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An interesting perspective on China’s investment and consumption from Shan Weijian

The full interview is here.

Shan’s overarching thesis is that China’s consumption potential hasn’t been fully released.

He argued that China’s property problem was a drag, but housing price looks stabling, citing 2026 Jan to May Shanghai housing price up.

Further, he argued that nation wide housing rental yield is 2.8% and is meaningfully higher than China’ sovereign debt yield, which makes housing interesting as an asset class.

The argument on cost of construction has some merit, but that includes cost of land.

The part of 买涨不买跌 and 卖跌不卖涨 is a bit confusing to me as this is more short-term psychology influencing supply demand but not fundamentals.

—

I have a different opinion.

I think to housing has stabilized is probably pre-mature.

Some positive drivers can be short-lived, such as

– a good A-share stock market in 1H2026 (CSI300 17.66% in 2025 and 7.55% in 1H26, STAR50 60.86% in 2025 and 64.25 in 1H26)

– the large number of IPOs in HK and A-share,

– policy driven demand – such as “Shanghai seven measures” in Feb 2026; Shanghai gov recently introduced new measures to support housing market.

—-

Assume housing stabilization is true, which definitely has positive impact on consumption, it doesn’t necessarily mean consumption will be up.

There are many other factors, including confidence in the job market and income level, savings for retirement and healthcare, culture etc.

—-

However, I do sense that Chinese gov is doing more to stabilize housing price and consumption, although policy is not at a stimulating level.

And I do agree Chinese gov has more capacity / more policy in the toolbox.

Intel 1968–2002: From Memory Manufacturer to Computing Platform

December 2002

At the end of 2002, Intel Corporation occupied an unusual position.

The company remained the dominant supplier of microprocessors for personal computers. Its x86 architecture had survived Motorola, RISC processors, AMD clones, the rise and fall of numerous PC manufacturers, and several generations of computing technology. Microsoft Windows still overwhelmingly ran on x86. Hundreds of millions of users recognized the phrase “Intel Inside.”

But an Intel shareholder looking backward five years had little to celebrate.

Intel’s stock had closed 1997 at a split-adjusted $17.56. By 1999 it had risen to $41.16, and during 2000 it reached $75.81. By the end of 2002 it was back to $15.57. The investor had watched the stock rise more than fourfold and then lose almost 80% from its high.

The business had not disappeared.

Revenue was actually higher in 2002 than in 1997:

  • 1997: $25.1 billion
  • 2002: $26.8 billion

Yet operating income had fallen from $9.9 billion to $4.4 billion, and net income from $6.9 billion to $3.1 billion. Intel’s operating margin had fallen from roughly 39% to 16%.

The puzzle was larger than a stock-market bubble.

Intel had become one of the strongest technology franchises in modern business history. It had repeatedly reinvented itself, established the dominant PC architecture, built a powerful consumer brand, controlled much of the surrounding PC platform, and maintained roughly 80% of the world’s general-purpose microprocessor market.

How had that happened?

And why had a company with such an extraordinary competitive position produced almost no stock return for an investor buying at the end of 1997 and holding through 2002?


I. 1968–1980: The Memory Company Builds a Second Business

A company founded around memory

When Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore founded Intel in July 1968, the central idea was semiconductor memory.

Computers still relied heavily on magnetic-core memory. Moore believed advances in semiconductor manufacturing could replace core memory with smaller, faster, progressively cheaper integrated circuits.

Intel’s 1103 DRAM, introduced in 1970, validated the idea. By the end of 1971 it had become the world’s best-selling semiconductor device; by 1972, 14 of 18 major mainframe manufacturers in the United States, Europe and Japan were using it.

Intel went public on October 13, 1971, at $23.50 per share, raising $6.8 million. That year it generated $9.4 million of revenue and its first annual profit.

An investor buying the IPO was therefore not buying “the future PC CPU monopoly.”

He was primarily buying an innovative memory semiconductor company.


A second business appears

One month after Intel’s IPO, the company publicly introduced the 4004 microprocessor.

The processor originated from a project for Japanese calculator manufacturer Busicom. Instead of producing many specialized logic chips, Intel engineers designed a programmable general-purpose processor whose behavior could be changed through software.

Strategically, this was revolutionary.

Financially, it was initially small.

Intel spent most of the 1970s earning its money from memory chips and memory systems while gradually developing a second business around microprocessors, peripheral chips, development systems and software tools.

Exhibit 1 — Intel in the memory era

FY Revenue YoY Net income Net margin R&D
1971 $9.4m — >$1m ~11% —
1972 $23.4m +148% $3.1m 13% $3.4m
1973 $66.2m +183% ~$9m ~14% —
1974 $134.5m +103% $19.8m 15% $10.5m
1975 $136.8m +2% $16.3m 12% $14.5m
1976 $226m +65% $25m 11% ~$21m
1977 $283m +25% $32m 11% ~$28m
1978 ~$400m +41% ~$44m 11% ~$41m
1979 ~$661m +65% ~$78m 12% ~$67m
1980 $855m +29% $96.7m 11% $96m

Intel’s 1975 annual report makes the corporate identity clear. Management discussed expanding sales of memory systems while describing the need to “educate” customers about microcomputers—the former was an established business; the latter was still an emerging market.


Memory was still the larger business in 1980

The distinction is important.

By 1978–80, microprocessors had become important, but Intel had not yet become primarily a CPU company.

Contemporary industry estimates put Intel’s broad product-group revenue approximately as follows:

$m 1979 1980 1981
Memory Products Group $376m $406m $284m
Microcomputer Group $232m $371m $415m
Systems and other ~$123m ~$169m ~$169m
Eliminations (~$70m) (~$91m) (~$79m)
Intel revenue $661m $855m $789m

Thus, as late as 1980, memory remained Intel’s largest broad operating group.

But the two lines were almost equal:

Memory: ~$406 million
Microcomputer: ~$371 million.

Intel was approaching a crossover without yet knowing what that crossover would imply.

And there was an important complication inside “memory.” Intel had already begun deemphasizing some intensely competitive DRAM products and remained particularly strong in higher-value EPROM and programmable-memory products.

The problem was therefore not simply “all memory is bad.”

It was that standardized DRAM was becoming a fundamentally different economic business from proprietary microprocessors.


II. The Battle for the CPU: Intel Was Not Yet the Obvious Winner

Intel introduced the 8086 in 1978 and the lower-cost 8088 in 1979.

