Tag: China Observation

First quarter China household net additional mortgage lowest in 10 years

For the first quarter of 2026, the net increase in mid-to-long-term household rmb debt is lower than 2015 by ~33%. This is an approx of net new mortgages.

2015 was the year of 棚改货币化 / 去库存

2016 was the year of 房住不炒 (near end of the year)

1q26 – 2026年一季度金融统计数据报告

3月末，本外币贷款余额284.51万亿元，同比增长5.7%。月末人民币贷款余额280.51万亿元，同比增长5.7%。一季度人民币贷款增加8.6万亿元。分部门看，住户贷款增加2967亿元，其中，短期贷款减少1640亿元，中长期贷款增加4607亿元；企（事）业单位贷款增加8.6万亿元，其中，短期贷款增加4.13万亿元，中长期贷款增加5.42万亿元，票据融资减少1.1万亿元；非银行业金融机构贷款减少3680亿元。

1q15 – 2015年一季度金融统计数据报告

3月末，本外币贷款余额91.52万亿元，同比增长13.3%。月末人民币贷款余额85.91万亿元，同比增长14.0%，增速比上月末低0.3个百分点，比去年末高0.3个百分点。一季度人民币贷款增加3.68万亿元，同比多增6018亿元。分部门看，住户贷款增加8892亿元，其中，短期贷款增加2064亿元，中长期贷款增加6828亿元；非金融企业及其他部门贷款增加2.71万亿元，其中，短期贷款增加9543亿元，中长期贷款增加1.48万亿元，票据融资增加1643亿元；非银行业金融机构贷款增加632亿元。3月份人民币贷款增加1.18万亿元,同比少增661亿元。月末外币贷款余额9146亿美元，同比增长4.0%，一季度外币贷款增加341亿美元。

In fact, you need to go back to 2012 to find a lower number.

1q12 – 2012年一季度金融统计数据报告

3月末，本外币贷款余额60.77万亿元，同比增长15.5%。人民币贷款余额57.25万亿元，同比增长15.7%，比上月末高0.5个百分点，比上年末低0.1个百分点。一季度人民币贷款增加2.46万亿元，同比多增2170亿元。分部门看，住户贷款增加4995亿元，其中，短期贷款增加2581亿元，中长期贷款增加2414亿元；非金融企业及其他部门贷款增加1.95万亿元，其中，短期贷款增加1.05万亿元，中长期贷款增加5906亿元，票据融资增加2575亿元。月末外币贷款余额5595亿美元，同比增长17.2%，一季度外币贷款增加211亿美元。

M1 vs M2 gap in China

Back in 2016 and 2017, M1 growth was meaningfully faster than M2 growth in China, which typically indicates a high willingness to spend or invest in the economy.

That is a bullish sign.

On the contrary, if M1 growth is below M2 growth by a wide margin, it usually indicates people would rather save more than spend or invest.

That negative gap was deepening throughout 2024 till the famous 924 stimulus.

Using revised M1 growth rate, the negative gap was about -5% at the beginning of 2024 and about -10% in Sep 2024.

That negative gap shrunk to about -1% in Sep 2025 and about -3% in Feb 2026.

Actually, looking at M2 growth alone might give you a glimpse of China’s economy pulse and sentiment.

 

Labubu adjusted P/E

In a previous post, I said unpredictability is what Pop Mart investors must shoulder, but is there any number that can make investors slightly more comfortable?

Let’s try Labubu adjusted P/E and we need Labubu adjusted earnings.

Labubu (The Monsters IP from Pop Mart) revenue was over 14 billion rmb in 2025.

The other “good” IPs were about 3 billion rmb revenue.

We can assume there is 10 billion “extra” revenue that Labubu is earnings.

We can also assume Pop Mart’s marginal operating profit margin is 50%. Then the “extra” operating profit is ~5 billion rmb.

Subtract that from 2025 operating income will give you about 12bn rmb in Labubu adjusted operating profit.

With 25% tax rate, Labubu adjusted earnings is about 9bn rmb.

At 150 HKD per share, Pop Mart is at ~20x Labubu adjusted P/E.

Unpredictability is what Pop Mart investors must shoulder

Pop Mart stock plunged after earnings – down 23% on Wednesday and down 10% on Thursday.

Pop Mart’s forecast of 20% or so rev growth in 2026 is lower than what is expected and is a sharp decline after 185% growth in revenue in 2025.

