480)

So in 1990, new home price is ~18x annual income and before bubble is ~8x.


Relative performance

Price rose ~4x in 15 years

Peak to bottom took 5 years; declined ~40% (1990-1995)

From 1975 – 1995, price still rose ~2.5x in 20 years.

Source: Home Ownership and Economic Change in Japan


Relative to global (before bubble)

Price-to-income ratio is actually more than doubling US-level and is the highest among developed countries.

Source: Introduction to “Housing Markets in the U.S. and Japan”

However, Japan’s women work participation rate is lower than the US back then, which can impact household income.

Source: Lessons from the rise of women’s labor force participation in Japan


Income level

Peak income is actually lower for later generations.

Source: The Impact of the Rise and Collapse of Japan’s Housing Price Bubble on Households’ Lifetime Utility


Due to other reasons, e.g. Asia Financial Crisis, the property market didn’t seem to recover until later years.

Source: New apartment prices in Japan since 1956,
Tokyo Kantei via JAPAN PROPERTY CENTRAL

Can you invest in Chinese stocks these days?

Chinese companies’ stock price dropped sharply in the recent months, which seems to be an opportunity for entry. Should people take it?

We need to address a few questions.

Why the drop?

On the surface, China’s economy is entering a slow/no growth mode, with a deteriorating global business environment (especially towards China).

More recently, the sell-off accelerated as many retail investors were “forced” to deleverage. It’s not obvious, but on the personal finance level:

1) home prices declines triggered deleverage, where most Chinese families store most of their wealth. Especially for those who had taken out home equity in the forms of loans when housing prices were peaking in 2021, refinancing at similar level is nearly impossible now. To fill the gap, they need to sell other assets, or to give up the house for auction. Those who had bought stocks using the home equity are likely to suffer big losses in this process.

2) many high-yield investment products have stopped functioning, which may indicate potential meaningful loss in income and principle (those products are likely to have links to real estate developers or equity markets). If people were dependent on those investment products, it’s could cause troubles in personal finance which leads to deleverage.

Therefore, the buying power directly or indirectly built upon people’s home loans or purchases of investment products is liquidating.

 

Why bother to buy? 

1/ Their are still unique companies / business models / edges that’s hard to find elsewhere.

e.g. CATL is still the most efficient and large-scale battery producer, with profits. There are geopolitical concerns but CATL is also building capacities overseas. If the edge in production over others can sustain, and it can grow overseas in a way that local authorities endorse, it looks to be an investable business.

More specifically, the criteria I would argue is that its products or services are incrementally positive to the global economy, or is unique on the global stage, not just among Chinese peers.

In another word, some companies are still a valuable part of global economy, so investors don’t necessarily need to be interested in China, and may choose to hedge some beta/macro risk.

2/ Valuation has come close to global standard.

When you can easily get a 4%+ risk-free rate in savings, it requires a much higher rate for Chinese equities to be attractive.

Depending on risk appetite, 15x p/e implies 6.7% earnings yield, and 12x implies 8.3% earnings yield.

E.g. CATL is around 15x LTM p/e, although we need to see if it’s sustainable as battery prices dropped pretty dramatically. The point is if it’s a normalized 15x p/e for a globally unique business and is growing, it does offer some value to a portfolio.

China’s GDP growth?

2023 China’ official GDP figure is growth 5.2% yoy, as reported today.

The caveat is that the growth is in RMB terms. However, due to RMB devaluation, GDP in USD terms is flat for 2 years.

2021 GDP in RMB: 114,923.7 bn

2023 GDP in RMB: 126,058.2 bn

2021 average FX: 1 USD = 6.4529 RMB

2023 average FX: 1 USD = 7.0742 RMB

2023 vs 2021 GDP in RMB terms grew by 9.7%, or 4.7% annually;

while RMB vs USD dropped by 9.6%, or 4.7% annually.

So GDP in USD terms is flattish for 2 years.

 

China’s birthrate 2023: record low

2023 China has 9.02 mn new born, a record low. Birth rate is 6.39‰ (per 1000 people).

In Japan, it is estimated to have 726,416 new borns in 2023, also a record low.

Strict covid control had negative impact on birth rate. And the remote working culture seems very different in Asia vs. say the US. There is almost no remote working in China. And I don’t think remote working in Japan is mainstream. Remote working seems to be very good to raise kids.

How did post-08 housing price perform in Manhattan?

How did average price change?

Average price per sqft for 2 bedrooms dropped ~17% in 2009 and ~4% in 2010.

Overall average price per sqft looks slightly down / rather flattish in 2010 across all types.

Difference across areas is huge – certain areas can continue to drop over 10% in 2010.

Source: https://www.millersamuel.com/files/2011/10/MMR10.pdf


How was median income level?

Median household income level in New York County (Manhattan) in 2010 was $63,188, dropping 7.5%.

Median household income level in New York State in 2010 was $49,780, slightly dropping.

A 118 sqm 2-bedroom home (or 1,270 sqft), with average price per sqft of $1,097, is equivalent to 22x a median Manhattan family’s annual income in 2010, or 28x a median NY state family’s annual income in 2010.