But Intel did not own the future of computing.

In the late 1970s, Intel was actually losing market share to both Motorola and Zilog. From a purely technical standpoint, Motorola’s 68000 was widely considered the superior chip. It featured a cleaner architecture, a flat memory model, and 32-bit internal registers, making it a favorite among engineers. Zilog’s Z8000 was also highly regarded. Intel’s 8086, by comparison, felt clunky and saddled with awkward memory segmentation.

Intel responded in 1979 with Operation Crush.

Rather than selling purely on chip performance, Intel mobilized:

  • software tools;
  • engineering support;
  • peripheral chips;
  • documentation;
  • salespeople;
  • advertising;
  • seminars;
  • a multigeneration product road map.

The campaign produced almost 2,500 design wins.

This was an early strategic lesson that Intel would repeat for the next two decades:

The processor did not have to win as an isolated chip.
The ecosystem around the processor had to win.

One of those design wins was IBM.


III. Turning Point I — 1981: The Crisis

1981 was one of the strangest years in Intel’s history.

Financially, it was terrible. Intel’s 1981 revenue fell 8%. Net income fell 72%, from $96.7 million to $27.4 million.

Strategically, it may have been the most important year the company ever experienced.


Business One: memory economics break

In 1979 and 1980, the global demand for memory chips far outstripped what factories could produce. This price stability induced a massive wave of capital investment across the entire tech industry to build new fabrication facilities. However, by late 1980 and into 1981, a severe global recession hit. Just as new factories opened and unit shipments rose, consumer demand evaporated. This created a catastrophic market glut, sending memory prices plunging at unprecedented rates.

As the oversupply took hold, major Japanese conglomerates like Fujitsu, NEC, Hitachi, and Toshiba aggressively targeted the U.S. market. Backed by cheaper government-coordinated capital, Japanese firms built heavily automated factories that yielded higher-quality chips with far fewer defects.To win market share during the downturn, Japanese firms undercut American prices to levels where U.S. companies could no longer turn a profit. Intel suddenly found itself unable to compete with the quality or the price of Japanese commodity DRAMs.

Macroeconomic conditions in the United States further paralyzed Intel. The Federal Reserve raised interest rates to historic highs (approaching 20%) to fight inflation. This made building new factories incredibly expensive for American firms compared to their Japanese counterparts, who enjoyed lower borrowing costs.These skyrocketing interest rates drew foreign capital into the U.S., driving up the value of the dollar and making Intel’s exported memory chips artificially expensive overseas.

As this DRAM business became commoditized, Intel was discovering the danger of a product whose technological progress primarily translated into falling price per bit.


Business Two: microcomputers keep growing

While the memory business got crushed, a new business was about to grow fast. On August 12, 1981, IBM introduced the IBM Personal Computer using Intel’s 8088 processor.

The value of IBM was architectural. IBM possessed immense credibility with corporate purchasers. If IBM standardized on Intel architecture, software developers had a stronger incentive to write for it. PC suppliers had an incentive to make compatible peripherals. Other manufacturers had an incentive to build compatible machines.

The immediate financial contribution was modest. IBM sold only tens of thousands of PCs during 1981.

Yet, this was an important “hope”. Intel reported that microcomputer-component revenue still increased during 1981, despite price declines in many products.

The two curves therefore crossed:

1980

Memory: $406m
Microcomputer: $371m

1981

Memory: $284m
Microcomputer: $415m

This is the first real turning point in Intel’s history.


IBM creates one of Intel’s future competitors

IBM was unwilling to depend completely on a single supplier.

Intel therefore entered a technology-sharing arrangement with Advanced Micro Devices, formalized in 1982, allowing AMD to second-source Intel processors.

The logic was sensible in 1981:

Intel needed IBM more than IBM needed Intel.

An exclusive CPU architecture with inadequate supply security could have lost the design.

The strategic cost would become visible years later.

Intel had effectively helped create a legally sanctioned x86 competitor in order to establish x86 as the industry standard.

That trade-off—share the architecture to accelerate adoption, then later try to reclaim its economics—became one of the central competitive tensions of Intel’s history.


IV. 1982–1984: From Design Win to Platform

It is tempting to describe 1981–84 simply as “the PC boom.”

That is too neat.

The correct chronology is:

1981: architecture win
1982: recession and ecosystem formation
1983–84: PC/x86 acceleration inside a broader semiconductor boom


1982: IBM invests before the earnings arrive

Intel’s revenue recovered to about $900 million in 1982, but net income remained only around $30 million.

The company was still struggling with weak semiconductor economics.

Yet IBM made a remarkable decision.

Late in 1982, IBM agreed to invest $250 million in Intel, initially obtaining approximately 12% of the company.

For IBM, the objective was strategic: ensure that a critical technology supplier possessed enough financial strength to continue funding new semiconductor technology.

The investment implied something important.

The processor relationship had moved beyond:

“Intel sells chips to IBM.”

It had become:

“IBM needs Intel to remain technologically and financially capable of executing the PC road map.”


V. 1983–1984: Now the PC Boom Shows Up in the Numbers

By 1983 the underlying market had changed dramatically.

Approximate IBM PC-family shipments illustrate the acceleration:

Calendar year Approx. IBM PC-family units
1981 ~20,000
1982 ~140,000–180,000
1983 ~500,000
1984 ~1.2 million
1985 ~1.4 million

But IBM was no longer the whole story.

Compaq and other manufacturers were producing IBM-compatible PCs. More than one million PCs using Intel’s 8088 architecture were reportedly shipped during 1983 alone.

A broader measure of North American business-oriented desktop computers shows the scale of the expansion:

Year Units
1980 402k
1981 622k
1982 1.09m
1983 2.33m
1984 3.96m

The important economic event was therefore not merely that IBM sold more computers.

It was that:

IBM-compatible computing became a category.


Intel’s results reflected the transition

Exhibit 2 — The first PC cycle

FY Revenue Growth Gross margin Operating income Net income R&D Capex
1980 $855m +29% ~53% $183m $96.7m $96m $152m
1981 $789m -8% ~42% ~$30m $27m $116m $154m
1982 ~$900m +14% ~40% ~$28m ~$30m ~$131m ~$138m
1983 $1.12bn +25% ~44% ~$139m $116m ~$142m ~$145m
1984 $1.63bn +45% ~46% $250m $198m ~$180m $388m
1985 $1.36bn -16% 31% $(60)m ~$2m $195m ~$236m

Intel itself described the strong 1983–84 semiconductor market and identified microprocessors and related components as its greatest growth area.


