How much is home-made coffee vs. Starbucks?

just calculating coffee beans here.

1 grande Starbucks americano (ice/hot), typically $3-4 globally now, comes with 3 shots. (Tall has 2 shots)

1 shot = 7 grams of coffee beans

1 grande americano has 21 grams of coffee beans


just bought some beans (illy, Arabica, Etiopia). Price may wary, but for 250g it’s  ~$10-15

250g can make 10-12 serves of previously calculated grande americano

each serve (grande americano) costs ~$1 of coffee beans


using larger bags of cheaper beans, e.g. $55.5 for 2260g (see below), each serve of grande americano uses ~$0.5 coffee beans


Again, lots of stuff come into play: convenience, time, other ingredients, logo, etc.


Starbucks item prices: https://www.fastfoodprice.com/menu/starbucks-prices/ (Grande americano is $3.45)


Tall latte price globally

 

Perfect Diary or YSG? The dilemma for brand advertising

Following up on the previous blog, Perfect Diary seems to be at the perfect stage to do more brand advertising.

Two problems tho –

1/ what is the core message? Compared with 花西子, perfect diary seems to be less special in terms of message it sends.

2/ YSG wants to be the pipe or the platform. To do so, it needs resources to diversify, which inherently means the lower importance of perfect diary.

It seems to me that the conflict is also due to the short time frame the management has. To go for the ultimate J-curve of perfect diary and to become the holding group with successful tiered brands in a few years = a extremely tough goal.

If we draw a matrix – categories on the x-axis and premium level on the y axis, plus female/male on the z-axis.. long way to go.

China’s housing market (2) [WIP]

Asset allocation in China

Very different from the US, where financial assets represent a large portion of families’ wealth, for most Chinese families, real estate assets (residential) are the top choice and the most important part for asset allocation. According to a survey conducted in 2019, among urban families’ total assets, 59.1% is residential homes while only 20.4% is in financial assets[1],[2]. In a previous analysis on another series of data, housing asset represents 74.1%, 73.8%, and 72.7% of urban households’ total assets in 2010, 2012 and 2014 respectively[3]. Comparatively, in 2016, US households’ mean value of primary residence is only 24.4% of their mean value of total assets, while financial assets are around 42.5%[4].

For one thing, China’s A-share market doesn’t provide meaningful return over the last decade, compared with S&P 500. The chart below is from 2010 to 2019: the black line is CSI 300 Index, which consists of the 300 largest and most liquid A-share stocks, while the blue line is S&P 500.

Exhibit 2. CSI 300 and S&P 500 performance over from 2010 to 2019

In fact, among the 20.4% financial assets, the report said only around 10% (or 2% of total asset) is equity exposure, including stocks and mutual funds.

Meanwhile, housing prices in China is climbing steadily. Buying a home in top tier cities in China is like a leveraged long position in S&P 500 in the US, with lower risks and higher returns. Indeed, it would be comparable to a leveraged buyout deal – and millions of people are actively participating. According to some 2010 info, prices under RMB 30k per sqm[5] were common in Nanshan, Shenzhen; after 10 years, in the same district, new homes are priced at least at RMB 70k per sqm. Indeed, for the same community, prices can easily triple up.

The last decade’s rise is already on the back of a steady growth in the previous decade. In another study, Shenzhen’s housing price index rose from 1 to 3.65 between 2003 and 2013[6]. The same is true for other first tier cities – index increased from 1 to 4.43 for Shanghai, from 1 to 5 for Guangzhou, and from 1 to 7.6 for Beijing. Tier two and Tier three cities generally experience the same trajectory, with average growth rate a few points lower.

With a common 10x return and the ability to take leverage, residential real estate has become the most obvious, safest asset allocation choice with the best return profile for most people in China.

