Perfect Diary or YSG? The dilemma for brand advertising

Following up on the previous blog, Perfect Diary seems to be at the perfect stage to do more brand advertising.

Two problems tho –

1/ what is the core message? Compared with 花西子, perfect diary seems to be less special in terms of message it sends.

2/ YSG wants to be the pipe or the platform. To do so, it needs resources to diversify, which inherently means the lower importance of perfect diary.

It seems to me that the conflict is also due to the short time frame the management has. To go for the ultimate J-curve of perfect diary and to become the holding group with successful tiered brands in a few years = a extremely tough goal.

If we draw a matrix – categories on the x-axis and premium level on the y axis, plus female/male on the z-axis.. long way to go.

Brand advertising in 新国货时代

Many new consumer brands in China are at the inflection point now. While they are often good at initial traffic generation and use of KOLs, brand advertising seems still an effective and a necessary step to go mainstream. It’s also the ultimate battle that can build brand equity into a long-term competitive advantage.

Three takeaways:

1/ buying traffic is cost-effective and useful in early stage to test and improve the product. But it seems to have a decreasing marginal return after certain level – this is also where brand advertising should kick in.

2/ brand advertising may take time to be “effective” when non-linear growth can be observed. Three key factors to determine whether it will work / how long it’s gonna take: 产品完成度,种草基础,渠道渗透

3/ for new segments, first mover or the current market share leader doesn’t effectively mean it’s the winner – as long as there is no clear leadership in consumers’ mind. The first to establish a strong association or become the cognitive referent is the key.

China’s housing market (2) [WIP]

Asset allocation in China

Very different from the US, where financial assets represent a large portion of families’ wealth, for most Chinese families, real estate assets (residential) are the top choice and the most important part for asset allocation. According to a survey conducted in 2019, among urban families’ total assets, 59.1% is residential homes while only 20.4% is in financial assets[1],[2]. In a previous analysis on another series of data, housing asset represents 74.1%, 73.8%, and 72.7% of urban households’ total assets in 2010, 2012 and 2014 respectively[3]. Comparatively, in 2016, US households’ mean value of primary residence is only 24.4% of their mean value of total assets, while financial assets are around 42.5%[4].

For one thing, China’s A-share market doesn’t provide meaningful return over the last decade, compared with S&P 500. The chart below is from 2010 to 2019: the black line is CSI 300 Index, which consists of the 300 largest and most liquid A-share stocks, while the blue line is S&P 500.

Exhibit 2. CSI 300 and S&P 500 performance over from 2010 to 2019

In fact, among the 20.4% financial assets, the report said only around 10% (or 2% of total asset) is equity exposure, including stocks and mutual funds.

Meanwhile, housing prices in China is climbing steadily. Buying a home in top tier cities in China is like a leveraged long position in S&P 500 in the US, with lower risks and higher returns. Indeed, it would be comparable to a leveraged buyout deal – and millions of people are actively participating. According to some 2010 info, prices under RMB 30k per sqm[5] were common in Nanshan, Shenzhen; after 10 years, in the same district, new homes are priced at least at RMB 70k per sqm. Indeed, for the same community, prices can easily triple up.

The last decade’s rise is already on the back of a steady growth in the previous decade. In another study, Shenzhen’s housing price index rose from 1 to 3.65 between 2003 and 2013[6]. The same is true for other first tier cities – index increased from 1 to 4.43 for Shanghai, from 1 to 5 for Guangzhou, and from 1 to 7.6 for Beijing. Tier two and Tier three cities generally experience the same trajectory, with average growth rate a few points lower.

With a common 10x return and the ability to take leverage, residential real estate has become the most obvious, safest asset allocation choice with the best return profile for most people in China.

It is also worth noting that many high-quality companies in China, mostly in the internet industry, are not listed on the A-share market. Thus, they remain inaccessible to many people, further limiting their asset allocation choices.

[1] https://www.reuters.com/article/china-household-assets-0424-fri-idCNKCS2260VC (Chinese)

[2] http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H3_AP202004271378696212_1.pdf (Chinese)

[3] https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/7/2946/htm

[4] https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/research-department-working-paper/2019/trends-in-household-portfolio-composition.aspx

[5] https://sz.leju.com/news/2020-09-27/06456715630843769180881.shtml (Chinese)

[6] journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/685953

China’s housing market (1) [WIP]

Urbanization and population

According to the World Bank, China’s urban population percentage increased from 36% in 2000 to 60% in 2019, or around 843 million[1]. Two largest cities in China, Shanghai and Beijing, have 24.3 million and 21.5 million residents respectively in 2019 (Exhibit 1).

in millions 2000 2005 2010 2015 2019
Beijing 13.64 15.38 19.62 21.71 21.54
Shanghai 16.09 18.90 23.03 24.15 24.28

Exhibit 1. Beijing and Shanghai residents growth over the past two decades

While the definition for a “resident” is to live for more than 6 month of a given year, two other metrics are “Hukou” and “actual population served / managed” – Hukou, the most conservative one, is a concept dated back to ancient China while the latter is newly disclosed. In 2019, measured by actual population served / managed, Guangzhou has over 22 million, Shenzhen has over 22 million[2], Chengdu has over 21 million[3]. Meanwhile, their official residents in 2019 are 15.3, 13.4 and 16.6 million respectively.

While Hukou population for Shenzhen is only around 5 million, the actual population is 4 times more. The gap seems to be a good proof for Shenzhen’s fast growth over the past few decades, and also implies an outsized demand for future home buying. As further discussed below, Hukou (or certain years of social security tax) has become the prerequisite to buy homes in certain large cities such as Shenzhen. Therefore, fundamentally, the long-term increase in buying pressure is from 1) among the actual population, those who would like to stay in Shenzhen, obtain Shenzhen Hukou and buy homes, 2) the constant increase in actual population managed / served, as Shenzhen continues to attract businesses and provides high-quality jobs.

[1] https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL?end=2019&locations=CN&start=2000

[2] https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_7843440 (Chinese)

[3] https://m.bjnews.com.cn/detail/159193229415528.html (Chinese)

Second-hand e-commerce boom (hype)?

Poshmark (POSH) had a great run at the beginning of 2021 – closed at $101.5 per share on its first day (Jan 14), or 142% higher than its IPO price of $42.

On March 29, ThredUp (TDUP) went IPO with $14 listing price, closing its first day at $31.4 per share, or 124% higher.

Capital reacts fast in China as Zhuanzhuan raised $390 million on Apr 1. Zhuanzhuan was from Wuba and raise $300 in Sep 2019. In May 2020, Zhuanzhuan merged with Zhaoliangji, with post-merger valution of $1.8 billion.


However, valuations seem to be rich.

A long RealReal (REAL) short Poshmark (POSH) trade would return more than 13% in four week (March 4 – April 1).

Poshmark was trading at 10x forward rev while RealReals is below 5x.

If short was implemented right before Poshmark’s earnings on Mar 11, which disappoints, return would be 29%.


2020 revenue

Poshmark: $262.1mn

RealReal: $299.9mn

ThredUp: $186.0mn

Btw, these companies are not growing crazy at 50% or above – CAGR for the next 3 years is like 30%.