Was the boom really driven by PCs?

Partly—and increasingly.

It was not exclusively a PC boom. Industrial electronics, telecommunications, automotive products and other semiconductor markets were also strong.

But Intel was unusually leveraged to the fastest-growing segment.

Its 1984 report noted that both the surge in orders during the first half and the cancellations later in the year were heaviest in microprocessors and related components. It specifically identified PC and office-automation manufacturers as customers that had accumulated too much inventory.

This gives a much better interpretation of 1983–84:

A broad semiconductor recovery provided the macro cycle.
The explosion of IBM-compatible PCs gave Intel disproportionate upside.

And the product mix confirms it.

By the mid-1980s, Intel’s microprocessor, peripheral and microcontroller businesses were growing much faster than memory.

The corporate identity had already started changing before management formally acknowledged it.


VI. Turning Point II — 1985: The Year of the “Great Pivot”

In 1984 Intel’s financial performance looked exceptional.

Revenue rose 45%.

Net income rose 71%.

The company responded exactly as semiconductor companies often respond to shortages:

it built capacity.

Capex increased to almost $400 million, roughly twice annual net income.

Then the cycle reversed.

By late 1984, PC and office-automation growth slowed.

Customers that had stockpiled scarce chips suddenly had excess inventories.

Semiconductor supply caught up with demand.

Prices fell.

Intel’s 1985 revenue declined from $1.63 billion to $1.36 billion.


Intel exits DRAM

In mid-1985, CEO Andy Grove and co-founder Gordon Moore looked out the window and Grove famously asked: “If we got kicked out and the board brought in a new CEO, what do you think he would do?” Moore replied: “He would get us out of memories.” Grove responded: “Why shouldn’t you and I walk out the door, come back in, and do it ourselves?”

The decision was psychologically difficult.

Memory was not a minor failed product line. It was the business Intel had been founded to pursue.

However, later in 1985, Intel completely shut down its DRAM manufacturing lines, laying off thousands of employees and absorbing massive financial losses.


The same year, Intel launches the 386

In October 1985, Intel launched the Intel 386 microprocessor.

Crucially, Intel decided not to share the 386 blueprints with AMD or anyone else, defying IBM’s “second-sourcing” tradition.

This single decision transformed Intel into a sole-source monopoly, initiating the incredibly profitable “Intel Inside” era.

The coincidence makes 1985 the second—and arguably decisive—turning point:

Intel exits the technology on which it was founded and launches the processor that will help establish its monopoly-like franchise.

1981 had told Intel where the future might be.

1985 forced Intel to choose that future.


VII. 1986–1992: Converting an Architecture Into a Franchise

Intel’s problems did not disappear immediately.

1986 was another difficult year. Revenue fell again to roughly $1.27 billion, restructuring continued, and the company remained under pressure.

But the competitive structure had changed.

Intel was no longer fighting mainly over commodity semiconductor capacity.

It was fighting over who owned compatibility.


From second sourcing to proprietary architecture

Early x86 processors had been licensed to other manufacturers because large customers demanded multiple suppliers.

Once x86 had become established, this arrangement looked increasingly unattractive to Intel.

Why allow AMD to obtain each new generation of the very architecture whose installed base Intel had spent years building?

With the 386, Intel became much more aggressive about controlling access to its intellectual property.

AMD fought back through arbitration, litigation, reverse engineering and eventually independent compatible designs.

The strategic issue was no longer:

Who can manufacture an Intel-designed chip?

It became:

Who controls the evolution of x86?

Intel increasingly did.


IBM loses control of the standard

Meanwhile, IBM’s own position weakened.

Compaq and other clone manufacturers learned to produce machines compatible with IBM PCs without depending completely on IBM.

This produced a remarkable redistribution of industry power.

IBM controlled less of the PC.

Intel controlled more of the architecture.

Microsoft controlled more of the operating system.

The industry increasingly became known as Wintel, not “IBM computing.”

This is one of the central strategic lessons of the case:

The company that creates a market does not necessarily own its most valuable layer.

IBM owned the original system design.

Intel and Microsoft owned the compatibility points that survived across manufacturers.


VIII. The Economics Begin to Change

Intel’s results recovered sharply.

Following the monopolization of the “386” Chip, Intel repeated this solo strategy with the release of the i486 in 1989, cementing an unbroken sole-source monopoly that generated massive profit margin.

In 1990, Microsoft launched Windows 3.0, which became a massive commercial smash hit. Crucially, Windows 3.0 required the processing power of the Intel 386 to run smoothly. This created the legendary “Wintel” (Windows + Intel) alliance. Every time Microsoft sold a copy of Windows, Intel sold a high-margin processor

By 1990:

  • revenue had reached about $3.9 billion;
  • gross margin was roughly 51%;
  • operating income was about $858 million;
  • net income was about $650 million.

In 1991, Intel completely changed how technology was marketed by launching the “Intel Inside” campaign.

Intel wanted the consumer to tell Dell or Compaq:

“I specifically want the Intel version.”

By the end of 1992:

  • more than 500 OEMs had joined;
  • roughly 70% of eligible OEM advertising displayed the logo;
  • Intel’s initial commitment was approximately $250 million.

By 1992, revenue had reached $5.84 billion, and gross margin approximately 56%.

Intel went from a struggling, restructuring company to the world’s largest semiconductor manufacturer, crossing $1 billion in net profit for the first time.

Intel said its 486 family accounted for the majority of revenue and an even more substantial portion of gross margin.

Exhibit 3 — The franchise emerges

FY Revenue Net income Approx. market cap P/S P/E
1975 $137m $16m $503m 3.7x 31x
1980 $855m $97m $1.76bn 2.1x 18x
1985 $1.36bn ~$2m $3.45bn 2.5x NM
1990 $3.92bn ~$650m $7.81bn 2.0x ~12x
1995 $16.20bn $3.57bn $50.17bn 3.1x 14x

However, between roughly 1980 and 1995 Intel usually traded at only two to four times book value despite the franchise being progressively established.

The market did not immediately capitalize x86 as an enduring monopoly.


IV. 1993–1997: From CPU Supplier to PC Platform Owner

The Pentium arrived in 1993.

But by then Intel’s competitive advantage extended well beyond the CPU itself.

