Personal computers 2024

Intel (2023q4 earnings call): “Customer inventory levels have normalized, and 2023 PC consumption was in line with our 270 million-unit forecast. We expect the PC TAM up low single digits year on year in 2024, in line with third-party estimates. We expect to ship approximately 40 million AIPCs in 2024 alone.”

IDC: The total PC market of 2024 should see growth of 3.4% compared to 2023.

Logitech (FY24q3 earnings call): implied low single digit rev growth – “Looking ahead to FY25, we do not anticipate an inflection point in the slope of this curve. While the rate of our net sales declines has improved, there are a number of headwinds and uncertainties that may impact our net sales throughout FY25.”

 

Investors’ concerns about Disney

Netflix has surpassed Disney in market cap.

What are the concerns for investors? especially vs. an investment in Netflix

1) asset heavy (theme park) model

Theme park risk is exposed during covid. Plus, as theme parks are located across the world, different jurisdictions can complicate the operation.

And it’s trying to expand. In the next 10 years, Disney plan to double global capex to $60bn. Much of that is probably due to the land bank – “In fact, Disney Parks has over 1,000 acres of land for possible future development to expand theme park space across its existing sites”.

It’s a truly unique experience, but also considered as a riskier one vs. Netflix’s spending on content.

And it requires consumer spending on theme parks to double? This might be possible if one family went to Disney Park once in the past decades, and is going to visit twice in the next decade; but could be a burden if one expects visits per year to double for a family.

2) caught up in US-China tension?

Netflix doesn’t directly operate in China, and its financial performance doesn’t depend on China. This can be a relief for investors, who usually don’t want to be caught up in geopolitical tensions.

3) unprofitable streaming?

It takes time to be profitable in streaming, with a stable subscriber basis and a good pricing strategy. It’s actually not that easy.

For CY2023q3, Disney streaming revenue is ~59% of Netflix. Disney had 199mn subscriptions across offerings, while Netflix had 247mn during the same time period, or 80% in terms of number of subscriptions.

Disney’s core Disney+ paid subscriptions are at 112.6 million as of Sep 2023 and lost $420 million in that quarter. Although loss has decreased, it take longer and a bigger scale to become a good income stream for Disney.

Comparing with Netflix, which got $16.64 / month from ~80mn paid membership in US & Canada, Disney got $7.5 / month for its 46.5mn US subscribers.

You can’t double the price overnight. Disney needs to increase its value delivered to consumers in streaming.

Disney announced price hike back in Aug, effective Dec 2023 – from $10.99 to $13.99 / month, or 27% hike for the non-ads plan in the US.

New:

Source: https://www.flatpanelshd.com/news.php?subaction=showfull&id=1691641877

 

Old:

Source: https://thewaltdisneycompany.com/ad-supported-disney-subscription-tier-to-launch-in-the-u-s-on-december-8/

Netflix: there is a lot to like

Besides a single quarterly earnings beat, there are many things investor like. Netflix can appeal to both defensive and offensive investors.

1/ a stable positive FCF

For several quarters in a row, Netflix has delivered $1.5bn+ FCF/qtr, and expects 2024 FCF to be ~$6bn. Positive FCF is crucially important in today’s high-interest rate environment.

Btw, Netflix doesn’t need massive capex and doesn’t worry about utilization etc. However, Netflix does need to spend on contents.

This FCF is built upon a $17bn cash spend budget on content for 2024.

If not for the $1B in delayed spending due to the WGA and SAG-AFTRA strikes, 2024 FCF should be $7bn.

$7bn with 4-5% required fcf yield implies a $140-175bn market cap, which was where Netflix was trading at in 2023.

2/ growing TAM

Investors like an expanding TAM – like Amazon’s flying wheel model.

Internationalization was the first step: 2012 Netflix had <5mn paid subscriptions (incl. Canada).

By the end of 2023 (in 11 years), Netflix has ~180mn paid members outside of US & Canada – a more than 36-fold increase.

Now, Netflix has pretty interesting upside in non-video streaming businesses: such as ads and gaming.

“It’s a $600B+ opportunity revenue market across pay TV, film, games and
branded advertising — and today Netflix accounts for only roughly 5% of that addressable market”

2023q4 Netflix letter to shareholders

3/ Shareholder return

2023Q1 buyback: $400mn

2023Q2 buyback: $645mn

2023Q3 buyback: $2.5bn

2023Q4 buyback: $2.5bn

Its capital allocation strategy:

The first priority for our cash is to reinvest in our core business
and to fund new opportunities like gaming and ads, followed by selective acquisitions;

Target maintaining minimum cash equivalent to roughly two months of revenue (e.g., about $5.4B based on Q1 revenue).

