Living space in China vs. developed countries

According to the China Population Census Yearbook 2020, China has 462 million households, with average area of 111 sqm per household and 41.76 sqm per person. Average room per household is 3.2 and average room per person is 1.2.

Average space per capital of 41.76 sqm is not a small number. 

To compare, I asked ChatGPT for other countries’ numbers – 40-45 is quite the average. Only US, Canada and Australia are meaningfully above that number.

Just to double check in case ChatGPT is wrong, I looked up for German’s average living space, which was 46 sqm per person in 2018.

This number hasn’t changed much in the last decade or so. It was ~42 sqm per person in 2006 already, after decades of improvements (from 19 sqm per person in 1960).


Some further cross -check

Take a look at average home size in Europe, 100 sqm is already quite good.

Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8073340/pdf/ijerph-18-04278.pdf

Average room per person is 1.6 among EU countries.

 

Take turns: Japan and China

Japan largely missed the PC/mobile/internet wave decades ago.

In retrospect, Japan was in “competition” with the US in memory chips etc.

Microsoft chose Beijing as its APAC research center back in 1998.


Now in 2024, Microsoft chose Japan to invest billion of dollars for AI and cloud.

And China is in “competition” with the US in AI and other tech.

China risks losing behind in AI, mostly as the most powerful chips are not allowed to be sold to China.

 

 

The year after Abbott exited China’s infant formula market

At the end of 2022, Abbott Laboratories announced the gradual exit of mainland China’s infant formula market throughout 2023.

Abbott had ~3% market share.

How other international brands were doing in 2023?

Nestle’s Greater China business overall saw 4.2% organic growth in 2023, citing positive growth in Infant Nutrition.

Danone (Aptamil brand) saw market share gain in 2023, with 8.3% yoy like-for-like growth in specialized nutrition in China, North Asia & Oceania.

A2 grew 10.4% yoy in 23H2 (FY24H1) for its China label products, and 16% yoy in 23H1 (FY23H2).

 


 

 

McDonald’s China menu price / China CPI

There was this “oh麦” membership offered by McDonald’s China.

If you buy the membership, you can purchase several “4件套” for a bigger discount.

It was rmb 29 for [Big Mac combo meal + 5 Chicken Nuggets] back in 2021.


The price increased by 1 rmb generally in July 2022, when the membership was upgraded to “O麦金” membership. [https://www.zhihu.com/question/543192349]

[Big Mac combo meal + 4 Chicken Nuggets] -> 30 rmb, or 3.4% increase

The cheaper grilled chicken combo + 4 chicken nuggets also increased by 1 rmb to 26 rmb, or 4%; considering the number chicken nuggets decreased by 1, price hike here is more than 4%.


In Dec 2023, “4件套” price hiked by another 1 rmb.

[Big Mac combo meal + 4 Chicken Nuggets] -> 31, or 3.3% increase

The cheaper grilled chicken combo + 4 chicken nuggets also increased by 1 rmb to 27 rmb.


Another interesting thing is the price before discount.

Here is the table to summarize the modest price increase in China.

 

How China exported deflation & what data to watch

1/ China PPI

China’ PPI (12-month) started to decline from Nov 2021 (Dec 2020 – Nov 2021 when global demand running high and supply running low), and entered the negative territory in Oct 2022 (global demand shock after Fed hiked rates & war in Ukraine)

China’ PPI (12-month) has remained in negative territory for 16 month as of Jan 2024 data. Looks to remain negative for next 6 month at least.

 

2/ RMB depreciation

Average exchange rate for RMB has depreciated ~9% in 2 years against USD, which caused additional price deflation.

Average exchange rate in 2023: 0.1415 USD.

Average exchange rate in 2021: 0.155 USD.

 

3/ Domestic demand

Hard to quantify, but weak China domestic demand is partially causing weakness in global demand in commodities etc., especially from the real estate sector., thus reducing inflation pressure.

The sharp dropped happened in August 2021, when Evergrande’s debt problem was catching world’s attention.

Can you invest in Chinese stocks these days?

Chinese companies’ stock price dropped sharply in the recent months, which seems to be an opportunity for entry. Should people take it?

We need to address a few questions.

Why the drop?

On the surface, China’s economy is entering a slow/no growth mode, with a deteriorating global business environment (especially towards China).

More recently, the sell-off accelerated as many retail investors were “forced” to deleverage. It’s not obvious, but on the personal finance level:

1) home prices declines triggered deleverage, where most Chinese families store most of their wealth. Especially for those who had taken out home equity in the forms of loans when housing prices were peaking in 2021, refinancing at similar level is nearly impossible now. To fill the gap, they need to sell other assets, or to give up the house for auction. Those who had bought stocks using the home equity are likely to suffer big losses in this process.