Intel influenced or controlled increasingly important parts of:

  • instruction-set architecture;
  • processor road maps;
  • chipsets;
  • motherboard reference designs;
  • bus standards;
  • development tools;
  • software optimization;
  • manufacturing processes;
  • OEM launch schedules.

The company’s fabs were particularly important.

Because Intel sold very high processor volumes, it could afford leading-edge manufacturing investments. Better manufacturing improved cost and performance. Better products increased volume. Larger volume funded the next generation of fabs.

Scale reinforced technology.

Technology reinforced scale.


The network effect around Windows

The software ecosystem reinforced the hardware economics.

More x86 PCs:

→ more developers write x86-compatible software.

More x86 software:

→ customers prefer x86 PCs.

More customers:

→ OEMs build more x86 machines.

More x86 machines:

→ Intel has more resources to invest in the next generation.

A competing architecture therefore did not simply have to produce a superior CPU.

It had to overcome the accumulated value of software compatibility.

The FTC would later identify exactly these barriers: enormous design and manufacturing costs, economies of scale, existing software investments, developer support and Intel’s reputation.


X. AMD Changes Strategy

Intel never enjoyed competition-free dominance.

AMD’s strategy evolved with the industry.

Initially it was a licensed second source – under the 1982 agreement, the AMD chips were functionally and physically identical to Intel’s.

When Intel increasingly restricted access to new generations, AMD

  1. litigated for contractual rights;
  2. reverse-engineered compatible processors – Am386.
  3. eventually designed independently engineered x86-compatible CPUs.

Intel and AMD finally settled major portions of their technology dispute in 1995. AMD retained certain rights involving older generations but could not simply copy Intel’s future Pentium/P6 microcode.

AMD therefore had to become a real CPU designer, not merely Intel’s shadow manufacturer.

That raised AMD’s risk—but also eventually made it a more meaningful competitor.


XI. The Financial Machine, 1992–1997

The economics of Intel’s new business were radically better than those of the old one.

Exhibit 4 — Intel becomes the PC profit pool

FY Revenue Operating income Operating margin Net income Diluted EPS*
1992 $5.84bn $1.49bn 25.5% $1.07bn $0.16
1993 $8.78bn $3.39bn 38.6% $2.30bn $0.33
1994 $11.52bn $3.39bn 29.4% $2.29bn $0.33
1995 $16.20bn $5.25bn 32.4% $3.57bn $0.50
1996 $20.85bn $7.55bn 36.2% $5.16bn $0.73
1997 $25.07bn $9.89bn 39.4% $6.95bn $0.97

*Restated for subsequent stock splits through 2000.

Between 1992 and 1997:

Revenue: 4.3×

Net income: 6.5×

Intel was not merely benefiting from PC growth.

Its margins were expanding because it had captured a more valuable layer of the industry.


XII. 1997: How Expensive Was an Obvious Monopoly?

This question becomes important later.

By the end of 1997, virtually nobody could plausibly describe Intel as an obscure emerging company.

It had:

  • the dominant PC architecture;
  • a massive installed software base;
  • extraordinarily strong OEM relationships;
  • Intel Inside;
  • leading-edge fabs;
  • roughly $7 billion of annual profit.

Yet its end-1997 equity value was about $114 billion.

That implied roughly:

P/E = $114bn / $6.95bn ≈ 16.5x

P/S = $114bn / $25.1bn ≈ 4.6x

The competitive position looked spectacular.

The valuation, by later technology-stock standards, did not.

This would matter enormously to the investor who bought at that point.


XIII. 1998–2000: Competitors Fight Back

Intel’s dominance was strongest precisely when competitive responses intensified.

AMD’s K6 attacked the value segment.

AMD acknowledged how difficult the position was: because of Intel’s dominance and brand strength, AMD said it priced its K6 processors at least 25% below Intel products with comparable performance. Intel’s price moves therefore directly constrained AMD’s own margins.

By Q4 1998, AMD said the K6 family had reached approximately 16% of worldwide Windows-compatible processor units, more than twice its prior-year share. Yet AMD still lost more than $100 million during 1998.

Intel responded with Celeron, attacking the lower-priced PC market rather than allowing AMD to own a protected profit pool.

This demonstrated an important form of monopoly power.

Intel did not need to prevent competitors from selling chips.

It could make the segments they entered less economically attractive.


AMD’s Athlon becomes genuinely competitive

AMD’s next-generation Athlon represented a bigger challenge.

It was not simply a cheaper clone. In certain periods it offered performance competitive with or superior to Intel’s products.

By 2000 AMD estimated that it had roughly 17% of worldwide PC processor units.

But Intel still retained overwhelming scale, brand, OEM distribution, software compatibility and manufacturing resources.

Competition had become real.

Dominance remained intact.


XIV. Intel Becomes a Regulatory Problem

By 1998, Intel’s market position was powerful enough to attract U.S. antitrust scrutiny.

The Federal Trade Commission said Intel’s own analyses indicated approximately 80% of worldwide dollar sales of general-purpose microprocessors. Other FTC analyses put Intel near 80% of units and almost 90% of dollar sales depending on the precise processor market definition.

The FTC also focused on something more subtle than processor prices.

OEMs depended on Intel for advance technical information and product samples so that they could design machines around future processors and launch them on schedule.

The FTC alleged that Intel had used access to such information in intellectual-property disputes with customers such as Digital Equipment, Intergraph and Compaq. Intel subsequently settled the case without admitting the substantive allegations.

The case revealed how Intel’s power had evolved.

1971

Intel supplied memory components.

1981

Intel supplied IBM’s CPU.

1990

Intel increasingly controlled x86 architecture.

1995

Intel created consumer demand for its CPU.

1998

Intel could influence when major computer manufacturers were technologically able to launch their next PCs.

Intel had moved from supplier to platform gatekeeper.


XVI. 1998–2000: The Business Improves—and the Valuation Improves Faster

Intel’s profits continued increasing despite AMD’s gains.

Exhibit 5 — The late-1990s boom

FY Revenue Gross margin Operating income Net income Diluted EPS
1997 $25.07bn 60.3% $9.89bn $6.95bn $0.97
1998 $26.27bn 54.0% $8.38bn $6.07bn $0.86
1999 $29.39bn 59.7% $9.77bn $7.31bn $1.05
2000 $33.73bn 62.5% $10.40bn $10.54bn $1.51

One qualification is important: Intel’s 2000 net income included unusually large investment-related gains, so operating income gives a cleaner picture of the underlying semiconductor business. Still, the core economics were exceptional.