After meeting those needs, we anticipate returning cash to stockholders through share repurchases.

Bridgewater’s alpha return after 2018

2019: flat

The firm’s flagship Pure Alpha strategy was essentially flat in 2019, with Pure Alpha 18 Percent, the more leveraged version, falling 0.5 percent for the year, according to an investor in the funds. The less leveraged version, Pure Alpha 12 percent, gained 0.5 percent for the year.

2020: -7.6%

Bridgewater Associates’ flagship Pure Alpha fund lost 7.6% in 2020, while the firm’s All Weather fund was up over 10%.

Pure Alpha 12% Strategy fund, which went from posting a 0.29% return in 2019 to suffering a loss of -10.63% in 2020. Furthermore 2020 also wiped out two years of returns on their Pure Alpha 18% Volatility Strategy.

2021: 8%

Performance of Bridgewater’s flagship global macro fund Pure Alpha 18% Vol fund was up 7.95% in 2021 compared with a loss of 12.6% in 2020. The firm’s All-Weather 10% Vol risk-parity strategy returned 11.57% in 2021 and 9.5% in 2020.

2022: 9.4% (6% through Nov)

The Pure Alpha fund tumbled about 13% in the fourth quarter through November, cutting its year-to-date gain to 6%.

Pure Alpha II tumbled in October and November 2022 after having been up 22%. It ended that year up 9.4%.

2023: -7.6%

Bridgewater Associates’s flagship hedge fund lost 7.6% last year, with all of the drop coming in the last two months of 2023, according to people familiar with its performance. The losses for the world’s biggest hedge fund corresponded to the biggest two-month gain in global bonds since at least 1990 and a roughly 14% gain in US shares. The Pure Alpha II fund was up 7.5% through October before dropping about 14% in the following two months.

The firm’s long-only All Weather fund returned 10.6% last year, one of the people said.

 

What did Japan’s housing price look like during 1990s housing bubble?

Price-to-income ratio

The average price of a new 70 sqm apartment in 1990 in Tokyo was 107,660,000 Yen, or 1,538,000 Yen/sqm, while the average annual income was 5,940,000 Yen. Before the bubble, the average price-to-income ratio in 1985 was 8.08.

Financial Times article (https://www.ft.com/content/2ba1cb74-f598-3a4e-9edd-4e55a48d3480)

So in 1990, new home price is ~18x annual income and before bubble is ~8x.


Relative performance

Price rose ~4x in 15 years

Peak to bottom took 5 years; declined ~40% (1990-1995)

From 1975 – 1995, price still rose ~2.5x in 20 years.

Source: Home Ownership and Economic Change in Japan


Relative to global (before bubble)

Price-to-income ratio is actually more than doubling US-level and is the highest among developed countries.

Source: Introduction to “Housing Markets in the U.S. and Japan”

However, Japan’s women work participation rate is lower than the US back then, which can impact household income.

Source: Lessons from the rise of women’s labor force participation in Japan


Income level

Peak income is actually lower for later generations.

Source: The Impact of the Rise and Collapse of Japan’s Housing Price Bubble on Households’ Lifetime Utility


Due to other reasons, e.g. Asia Financial Crisis, the property market didn’t seem to recover until later years.

Source: New apartment prices in Japan since 1956,
Tokyo Kantei via JAPAN PROPERTY CENTRAL

Can you invest in Chinese stocks these days?

Chinese companies’ stock price dropped sharply in the recent months, which seems to be an opportunity for entry. Should people take it?

We need to address a few questions.

Why the drop?

On the surface, China’s economy is entering a slow/no growth mode, with a deteriorating global business environment (especially towards China).

More recently, the sell-off accelerated as many retail investors were “forced” to deleverage. It’s not obvious, but on the personal finance level:

1) home prices declines triggered deleverage, where most Chinese families store most of their wealth. Especially for those who had taken out home equity in the forms of loans when housing prices were peaking in 2021, refinancing at similar level is nearly impossible now. To fill the gap, they need to sell other assets, or to give up the house for auction. Those who had bought stocks using the home equity are likely to suffer big losses in this process.

2) many high-yield investment products have stopped functioning, which may indicate potential meaningful loss in income and principle (those products are likely to have links to real estate developers or equity markets). If people were dependent on those investment products, it’s could cause troubles in personal finance which leads to deleverage.

Therefore, the buying power directly or indirectly built upon people’s home loans or purchases of investment products is liquidating.

 

Why bother to buy? 