Monthly median income from a Manhattan household can buy 4.8 sqft, or 0.446 sqm, at average 2-bedroom price.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MHINY36061A052NCEN

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSNYA646N


Another source for median household income is here, from nyc.gov: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/acs/house_income_nyc_boro_06_10.pdf

How much money did electric vehicles companies burn (China Trio: Nio, Li, Xpev)

Employee counts at the end of 2020, 2021, 2022:

Nio total 7,763 15,204 26,763
Xpev total 5,084 13,978 15,829
Li total 4,181 11,901 19,396

Their R&D expenses combined is likely to be similar as Tesla’s R&D expenses in 2023, or ~$4bn.


CapEx (rmb, mn) in 1H 2022, 2H 2022, 1H 2023:

Nio -3,463 -3,510 -5,039
XPEV -2,383 -2,297 -1,429
Li -2,010 -3,118 -2,569

Despite a macro downturn, Nio is spending more in capex.

Nio’s capex is now 26% of its revenue in 23H1; XPEV capex has come down a bit to 16% of revenue; Li Auto had the best ratio at 5.4% of revenue in 23H1.

The trio has spent 18bn rmb in capex from H2 2022 to H1 2023, or ~$2.5bn in usd.

To compare, Tesla has spent $7.8bn in capex during the same period; Rivian spent $1.1bn and Lucid spent $1bn.

While Tesla and Li Auto’s gross profits are higher than their capex number, the other 4 companies were burning their own cash.


Middle-east (CYVN, Abu Dhabi based) is backing Nio in 2023, providing ~$3bn net new funding to Nio.

EU (Volkswagen) is backing Xpev in 2023, providing ~$700mn financing to Xpev.

 

 

Self-fulling markets

Self-fulfilling thesis seems everywhere.

Housing – rising home prices -> more people want to buy; banks willing to lend more -> more people can buy -> higher home prices..

Liquor/baijiu (Moutai) in China – buy Moutai stock & Moutai liquor-> Moutai will rise in value over the years (due to inflation etc. and company may raise prices) as an “investment product” -> you can even take “equity/cash” from the liquor you bought -> you can buy more Moutai or Moutai stocks -> excessive demand will drive Moutai price & Moutai’s financials thus stock price shall go up -> investors make profit on stocks and can buy more Moutai or Moutai stocks…

Tesla – buy Tesla stocks & put down reservations -> stock price rise due to higher demand -> use profits from Tesla stock to buy real Tesla cars, which can contribute to Tesla financials -> stock price rises… This may work well at early stage when volume is low.

 

 

TSMC in EU

Capital structure. The setup seems simple. Total cost is 10 billion euros. German gov shall give 5 billion euros in subsidies. TSMC will put down 3.5 billion euros, for a 70% stake. Bosch, Infineon Technologies and NXP Semiconductors will each put down 500 million for a 10% stake – 30% total.

Timing. TSMC’s fab in Japan announced in Oct 2021, started construction in Apr 2022 and is finishing in Q1 2024 (2 years of construction), and began mass production in H2 2024. The Kumamoto plant will start with 28-nm and 22-nm chips.

TSMC’s German fab hasn’t started yet. Should it began construction in H1 2024, it should finish in 2026 and start mass production in 2027. which sounds a bit far away. And this fab is for mature node (28/22nm planar CMOS and 16nm/12nm FinFET nodes).

Cost. Back in 2016, TSMC’s Nanjing plant (Fab 16) is said to cost $3bn for 20,000 12-inch wafers per month, plus the construction of a design service center. The German plant is designed to have 40,000 wafers a month, but still, the cost has inflated to almost 2x after 8 years, or ~8% annually.

 

MSCI China 2023 EPS growth expectation vs. reality

MSCI China EPS in CNY terms from 2023 Q1-Q3 is 1.08, 1.23, 1.25, growing 3.85%, 1.65%, 2.46% yoy.

While reversing the downtrend in 2022, the growth is less than expected. Even with 23q4 current expectation of 9% growth yoy, MSCI China EPS growth is ~4.3% for the full-year 2023.

What was the expectation at the end of 2022 / early 2023?

Let’s take a look:

UBS (Nov/Dec 2022) – “We expect significant easing in COVID-19 restrictions in the second quarter. We forecast earnings growth of 15%-20% for MSCI China, which would be underpinned by lower commodity prices, improved economic growth and lower asset write-downs,”

Morgan Stanley (EPS growth in 2023: 12% -> 13% -> 16%) – for 2023 YE MSCI China Index target, in Nov 2022 report it was 59; raised to 70 in Dec 2022; raised again to 80 in Jan 2023

Goldman Sachs (Dec 2022) – “revise up our earnings forecasts to 13% from 8%” (the link is a report in Jan 2023 but revision is made in Dec 2022.

Citi (Jan 2023) – “expects earnings per share for the MSCI China index to grow 15% year-over-year in 2023. ”

The outcome is the big miss in earnings. We are like to see ~2% 2023 EPS growth in reality vs. expectation of ~15% at the beginning of the year