What changed even more dramatically was what investors were willing to pay.


XVII. Exhibit 6 — Intel’s Valuation Cycle

For consistency, the valuation ratios below use market capitalization / reported company financials, rather than combining raw historical stock prices with EPS from different split bases.

Date Market cap Revenue Net income P/S P/E
1975 YE $0.50bn $0.137bn $0.016bn 3.7x 31x
1980 YE $1.76bn $0.855bn $0.097bn 2.1x 18x
1985 YE $3.45bn $1.365bn ~$0.002bn 2.5x NM
1990 YE $7.81bn $3.92bn ~$0.65bn 2.0x ~12x
1995 YE $50.2bn $16.20bn $3.57bn 3.1x 14x
1997 YE $114.4bn $25.07bn $6.95bn 4.6x 16.5x
1998 YE $196.5bn $26.27bn $6.07bn 7.5x 32x
1999 YE $274.4bn $29.39bn $7.31bn 9.3x 37.5x
2000 peak ~$495bn $33.73bn† $7.31bn‡ ~14.7x† ~68x‡
2000 YE $202.1bn $33.73bn $10.54bn 6.0x 19x
2001 YE $210.4bn $26.54bn $1.29bn 7.9x NM/trough
2002 YE $102.4bn $26.76bn $3.12bn 3.8x 33x

†Using eventual FY2000 revenue for perspective.
‡Using FY1999 earnings as the trailing earnings available entering the 2000 peak.

Historical 1975–98 market values are from the Intel valuation history assembled by Greenwald et al.; 1997 onward year-end market caps are independently consistent with reconstructed market-cap data.

The pattern is striking.

At the end of 1997, Intel was already an overwhelmingly dominant technology platform at only ~16.5x earnings.

By the end of 1999, investors paid ~37.5x.

Around the 2000 stock-market high, Intel’s equity value approached half a trillion dollars.

Thus, Intel’s final stock-market surge was not primarily caused by Intel suddenly becoming a better monopoly.

It was caused by the market assigning a much larger value to the monopoly it already knew existed.


XVIII. Exhibit 7 — The Stock Price Tells the Story

Intel split its stock repeatedly, including 2-for-1 splits in 1997, 1999 and 2000. All prices below are presented on a consistent split-adjusted basis.

Year Year-end price Annual change
1980 $0.42 —
1981 $0.23 -44%
1982 $0.40 +72%
1983 $0.88 +117%
1984 $0.58 -33%
1985 $0.61 +5%
1986 $0.44 -28%
1987 $0.83 +89%
1990 $1.20 +12%
1992 $2.72 +78%
1995 $7.09 +78%
1996 $16.37 +131%
1997 $17.56 +7%
1998 $29.64 +69%
1999 $41.16 +39%
2000 high $75.81 —
2000 YE $30.06 -27%
2001 YE $31.45 +5%
2002 YE $15.57 -50%

The investor experience from the end of 1997 is extraordinary:

$17.56 → $75.81 = +332%

then:

$75.81 → $15.57 = -79%

and ultimately:

$17.56 → $15.57 = -11% over five years.

There was no smooth five-year stagnation.

There was a spectacular late-cycle melt-up followed by a nearly complete round trip.


XIX. 2000–2002: Dominance Does Not Prevent a Downcycle

The Internet boom had encouraged enormous technology investment.

Businesses built networks.

Telecommunications companies ordered equipment.

PC manufacturers and corporations upgraded systems.

Semiconductor producers built capacity.

Then the cycle turned.

Intel’s revenue fell:

$33.7bn → $26.5bn in 2001, a decline of about 21%.

Reported net income fell:

$10.5bn → $1.3bn.

Some of that enormous earnings decline reflected investment gains and acquisition-related accounting, but the underlying operating deterioration was still severe.

Cost of sales rose from roughly 38% of revenue to more than 50%.

Factories designed to produce enormous volumes still carried fixed costs when those volumes disappeared.

By 2002 revenue stabilized at $26.8 billion and net income recovered to $3.1 billion, but Intel remained far below its peak profitability.


XX. The Great Paradox: Intel Did Not Lose Its Moat

This is the most important point in understanding the 2000–02 decline.

Intel did not suddenly lose the PC architecture.

Windows did not abandon x86.

PC manufacturers did not abandon Intel.

AMD did not take 70% of the market.

Intel remained the leading microprocessor supplier.

What disappeared was the assumption that peak demand, peak utilization and peak margins were permanent.

A moat answers:

Who captures the industry’s economics?

It does not answer:

How large will those industry economics be every year?

Intel could own most of the CPU profit pool while the CPU profit pool itself temporarily shrank.


XXI. Revenue Barely Changed; Profitability Did

Compare 1997 with 2002.

1997 2002 Change
Revenue $25.07bn $26.76bn +7%
Operating income $9.89bn $4.38bn -56%
Operating margin 39.4% 16.4% -23 pts
Net income $6.95bn $3.12bn -55%
Market cap $114bn $102bn -10%

This is why the five-year stock result cannot be explained simply by “multiple compression.”

In fact, using year-end reported earnings:

1997 P/E ≈ 16.5x

2002 P/E ≈ 33x

The multiple expanded because 2002 earnings were depressed.

What collapsed was the denominator.


XXII. Intel’s Five Strategic Transformations

1. 1968–1980 — Semiconductor memory company

Intel’s competitive advantage originated in semiconductor process innovation.

The business grew spectacularly, but increasingly standardized memory products attracted competitors and price declines.

The microprocessor was still the second business.


2. 1981 — Two businesses cross

Memory revenue and profit collapse despite record unit volumes.

Microcomputer revenue continues growing.

IBM chooses x86.

The old business deteriorates at precisely the moment the future business gains external validation.

This is Turning Point I.


3. 1982–1984 — A design win becomes an ecosystem

IBM’s PC sales accelerate.

Compaq and other clones expand the installed base.

DOS software reinforces compatibility.

Intel’s processor-related revenues grow much faster than memory.

The boom is partly a broad semiconductor cycle, but PCs increasingly explain Intel’s disproportionate growth.


4. 1985 — Intel chooses the new company

The capacity cycle breaks.

Japanese memory competition exposes DRAM’s structural economics.

Intel exits DRAM and launches the 386.

Resources move toward proprietary microprocessors.

This is Turning Point II.


5. 1986–2000 — Architecture becomes platform

Intel restricts second sourcing.

AMD becomes an independent compatible competitor.