Labubu is still one of the hottest fashion toy IP worldwide with no competitors I think.

However, investors can’t reliably forecast future rev and thus cash flows of Pop Mart as nobody knows whether Labubu can sustain its mojo / for how long and how far.

Unpredictability is usually a negative thing, but people disregarded it as a risk when Labubu was in rapid growth mode. The “upside” unpredictability blinds investors – they liked it actually.

Now if you really want to be an investor in Pop Mart, you need to be comfortable with this inherent unpredictability.

One way to think about this is that Pop Mart is ultimately a very good channel like Tencent. Whatever it incubates and sells, its stores will sell them well. Pop Mart stores are the product of Pop Mart, alongside the IPs like Labubu.

However, to say Pop Mart stores is like WeChat is too much a compliment for Pop Mart so far. Network effect that is so strong and unique that WeChat really doesn’t have a competitor.

Why CFOs may not be good CEOs

I believe excellent CEOs need a set of unique skillsets – they need to be able to unite people, rally the morale, be bold and innovative in strategy.

Good CFOs are very good at numbers, very analytical when presented a well-defined question. They are also responsible for financing and executing M&As which can be strategical.

I think excellent CFOs can bring CEO-like value when they proactively pursue M&A deals or actively manage acquired companies. However, this is not a base case.

I could be wrong, but more often than not, CFOs don’t really need to be innovative or think outside the box to be okay – they are fine to be pragmatic and consistent, and sometimes expected to be so.

When CFOs become CEOs, there might be an attendance to deliver near-term numbers rather than focus on real value creation.

It could also go wrong if they rely too much M&As – bad deals will cost a fortune and even mediocre deals carry opportunity costs.

Alibaba used to have Daniel Zhang as CFO and he became CEO in 2015. When he stepped down in Sep 2023, the annualized return during his tenure is at best bond-like.

That’s why I don’t feel good about Mixue Group – it announced that its CFO Zhang Yuan will become CEO, effective immediately. Mixue founders will stay as co-chairman though.

Let’s see.

Two values of e-commerce and Meituan

There are two core values provided by “e-commerce” platforms, transaction and discovery.

If you know what you want, search in Taobao, and put an order, Alibaba provides the “transaction” value.

If you just want to order McDonald’s food delivery, Meituan also provides the “transaction” value.

What shopping mall provides and what Taobao used to be famous for is that consumers are just wandering around / 逛 – this is how the “discovery” value can be provided.

“Discovery” is deserved to earn higher, and almost as a cut to final sales – businesses believe they win this incremental order because of you. In “transaction” mode, businesses believe they have already had the order; thus transaction providers can only earn the fulfillment fee.

In the transaction mode, the lowest transaction cost provider will naturally win more busines.

In the discovery mode, the provider that can generate more “new sales” can win more business.

So Tencent mini-program / mini-shop is good for luxury brands as the they just need a place to list. Consumers almost already know these brands. The lower than transaction cost the better.

Douyin, Xiaohongshu are better in discovery mode as users spend a lot of time in their app “wondering”. The apps are more likely than others to create incremental demand – users don’t know they want it until they see it.

Previously, transaction mode and discovery mode are served in the same place like Taobao.

This is also true for Meituan in food delivery or in-store dining. Chinese consumers scroll Meituan app for look for food delivery or dining ideas. Even if they are already in the restaurant or know what to order, they also go to Meituan to make related transaction.

Meituan also provides pre-defined sets for many in-store dining – this is tricky. Is this discovery mode? Consumers don’t know what to eat even they are already in the restaurant.

But I think it’s still more transaction mode. Think about the fixed tasting menus provided at a Michelin restaurant. Meituan doesn’t help create incremental demand here if I browse and purchase the $199 set via the app – the value is transaction or like credit cards.

All I want to say is that if Meituan will be like Taobao, competition will be from two fronts – one is by providing lower transaction cost, another is by stealing the discovery cake.

拭目以待

Where does Alibaba’s bullishness come from?

Alibaba recently outlined a 5-year target to $100bn AI+Cloud revenue, however many investors are either not convinced or skeptical of future monetization.

Why Alibaba has $100bn target in the first place?

Besides the delayed AI boom in China with potential breakthrough in domestic AI chip production, what are the drivers?