2) many high-yield investment products have stopped functioning, which may indicate potential meaningful loss in income and principle (those products are likely to have links to real estate developers or equity markets). If people were dependent on those investment products, it’s could cause troubles in personal finance which leads to deleverage.

Therefore, the buying power directly or indirectly built upon people’s home loans or purchases of investment products is liquidating.

 

Why bother to buy? 

1/ Their are still unique companies / business models / edges that’s hard to find elsewhere.

e.g. CATL is still the most efficient and large-scale battery producer, with profits. There are geopolitical concerns but CATL is also building capacities overseas. If the edge in production over others can sustain, and it can grow overseas in a way that local authorities endorse, it looks to be an investable business.

More specifically, the criteria I would argue is that its products or services are incrementally positive to the global economy, or is unique on the global stage, not just among Chinese peers.

In another word, some companies are still a valuable part of global economy, so investors don’t necessarily need to be interested in China, and may choose to hedge some beta/macro risk.

2/ Valuation has come close to global standard.

When you can easily get a 4%+ risk-free rate in savings, it requires a much higher rate for Chinese equities to be attractive.

Depending on risk appetite, 15x p/e implies 6.7% earnings yield, and 12x implies 8.3% earnings yield.

E.g. CATL is around 15x LTM p/e, although we need to see if it’s sustainable as battery prices dropped pretty dramatically. The point is if it’s a normalized 15x p/e for a globally unique business and is growing, it does offer some value to a portfolio.

China’s birthrate 2023: record low

2023 China has 9.02 mn new born, a record low. Birth rate is 6.39‰ (per 1000 people).

In Japan, it is estimated to have 726,416 new borns in 2023, also a record low.

Strict covid control had negative impact on birth rate. And the remote working culture seems very different in Asia vs. say the US. There is almost no remote working in China. And I don’t think remote working in Japan is mainstream. Remote working seems to be very good to raise kids.

How much money did electric vehicles companies burn (China Trio: Nio, Li, Xpev)

Employee counts at the end of 2020, 2021, 2022:

Nio total 7,763 15,204 26,763
Xpev total 5,084 13,978 15,829
Li total 4,181 11,901 19,396

Their R&D expenses combined is likely to be similar as Tesla’s R&D expenses in 2023, or ~$4bn.


CapEx (rmb, mn) in 1H 2022, 2H 2022, 1H 2023:

Nio -3,463 -3,510 -5,039
XPEV -2,383 -2,297 -1,429
Li -2,010 -3,118 -2,569

Despite a macro downturn, Nio is spending more in capex.

Nio’s capex is now 26% of its revenue in 23H1; XPEV capex has come down a bit to 16% of revenue; Li Auto had the best ratio at 5.4% of revenue in 23H1.

The trio has spent 18bn rmb in capex from H2 2022 to H1 2023, or ~$2.5bn in usd.

To compare, Tesla has spent $7.8bn in capex during the same period; Rivian spent $1.1bn and Lucid spent $1bn.

While Tesla and Li Auto’s gross profits are higher than their capex number, the other 4 companies were burning their own cash.


Middle-east (CYVN, Abu Dhabi based) is backing Nio in 2023, providing ~$3bn net new funding to Nio.

EU (Volkswagen) is backing Xpev in 2023, providing ~$700mn financing to Xpev.

 

 

MSCI China 2023 EPS growth expectation vs. reality

MSCI China EPS in CNY terms from 2023 Q1-Q3 is 1.08, 1.23, 1.25, growing 3.85%, 1.65%, 2.46% yoy.

While reversing the downtrend in 2022, the growth is less than expected. Even with 23q4 current expectation of 9% growth yoy, MSCI China EPS growth is ~4.3% for the full-year 2023.

What was the expectation at the end of 2022 / early 2023?

Let’s take a look:

UBS (Nov/Dec 2022) – “We expect significant easing in COVID-19 restrictions in the second quarter. We forecast earnings growth of 15%-20% for MSCI China, which would be underpinned by lower commodity prices, improved economic growth and lower asset write-downs,”

Morgan Stanley (EPS growth in 2023: 12% -> 13% -> 16%) – for 2023 YE MSCI China Index target, in Nov 2022 report it was 59; raised to 70 in Dec 2022; raised again to 80 in Jan 2023

Goldman Sachs (Dec 2022) – “revise up our earnings forecasts to 13% from 8%” (the link is a report in Jan 2023 but revision is made in Dec 2022.

Citi (Jan 2023) – “expects earnings per share for the MSCI China index to grow 15% year-over-year in 2023. ”

The outcome is the big miss in earnings. We are like to see ~2% 2023 EPS growth in reality vs. expectation of ~15% at the beginning of the year