Windows/x86 creates network effects.

Intel Inside creates end-user demand.

Chipsets, motherboards and development tools expand Intel’s control.

By the late 1990s, Intel does not merely supply CPUs.

It helps define what a PC is.


XXIII. Exhibit 8 — Competitive Landscape and Competitor Behavior

Era Main competitive threat Competitor behavior Intel response
1968–75 Core memory, U.S. semiconductor firms Compete on memory density/process Rapid memory innovation; 1103
1975–80 TI, Mostek, NEC, Hitachi, Toshiba; Motorola in CPUs Memory price/scale competition; Motorola wins CPU designs EPROM differentiation; Operation Crush
1981–85 Japanese memory + AMD as x86 second source Japan drives memory prices lower; AMD supplies compatible Intel processors Let AMD second-source to satisfy customer needs; increasingly shift resources to microprocessors
1985–92 AMD clones; Motorola/RISC Reverse engineer x86 or promote alternative architectures Exit DRAM; protect 386/486; exploit software compatibility
1991–97 AMD, Cyrix, PowerPC, RISC Lower-cost compatible CPUs or alternative architectures Intel Inside; fabs; faster product cadence; platform components
1998–2000 AMD K6/Athlon AMD discounts K6 ≥25%; attacks value then performance segments Celeron, pricing response, manufacturing scale
2001–02 AMD Athlon/XP; PC downturn Performance/value competition during weak market Pentium 4, process investment, maintain R&D through downturn

AMD’s own SEC filings provide perhaps the clearest description of the asymmetry. AMD argued that Intel’s financial strength and market dominance allowed Intel to set x86 standards and alter pricing in ways that directly affected competitors’ margins.


XXIV. What Actually Created Intel’s Moat?

By 2000, Intel’s advantage contained at least six reinforcing elements.

Architecture

The installed x86 software base made switching costly.

Developers

Developers had powerful incentives to optimize for the largest installed platform.

OEM relationships

Manufacturers designed product road maps around Intel’s releases.

Manufacturing scale

Enormous processor volume funded leading-edge fabs and process transitions.

Platform control

Chipsets, motherboards, technical standards and advance product information expanded Intel’s influence beyond the CPU.

Brand

Intel Inside created consumer demand for a component users rarely physically saw.

No single element explains Intel’s dominance.

The moat came from the interaction among them.


XXV. The Investor’s Problem Was Different From the Strategist’s Problem

A corporate strategist examining Intel in 1997 might have correctly concluded:

Intel has an extraordinary competitive advantage.

A stock investor needed to answer two additional questions:

What level of earnings is sustainable?

and:

How much of the future is already reflected in the price?

Those questions became particularly difficult in 1999–2000 because both the business cycle and the valuation cycle pointed upward simultaneously.

At the 2000 high, an investor was implicitly capitalizing exceptionally favorable semiconductor economics at an exceptionally favorable multiple.

That combination—not the disappearance of Intel’s moat—created the eventual stock-market damage.


XXVI. December 2002: The Decision

By the end of 2002, Intel was valued at roughly $102 billion.

The stock had returned almost exactly to where it had traded five years earlier.

Yet much had changed.

Intel still controlled the dominant PC architecture.

AMD had demonstrated that technically credible competition was possible.

PC growth was slowing relative to the 1990s.

Intel continued spending billions of dollars on R&D and manufacturing.

The Internet had not disappeared.

Neither had personal computing.

But investors could no longer assume that the extraordinary earnings trajectory of the 1990s would repeat indefinitely.

The central question was therefore no longer whether Intel was a good company.

It plainly was.

The question was:

What were Intel’s normalized earnings—and what growth rate should an investor pay for after the extraordinary PC buildout of the 1990s?

Intel’s history had demonstrated three very different forms of value creation.

The first came from inventing a superior product: semiconductor memory.

The second came from owning a standard: x86.

The third came from capitalizing that standard at an increasingly high stock-market valuation.

Only the first two were controlled primarily by Intel.

The third belonged to the market.

中国地方政府为什么更喜欢“造东西”,而不是“让人消费”?// Why Do Chinese Local Governments Prefer Building Things Over Boosting Consumption?

一个很重要、但经常被忽略的原因,是税制激励。

中国现行增值税是中央和地方共享税。2016年营改增后,地方分享比例从25%提高到50%,而地方拿到的这部分收入,仍然很大程度上跟企业纳税地绑定。换句话说,一家汽车厂、电池厂、化工厂落在哪里,哪里不仅拿GDP、就业和投资,也能拿到持续的增值税税源。

这会自然强化地方政府的制造业偏好。

假设一个新工厂每年创造10亿元应缴增值税。过去地方可能只分到2.5亿元,2016年以后可以分到5亿元。再叠加企业所得税、城建税及各种附加,一个大型制造项目对地方财政的价值非常高。

于是地方政府最合理的行为,就是抢工厂、抢产能、抢总部、给土地、给融资、建产业园。单个地方这样做完全理性,但全国所有地方一起这样做,就容易形成重复投资和过剩产能。

反过来,一个居民多消费1000元,对当地政府的财政收益却没有那么直接。

比如上海居民买一辆安徽生产的车,制造企业缴纳的增值税税源主要仍跟企业纳税地相关。上海创造了最终需求,却未必能像生产地一样直接获得对应税收。

这就是中国税制一个很重要的结构性特征:

地方财政更奖励“生产发生在哪里”,而不是“消费发生在哪里”。

其实“消费地”并不一定难定义。实体商品可以按最终收货地,线下消费可以按门店所在地,汽车可以按上牌地;数字订阅没有收货地址,也可以按信用卡或支付账户的账单/KYC地址归属。规则不需要做到哲学意义上的100%准确,只要统一、稳定、可验证即可。

因此,中国并不一定需要简单加税。可以降低一部分现有VAT,同时把对应税率改成按最终消费地归属的sales tax;或者更简单,把现有地方VAT的一部分从“纳税地分配”改成“消费地分配”。

核心不是税叫什么名字,而是地方政府面对什么激励。

如果新增一座工厂能明显增加地方财政收入,而新增100亿元居民消费却不能,那么地方政府自然会继续优先招商、投资和扩产。

所以中国“重投资、重制造、轻消费”不仅是产业政策问题,也有很强的财政制度基础。

想真正刺激消费,除了给居民发钱,更重要的是让地方政府也能从消费增长中赚钱。


One important but often overlooked reason is the incentive created by China’s tax system.