It is also worth noting that many high-quality companies in China, mostly in the internet industry, are not listed on the A-share market. Thus, they remain inaccessible to many people, further limiting their asset allocation choices.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/china-household-assets-0424-fri-idCNKCS2260VC (Chinese)

[2] http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP202004271378696212_1.pdf (Chinese)

[3] https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/7/2946/htm

[4] https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/research-department-working-paper/2019/trends-in-household-portfolio-composition.aspx

[5] https://sz.leju.com/news/2020-09-27/06456715630843769180881.shtml (Chinese)

[6] journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/685953

China’s housing market (1) [WIP]

Urbanization and population

According to the World Bank, China’s urban population percentage increased from 36% in 2000 to 60% in 2019, or around 843 million[1]. Two largest cities in China, Shanghai and Beijing, have 24.3 million and 21.5 million residents respectively in 2019 (Exhibit 1).

in millions 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019
Beijing 13.64 15.38 19.62 21.71 21.54
Shanghai 16.09 18.90 23.03 24.15 24.28

Exhibit 1. Beijing and Shanghai residents growth over the past two decades

While the definition for a “resident” is to live for more than 6 month of a given year, two other metrics are “Hukou” and “actual population served / managed” – Hukou, the most conservative one, is a concept dated back to ancient China while the latter is newly disclosed. In 2019, measured by actual population served / managed, Guangzhou has over 22 million, Shenzhen has over 22 million[2], Chengdu has over 21 million[3]. Meanwhile, their official residents in 2019 are 15.3, 13.4 and 16.6 million respectively.

While Hukou population for Shenzhen is only around 5 million, the actual population is 4 times more. The gap seems to be a good proof for Shenzhen’s fast growth over the past few decades, and also implies an outsized demand for future home buying. As further discussed below, Hukou (or certain years of social security tax) has become the prerequisite to buy homes in certain large cities such as Shenzhen. Therefore, fundamentally, the long-term increase in buying pressure is from 1) among the actual population, those who would like to stay in Shenzhen, obtain Shenzhen Hukou and buy homes, 2) the constant increase in actual population managed / served, as Shenzhen continues to attract businesses and provides high-quality jobs.

[1] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL?end=2019&locations=CN&start=2000

[2] https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_7843440 (Chinese)

[3] https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/159193229415528.html (Chinese)

Current State of Covid

I found this graph a good illustration of what has been happening in the past year – “Zoom” vs. “Vaccine” on Google Trends.

Source: Google Trends

Meanwhile, trend only illustrates new changes – “zoom” has permanently entered people’s life although the number of searches for it lowers overtime.

Rule of 40 & Valuation

For SaaS companies, rule of 40 is a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation, to measure the healthiness of the business.

Score = top-line growth + bottom-line margin

Score of 40 or above is good – e.g. a business grows at 40% with 0% adj. ebitda margin.

The valuation for those businesses, which usually starts at 10x revenue, is assuming a maturity stage of 0% growth and 40% profitability.

10x revenue @40% profit margin = 25x P/E

8x revenue @40% profit margin = 20x P/E

DoorDash Beyond Pandemic

Back in January, I wrote about how DoorDash could be valued at $60bn, with solid earnings (in the future).

While I question the near-term growth beyond $60bn, today’s earnings obviously doesn’t help.

Its stock drops more than 10% after-market.


Two things that the market seems to be too optimistic about:

1/ GOV and revenue growth – won’t be amazing

While it’s amazing that DoorDash GOV grew more than 200% in 2020, its forecast for 2021 is conservative: $30bn to $33bn, or 28% growth at the middle point.

Given Q4 GOV is ~$8.2bn, it’s basically forecasting minimal sequential growth. (lower in Q3/Q3 and higher in Q1/Q4, considering seasonality)

Our outlook anticipates the successful rollout of COVID-19 vaccines, among other things. Though we cannot predict the short or long-term effects this will have on consumer behavior, our guidance assumes it creates headwinds to growth in total orders and average order values. We caution investors that the outlook for 2021 remains highly uncertain, and consumer behavior could deviate from the expectations included in our guidance. Our guidance also assumes that the timing of scaled vaccinations will coincide with our seasonally softer Q2 and Q3 periods. Consequently, our forecast assumes increasing consumer churn, reduced order frequency at the cohort level, and slightly smaller average order values beginning in Q2. Because of this, our full year 2021 guidance assumes Marketplace GOV in Q2 and Q3 will be below the levels we expect in Q1.

2/ Profits – won’t be amazing

While DoorDash posted ~10% adj. EBITDA margin for the past three quarters, it may not be able to do so in 2021.

Considering $86 million adj. EBITDA in 2020 Q3, the forecast of $0-200 million for FY2021 seems lower than what investors were expecting.


That being said, to maintain a healthy ecosystem and to withstand the normalization of life, DoorDash needs to put extra efforts in retaining users and Dashers, and business partners. And it can and will invest more in acquiring talents.