1) Amazon CEO Andy Jassy outlined $600bn goal in 10 years recently

$100bn would be about 700bn rmb and matches the AWS “number”.

2) Within Alibaba, there could be potential internal politics consideration

E-commerce is still the most profitable core business; Jiang Fan leads the e-commerce efforts, spending billions in quick commerce etc.

Eddie Wu leads the AI+Cloud and is CEO of Alibaba. This is growing fast but still not as profitable.

These two people might be fighting for resources and territory within Alibaba.

AI+Cloud needs to be bold.

700bn rmb rev with 15% EBITA margin will be ~100bn rmb EBITA.

This could be matching Alibaba’s China e-commerce adj. EBITA in 2026, which dropped from ~200bn though, due to massive subsidy.

For Jiang Fan, quick commerce is a way to paint growth picture for overall china e-commerce business.

Otherwise, Eddie Wu might get more of Alibaba’s incremental spending, which then will almost ensure Wu’s rise and Jiang’s fall.

Jiang was also smart in not picking the fight with PDD, which is probably harder to win. The fight with Meituan is not easy, but if you have to pick one to fight with between PDD and Meituan, Meituan is the choice.

Tencent also has already made the choice – it sold Meituan stake and kept PDD stake.

Fighting with PDD is more defending vs. fighting with Meituan is winning new businesses. KPIs will look more exciting in the new business.

88% drop in new household mortgage Jan-Feb 2026 vs 2021

In the first two month of 2026, China households increased mid-to-long-term borrowing by 165.4 bn rmb, vs 1356.1 bn rmb in the first two month of 2021.

That is a decrease of 88%.

Households’ new mid-to-long-term borrowing is mostly associated with mortgages / housing purchases.

Details below.

Feb 2026 – PBOC

前两个月人民币贷款增加5.61万亿元。分部门看，住户贷款减少1942亿元，其中，短期贷款减少3596亿元，中长期贷款增加1654亿元；

Feb 2021 – PBOC

2月份人民币贷款增加1.36万亿元，同比多增4529亿元。分部门看，住户贷款增加1421亿元，其中，短期贷款减少2691亿元，中长期贷款增加4113亿元

Jan 2021 – PBOC

1月份人民币贷款增加3.58万亿元，同比多增2252亿元。分部门看，住户贷款增加1.27万亿元，其中，短期贷款增加3278亿元，中长期贷款增加9448亿元

Stopping disclosure is a sure pressure in near term

Tencent Music $TME will no longer report the operating metrics on a quarterly basis such as Monthly Active Users (MAU) for online music services and Number of Paying Users for online music, starting from next quarter.

The stock dropped 24.65% in a day, with other concerns like more competition from ByteDance’s Soda Music.

It’s almost a sure thing that stopping disclosure on key operating metrics will make stock price under pressure.

A very similar case is Netflix in 2024.

In April 2024, Netflix announced it would stop reporting quarterly membership numbers and Average Revenue per Member (ARM) starting in 2025.

Netflix shares fell ~8% the day after the Q1 2024 report.

Here is the last report on these operating metrics.

 

The company argued that subscriber count is no longer the best indicator of health due to new revenue streams like advertising and “extra member” fees.

Netflix still discusses those in shareholder letters and gives financial guidance, like this for 4q25 earnings.

While $TME gave similar explanations, it didn’t give investors 4 quarters to adapt.

As advertising and other IP related offerings scale, and as we offer multi-tiered membership for online music subscriptions, the business impact of each paid membership varies. As a result, we are increasingly focused on revenue and profit as our primary performance indicators.

Given this evolution, starting from next quarter, we will discontinue the disclosure of certain quarterly operating metrics, including online music MAU, paying users and ARPPU.

We will instead report the number of total paying users across our music services annually, as of year-end.

– 4q25 TME earnings release

 

Three 40bn RMB investments

Bytedance’s Volcano Cloud: to lose 40bn RMB in 2026

Alibaba is subsidizing over 40bn RMB per year via Taobao Instant Commerce. (Over 50bn announced in July 2025 for next 12month; reiterated importance of subsidy in 2026 earlier this year)

Tencent announced more than 36bn investments in AI product development for 2026 with its 4q25 earnings, with no return KPI near term and more to come in the future.

These are 0.1% of China GDP already!

Better compensation, subsidy to consumers and businesses are also different kinds of GDP-boosting initiatives; big companies are doing their social responsibility jobs as well.