China’s VAT is shared between the central and local governments. After the 2016 VAT reform, the local share rose from 25% to 50%. Crucially, much of that local revenue is still tied to where the company pays tax. So when an auto plant, battery factory, or chemical plant locates in a city, the local government gets not only GDP, jobs, and investment, but also a recurring VAT tax base.

That naturally strengthens the incentive to attract manufacturing.

If a new factory generates RMB1 billion of VAT a year, the local government might have received roughly RMB250 million before 2016 and RMB500 million afterward. Add corporate income tax, urban maintenance tax, and other surcharges, and a large manufacturing project becomes extremely valuable to local finances.

The rational response is obvious: compete for factories, capacity, headquarters, industrial parks, land investment, and financing support. That may be rational for each individual locality, but when every locality behaves the same way, the national result can be duplicated investment and excess capacity.

Consumption works differently.

If a Shanghai resident buys a car produced in Anhui, much of the VAT-related local revenue still follows the producer’s tax location. Shanghai creates the final demand, but it does not necessarily capture the corresponding marginal tax revenue in the same way Anhui does.

This creates a structural bias:

Local fiscal systems reward where production happens more than where consumption happens.

A consumption-based system does not necessarily have to be technically complicated. Physical goods could be sourced based on the final delivery address, offline services based on the store location, and cars based on the registration location. For digital subscriptions with no shipping address, the tax could be assigned using the billing or KYC address of the credit card or payment account.

The rule does not need to identify the philosophically perfect “true” place of consumption. It only needs to be uniform, stable, and verifiable.

China therefore would not necessarily need to raise taxes. One option would be to reduce part of the existing VAT and replace it with a sales tax allocated according to the final place of consumption. An even simpler option would be to keep the VAT system intact but redistribute part of the local VAT share based on consumption rather than the producer’s tax location.

The key question is not what the tax is called. It is what behavior the fiscal system rewards.

If building another factory clearly increases local government revenue, while another RMB10 billion of household consumption does not, local governments will naturally continue to prioritize investment, manufacturing, and capacity expansion.

China’s bias toward investment and manufacturing is therefore not only an industrial-policy issue. It is also embedded in the fiscal system.

If China wants to stimulate consumption structurally, it is not enough to give consumers more money. Local governments also need to make more money when consumption rises.

ROIC of Nvidia data center built in 2024 for 2026 inference

Assume you invested in 2024 for Nvidia chips based data centers.

Back then, you used H200.

An 8-GPU HGX H200 server is closer to roughly 10–12kW at the server level.

1 MW IT load → ~80–90 eight-GPU servers
× 8 GPUs/server → ~640–720 H200s/MW
1 GW → ~640k–720k H200s

So 680 H200 per MW is probably more reasonable and thus cost ~$35mn per 1MW, or $35bn per GW.

 

 

1 GW IT load 2024 H200-era capex
GPU/HGX servers ~$18–24bn
Networking/storage ~$3–5bn
Facility/power/cooling ~$8–12bn
All-in ~$30–38bn/GW

Source: ChatGPT

How much revenue it can generate today?

Using DeepSeek V4-Pro pricing and token per day estimates like this give you ~$33.3k revenue/day/MW, or ~$12.2bn revenue/year/GW.

 

Per MW/day Tokens
Input ~51.0bn
Output ~12.8bn
Total ~63.8bn

Source: ChatGPT

Assume cash ebitda margin is 80%.

So the 2024 H200 gives you $10bn per year.

After tax (depreciation deducts income), that is ~30% roic over the $35bn capex in 2024.

HK record financing

Alibaba now tops the list with 80bn HKD financing.

排名 公司 / 时间 规模 关键 Terms HKEX 官方公告
1 阿里巴巴 9988 8/23交易,8/24公告 HK$80.0bn 710m新股;HK$112.70;较参考股价折价约3.6%;扩大后占股本3.57%;net约HK$79.7bn;预计8/26交割。 HKEX 配售条款公告
2 中际旭创 3308 7/30上市 HK$53.410bn IPO 54.5m股 × HK$980;net HK$52.891bn;另有8.175m股绿鞋,但该HK$53.41bn数字未计绿鞋。 HKEX 最终发售价及配发结果
3 宁德时代 3750 4/28 HK$39.190bn 配售 62.385m H股 × HK$628.20;较前收折价7.0%,较5日均价折价10.46%;扩大后稀释约1.36%。 HKEX 配售条款公告
4 智谱 2513 7/9 HK$31.411bn 最多 19.78m H股 × HK$1,588;较前收折价12.99%,较5日均价折价6.72%;扩大后约4.25%。 HKEX 配售条款公告
5 立讯精密 2475 7/9上市;8/5绿鞋 ≈HK$25.060bn 基础 383.473m股 × HK$63.28 = HK$24.266bn;8/5部分绿鞋 12.542m股 × HK$63.28 ≈ HK$0.794bn。 IPO最终结果 · 绿鞋公告
6 胜宏科技 2476 4/21上市;4/22绿鞋 ≈HK$23.135bn IPO最终95.85m股、HK$209.88,基础gross HK$20.117bn;随后全额绿鞋14.3775m股,同价发行。(HKEX News) IPO最终结果 · 全额绿鞋公告
7 美的集团 0300 5/6定价;5/7公告 HK$17.248bn 两档各HK$8.624bn、均zero coupon、100%发行。2027档:到期11 May 2027、转股价HK$96.82;2033档:到期13 May 2033、转股价HK$115.76,到期赎回114.95%。 HKEX 双档CB完整条款
8 MiniMax 0100 7/10 HK$16.041bn 配售:35.6m股 × HK$268 = HK$9.541bn;另发 HK$6.5bn zero-coupon CB,100%发行,约7/14/27到期,初始转股价HK$335,较前收premium 12.64%,到期赎回102.75%。 HKEX 配售+CB完整条款
9 联想集团 0992 6/17交易;6/18公告 US$2.0bn zero coupon、100%发行、7年期,到期25 Jun 2033;初始转股价HK$36.70,较签约日收盘价premium约47.5%;net约US$1.979bn。 HKEX CB完整条款
10 MMG 1208 6/16 HK$6.268bn + US$0.8bn CB 配股 705.892m股 × HK$8.88;另发US$800m zero-coupon CB,发行价102%,所以CB gross cash为US$816m;21 Jun 2027到期;初始转股价HK$10.21。 HKEX 配售+CB完整条款
11 牧原股份 2714 2/6上市;3/5绿鞋 ≈HK$12.099bn 基础 273.9514m股 × HK$39 = HK$10.684bn;3/5部分绿鞋 36.2717m股 × HK$39 ≈ HK$1.415bn。 IPO最终结果 · 绿鞋公告
12 紫金矿业 2899 1/29交易;1/30公告 US$1.5bn face / US$1.5375bn gross zero coupon;发行价102.5%;5 Feb 2031到期;初始转股价HK$63.30,较前收premium 37.19%、5日均价premium 45.92%。(HKEX News) HKEX CB完整条款
13 中国宏桥 1378 4/28 RMB10.2bn USD-settled zero coupon CB;100%发行;3 May 2027到期;初始转股价HK$43.90。 HKEX CB完整条款
14 东鹏饮料 9980 2/3上市;2/28绿鞋 ≈HK$11.099bn 基础 40.8899m股 × HK$248 = HK$10.141bn;部分绿鞋 3.8658m股 × HK$248 ≈ HK$0.959bn。 IPO最终结果 · 绿鞋公告
15 华泰证券 6886 2/3 HK$10.0bn zero coupon、100%发行;8 Feb 2027到期;初始转股价HK$19.70,较前收premium 6.78%,较5日均价premium 5.09%;net HK$9.925bn。 HKEX CB完整条款
16 洛阳钼业 / CMOC 3993 1/19交易;1/20公告 US$1.2bn zero coupon、100%发行;24 Jan 2027到期;初始转股价HK$28.03,较前收premium 28.70%,较5日均价premium 26.17%。 HKEX CB完整条款

