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Previous middle-east war length

1991 Gulf War

The actual combat phase of the 1991 Gulf War lasted about 43 days.

Air war began: January 17, 1991 (Operation Desert Storm started) Ground war began: February 24, 1991 Ceasefire / fighting stopped: February 28, 1991

So there are two common ways to measure it:

Full active fighting period: January 17 to February 28, 1991 = 43 days

Ground combat only: February 24 to February 28, 1991 = about 100 hours / 4 days

2001 Afghanistan War

Start: October 7, 2001

Initial fighting end: Early December 2001 — Kandahar fell / the Taliban regime effectively collapsed, which is the more complete endpoint for the initial regime-toppling campaign. 

About 2 month.

2003 Iraq war

Main invasion / conventional fighting phase, it began on March 20, 2003 and was largely completed by May 1, 2003, when the U.S. declared major combat over.

About 42 days.

All these actions are approved by US Congress so that US can use force for over 60 days.

Two support for US stocks

What gives you comfort in keeping US equity?

Trump put is not something everyone can accept.

Fed put is less certain if war keeps inflation high.

What else?

Buffett put – Berkshire’s massive cash position to support any big dip.

SpaceX/OpenAI IPO put – world’s wealthiest people/investors won’t let market close for their pay day.

Powell’s lesson on oil supply shock

Fed is hard to react to oil supply shock.

1/ Fed is designed to manage demand. It cannot produce more oil or open shipping lanes. Historically, the Fed “looks through” supply shocks unless they start to bleed into the broader economy (secondary effects / expectation for inflation rises).

2/ Energy shocks often spike and subside relatively quickly. However, Fed policies take months or even years to fully permeate the economy. Fed would be slowing down the economy exactly when it might be trying to recover from the high energy costs.

“By the time the effects of a tightening in monetary policy take effect, the oil price shock is probably long gone, and you’re weighing on the economy at a time when it’s not appropriate.”

Labubu adjusted P/E

In a previous post, I said unpredictability is what Pop Mart investors must shoulder, but is there any number that can make investors slightly more comfortable?

Let’s try Labubu adjusted P/E and we need Labubu adjusted earnings.

Labubu (The Monsters IP from Pop Mart) revenue was over 14 billion rmb in 2025.

The other “good” IPs were about 3 billion rmb revenue.

We can assume there is 10 billion “extra” revenue that Labubu is earnings.

We can also assume Pop Mart’s marginal operating profit margin is 50%. Then the “extra” operating profit is ~5 billion rmb.

Subtract that from 2025 operating income will give you about 12bn rmb in Labubu adjusted operating profit.

With 25% tax rate, Labubu adjusted earnings is about 9bn rmb.

At 150 HKD per share, Pop Mart is at ~20x Labubu adjusted P/E.

Unpredictability is what Pop Mart investors must shoulder

Pop Mart stock plunged after earnings – down 23% on Wednesday and down 10% on Thursday.

Pop Mart’s forecast of 20% or so rev growth in 2026 is lower than what is expected and is a sharp decline after 185% growth in revenue in 2025.

Labubu is still one of the hottest fashion toy IP worldwide with no competitors I think.

However, investors can’t reliably forecast future rev and thus cash flows of Pop Mart as nobody knows whether Labubu can sustain its mojo / for how long and how far.

Unpredictability is usually a negative thing, but people disregarded it as a risk when Labubu was in rapid growth mode. The “upside” unpredictability blinds investors – they liked it actually.

Now if you really want to be an investor in Pop Mart, you need to be comfortable with this inherent unpredictability.

One way to think about this is that Pop Mart is ultimately a very good channel like Tencent. Whatever it incubates and sells, its stores will sell them well. Pop Mart stores are the product of Pop Mart, alongside the IPs like Labubu.

However, to say Pop Mart stores is like WeChat is too much a compliment for Pop Mart so far. Network effect that is so strong and unique that WeChat really doesn’t have a competitor.

US paratroopers going to middle-east

The Pentagon has ordered about 2,000 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division to begin moving to the Middle East to give President Trump additional military options even as he weighs a new diplomatic initiative with Iran

– The New York Times

I was wondering what are chances that troops are assembled but won’t be put in use.

Paratroopers are meant to be deployed for ground operations. It’s not just bombing around.

I ask ChatGPT to summarize precedents that troops were assembled but didn’t act.

2013 Syria. The U.S. moved forces into position for possible strikes after Assad’s chemical-weapons attack, and Obama said he had decided to take military action, but then paused for congressional authorization and the strike never happened. That is probably the clearest modern example of “assembled and ready, but ultimately did not act.”

2023 Eastern Mediterranean after Oct. 7. The U.S. surged the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the eastern Mediterranean explicitly “to deter” escalation. That force was assembled in-theater as a warning and stabilizer, not for an immediate attack. Reuters later described its role as helping prevent a broader regional conflict.

1994 Kuwait / Iraq (Operation Vigilant Warrior). The U.S. rapidly deployed substantial forces after Iraqi units moved toward Kuwait. President Clinton later said the speed of the deployment helped Iraq “get the message,” after which Iraqi forces withdrew and U.S. combat troops began going home without a war.

1988 Honduras (Operation Golden Pheasant) also fits the pattern: U.S. troops were rushed in after a cross-border crisis with Nicaragua, but the deployment functioned mainly as deterrence and the situation de-escalated before major combat.

And cases when that US already went into war/conflict, but only air strike etc.; then troops for ground operations were assembled but didn’t use.

Kosovo, 1999. The U.S. and NATO were already in an active air war against Yugoslavia in Operation Allied Force. After the bombing campaign started, the U.S. deployed Task Force Hawk to Albania — an Apache-heavy Army force built for possible attacks on Serbian ground forces in Kosovo. But despite being assembled in theater for that purpose, the Apaches never flew a combat mission and the task force never fired a shot in combat before the war ended. That is probably the closest precedent to “already fighting from the air, ground-capable forces assembled, but not used.”

A second, somewhat broader example is Desert Storm, 1991. The coalition had already begun the air campaign against Iraq on January 17, 1991. Meanwhile, a very large U.S. Marine amphibious force was assembled offshore in the Gulf; official Marine Corps history says the 4th and 5th MEBs plus the 13th MEU formed the largest Marine combat landing force since the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the expected amphibious landing into Kuwait never happened. Instead, the force was used mainly as a threat/deception tool to pin Iraqi forces while the actual main ground offensive came from elsewhere.

Why CFOs may not be good CEOs

I believe excellent CEOs need a set of unique skillsets – they need to be able to unite people, rally the morale, be bold and innovative in strategy.

Good CFOs are very good at numbers, very analytical when presented a well-defined question. They are also responsible for financing and executing M&As which can be strategical.

I think excellent CFOs can bring CEO-like value when they proactively pursue M&A deals or actively manage acquired companies. However, this is not a base case.

I could be wrong, but more often than not, CFOs don’t really need to be innovative or think outside the box to be okay – they are fine to be pragmatic and consistent, and sometimes expected to be so.

When CFOs become CEOs, there might be an attendance to deliver near-term numbers rather than focus on real value creation.

It could also go wrong if they rely too much M&As – bad deals will cost a fortune and even mediocre deals carry opportunity costs.

Alibaba used to have Daniel Zhang as CFO and he became CEO in 2015. When he stepped down in Sep 2023, the annualized return during his tenure is at best bond-like.

That’s why I don’t feel good about Mixue Group – it announced that its CFO Zhang Yuan will become CEO, effective immediately. Mixue founders will stay as co-chairman though.

Let’s see.