1/ Their are still unique companies / business models / edges that’s hard to find elsewhere.

e.g. CATL is still the most efficient and large-scale battery producer, with profits. There are geopolitical concerns but CATL is also building capacities overseas. If the edge in production over others can sustain, and it can grow overseas in a way that local authorities endorse, it looks to be an investable business.

More specifically, the criteria I would argue is that its products or services are incrementally positive to the global economy, or is unique on the global stage, not just among Chinese peers.

In another word, some companies are still a valuable part of global economy, so investors don’t necessarily need to be interested in China, and may choose to hedge some beta/macro risk.

2/ Valuation has come close to global standard.

When you can easily get a 4%+ risk-free rate in savings, it requires a much higher rate for Chinese equities to be attractive.

Depending on risk appetite, 15x p/e implies 6.7% earnings yield, and 12x implies 8.3% earnings yield.

E.g. CATL is around 15x LTM p/e, although we need to see if it’s sustainable as battery prices dropped pretty dramatically. The point is if it’s a normalized 15x p/e for a globally unique business and is growing, it does offer some value to a portfolio.

China’s GDP growth?

2023 China’ official GDP figure is growth 5.2% yoy, as reported today.

The caveat is that the growth is in RMB terms. However, due to RMB devaluation, GDP in USD terms is flat for 2 years.

2021 GDP in RMB: 114,923.7 bn

2023 GDP in RMB: 126,058.2 bn

2021 average FX: 1 USD = 6.4529 RMB

2023 average FX: 1 USD = 7.0742 RMB

2023 vs 2021 GDP in RMB terms grew by 9.7%, or 4.7% annually;

while RMB vs USD dropped by 9.6%, or 4.7% annually.

So GDP in USD terms is flattish for 2 years.

 

China’s birthrate 2023: record low

2023 China has 9.02 mn new born, a record low. Birth rate is 6.39‰ (per 1000 people).

In Japan, it is estimated to have 726,416 new borns in 2023, also a record low.

Strict covid control had negative impact on birth rate. And the remote working culture seems very different in Asia vs. say the US. There is almost no remote working in China. And I don’t think remote working in Japan is mainstream. Remote working seems to be very good to raise kids.

How did post-08 housing price perform in Manhattan?

How did average price change?

Average price per sqft for 2 bedrooms dropped ~17% in 2009 and ~4% in 2010.

Overall average price per sqft looks slightly down / rather flattish in 2010 across all types.

Difference across areas is huge – certain areas can continue to drop over 10% in 2010.

Source: https://www.millersamuel.com/files/2011/10/MMR10.pdf


How was median income level?

Median household income level in New York County (Manhattan) in 2010 was $63,188, dropping 7.5%.

Median household income level in New York State in 2010 was $49,780, slightly dropping.

A 118 sqm 2-bedroom home (or 1,270 sqft), with average price per sqft of $1,097, is equivalent to 22x a median Manhattan family’s annual income in 2010, or 28x a median NY state family’s annual income in 2010.

Monthly median income from a Manhattan household can buy 4.8 sqft, or 0.446 sqm, at average 2-bedroom price.

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MHINY36061A052NCEN

Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/MEHOINUSNYA646N


Another source for median household income is here, from nyc.gov: https://www.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/acs/house_income_nyc_boro_06_10.pdf

How much money did electric vehicles companies burn (China Trio: Nio, Li, Xpev)

Employee counts at the end of 2020, 2021, 2022:

Nio total 7,763 15,204 26,763
Xpev total 5,084 13,978 15,829
Li total 4,181 11,901 19,396

Their R&D expenses combined is likely to be similar as Tesla’s R&D expenses in 2023, or ~$4bn.


CapEx (rmb, mn) in 1H 2022, 2H 2022, 1H 2023:

Nio -3,463 -3,510 -5,039
XPEV -2,383 -2,297 -1,429
Li -2,010 -3,118 -2,569

Despite a macro downturn, Nio is spending more in capex.

Nio’s capex is now 26% of its revenue in 23H1; XPEV capex has come down a bit to 16% of revenue; Li Auto had the best ratio at 5.4% of revenue in 23H1.

The trio has spent 18bn rmb in capex from H2 2022 to H1 2023, or ~$2.5bn in usd.

To compare, Tesla has spent $7.8bn in capex during the same period; Rivian spent $1.1bn and Lucid spent $1bn.

While Tesla and Li Auto’s gross profits are higher than their capex number, the other 4 companies were burning their own cash.


Middle-east (CYVN, Abu Dhabi based) is backing Nio in 2023, providing ~$3bn net new funding to Nio.

EU (Volkswagen) is backing Xpev in 2023, providing ~$700mn financing to Xpev.