Source: ChatGPT

Evidence of deflation in China – %Arabica coffee

I met %Arabica Coffee in Hong Kong.

I liked it, especially the design of the coffee shop; I still kept its physical customer loyalty program card.

The coffee chain expanded in mainland China in 2018.

I have been to several of its stores in mainland China and it’s one of my favorites.

In mainland China, the %Arabica coffee loyalty program is more digital (I am using its mini-program on WeChat) and ran separately from the HK one.

The mini-program kept my previous purchases and the Grande Ice Americano is 35 rmb.

You know what, I am buying the %Arabica Grande Ice Americano with delivery to my door for 24 rmb (on weekend) !

As Meituan should also take a cut, the net price for %Arabica is much lower than 23 rmb.

That’s 1/3 cut for consumers and 40-50% cut for %Arabica!

 

That even makes the housing price decline in China “normal” and “not sufficient”.

Best AI

The best AI is the AI that can learn the best after being created.

Education is college is pre-training.

Humans with the best grades in college is probably not the best humans afterwards.

Even you add post-training, which is like internship or few years of work experience, that is still not the best part.

The best AI/human can keep compound on itself.

That is especially true for AI as it can live much longer.

Alibaba’s 3-year payback period

In Alibaba’s earnings call, it touted 3 years of payback and could improve that to 2.5 years or even 2 years.

That sounds strong.. but if you compare, that is nothing.

Even Luckin claims its franchisees have 1.5 – 2 years of payback periods.

And SpaceX said during recent 2q26 earnings that it has <1 year of payback period.

Nebius’s payback period is now 1 year and 10 months, down from 2-3 years, disclosed in 2q26 earnings.

 

Bond yield becomes a topic? looks fine for Europe

Benchmark 10-year yield ranges:

Period Germany Italy Spain Background
Late 1970s–1980s 6–11% 10–14% 11–14% High inflation and nominal growth
Early 1990s peak ~9% 14.2% 14.0% Currency/ERM crisis
2000–07 3–5% 3.5–5.5% 3.5–5.5% Euro convergence
2011–12 crisis peak ~2% 7.3% ~7.6% Euro break-up/default risk
2020–21 low −0.8% 0.45% Around 0% ECB QE and pandemic policy
August 2026 3.26% 4.08% 3.72% Fiscal expansion, inflation and supply

How did European stocks perform?

 

Year STOXX Europe 600 price return Total return Broad environment
1988 +22.2% +25.4% Growth and yields rising
1989 +24.5% +28.0% Reunification optimism
1990 −17.8% −15.3% Bund yields/rates peak; recession fears
1991 +12.5% +15.8% Partial recovery
1992 +1.6% +5.8% ERM currency crisis
1993 +35.9% +40.7% Rate cuts and collapsing yields

 

Index 2011 2012
STOXX Europe 600 price −11.3% +14.4%
STOXX Europe 600 total return −8.6% +18.2%
Germany DAX −14.7% +29.1%
Italy −25.2% +7.8%
Spain IBEX −13.1% −4.7%

Note that 2011-12 is different – one key evidence is German yield yield was falling, while now it’s rising in 2026. Note that 2012 stock increased due to euro-breakup crisis being contained.

Germany’s 10-year yield has increased from about 2.86% at end-2025 to 3.26%, or roughly +40 bp YTD.

Year-end Germany Italy Spain STOXX 600 price return
2008 3.05% 4.47% 3.86% −45.6%
2009 3.14% 4.01% 3.80% +28.0%
2010 2.91% 4.60% 5.37% +8.6%
2011 1.93% 6.81% 5.50% −11.3%
Jul-12 1.24% 6.00% 6.80% Crisis peak
2012 year-end 1.30% 4.54% 5.34% +14.4%

 

Diverging path: Baidu vs. Google

In Q2 2026, Baidu online marketing revenue fell 19% YoY to RMB13.1bn, after falling 22% in Q1.

And AI-native ads doesn’t seem impressive.

Meanwhile Google Search & Other revenue grew 17% YoY to $63.3bn in 2q26.

Google search revenue didn’t feel much impact from growing usage of chat AI.

One difference, probably unrelated to AI-era, is that content sits inside giant closed ecosystems, much of which Baidu either can’t index properly or isn’t the natural starting point for.

Consumers can go directly to vertical apps. This is especially true when mobile is more important than web in China.

Baidu is simply not the end of a discovery journal, while Google still is.

Even if you chat with AI, you might still go to Google to do final checks or to look for places to do the transaction.

Another issue is that Google AI Overview seems more successful in monetization.

Baidu management says it is “deliberately holding back” AI-search monetization.

Google previously disclosed that queries showing AI Overviews monetized at approximately the same rate as traditional Search, and in Q2’26 said it continued to be encouraged by AI Overview monetization even as it expanded into more commercial queries.