Even 2021 GOV is $30-33bn, it will diversify (more heathy/stable demand), growing outside of the food delivery business. In 2023, this number can still go to $50 billion (say 2 billion orders x $25 per order), growing at over 25%.

And on the subscription front,

While DashPass orders carry a below-average Take Rate, the average DashPass subscriber orders more frequently and stays on the platform longer than the average non-subscriber.

DoorDash is playing the long game and the business is here to stay.

Be patient.

Increasing Yield & Multiples

US stock market is in a tough week as 10-year yield rises.

It’s interesting to review the CAPM formula and its relation with multiple.

Assumptions:

    • Market risk premium (MRP) = 6%
    • Before covid, risk-free rate = 10-year yield = ~2%
    • 10-year yield basically goes to 0.5% in 2020 and approaches now to 1.5%
    • Discount = Risk-free rate + MRP, assuming beta is 1
    • Earnings terminal growth rate = 3%
    • Earnings multiple = 1/(Discount – Terminal growth rate)
Risk-free rate Discount Multiple
2% 8% 20.0x
0.5% 6.5% 28.6x
1% 7% 25.0x
1.5% 7.5% 22.2x

When market was performing like it’s 1% but realized that it’s actually 1.5%, the correction is ~9%.

When market was performing like it’s 0.5% but realized that it’s actually 1.5%, the correction is ~22.5%.

Proposed Law in Japan For FinTech

Found this proposed law in Japan very interesting – for Financial Services Intermediary Business operator (FSIBO).

It’s basically a single registration system that allows 4 types of major fintech services​: Banking / Lending / Securities / Insurance​, as long as it’s an intermediary business.

It’s like a law for Ant Group…

Or for PayPay (backed by SoftBank).


To list a few details here:

FSIBO is not required to be sponsored by a principal institution​

A FSIBO is required to make a security deposit at a public deposit office before commencing its services to secure the payment of potential damages to its clients.

FSIBO can offer only those conventional products or services that do not need a sophisticated explanation to the clients​

The FSIBO must disclose fees or remuneration to be received from financial institutions or other matters upon clients’ request. The FSIBO is generally prohibited from receiving deposit from clients in relation to its intermediation service with financial institutions.​

FSIBO is subject to further requirements depending on the financial sector where the FSIBO provides its services

Facebook – Not An Easy Business

Facebook blocked all news content in a Australia on Thursday – users cannot share news links and Facebook Pages of media account are taken down.

This is in response to Australian government’s proposed law, which requires payment deals between media outlets and tech companies over content.

This is also one day after Google stroke a deal with News Corp, the media giant. Under the proposed law, Google will need to pay for news content if they appear in search results.

1/ Why Google and Facebook chose different routes (at least for now)?

I think their ad business are fundamentally different.

Facebook ads is seen on Facebook platforms, but Google ads is seen on both Google products and third-party websites.

Google is enabling third-party advertisers (think about the ads on newspaper’ website) to make money, e.g. AdSense. They are partners, and this network of advertisers is valuable to Google.

Facebook’s ads is sold by getting to know users better and letting users stay on its platforms longer. Traffic is important to Facebook, so news is important as a form of content that users want to see. However, Facebook also thinks it is giving media outlets traffic in return. More important, ads sold by Facebook is not relying on those media outlet.

2/ What content should be on social media?

Instagram is in a purer form of social media, so does Twitter. They are usually gravitating towards certain types of contents. On the other hand, products such as Facebook’ main app are aggregating all kinds of “feeds” as long as they can drive traffic.

I think the two types are both here to stay.

Another related issue is how to regulate contents, which has been an increasingly important issue in the US and globally.

“Regulate more” or “regulate less”?

I think either way more regulatory interventions (government) is most likely inevitable.

If platforms regulate less, regulators may think Section 230 is providing to much protection and platforms are not doing enough for their social responsibility.

If platforms regulate more, regulators might think they have too much power, which is also risky. And as they moderate more, it costs more and they may be challenged more often on their decisions.

“Public square” is not easy. “Digital living room” is where Facebook may find more flexibility in contents.

Paying for news might be one of the solutions to navigate some content risk, e.g. fake news, misinformation. However, fake news or misinformation might be the traffic driver that Facebook values.