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[Reading Buffett] 2017

Redefining risk-free: “risk-free” long-term bonds in 2012 were a far riskier investment than a long-term investment in common stocks, as

investing is an activity in which consumption today is foregone in an attempt to allow greater consumption at a later date. “Risk” is the possibility that this objective won’t be attained.

Another lesson from Buffett – stick with big, “easy” decisions and eschew activity.

[Reading Buffett] 2016

For certain stocks, Buffett has no intention to sell, however, those are still considered “available for sale” stocks.

Buffet’s tax lesson on dividends – “For a non-insurance company – which describes Berkshire Hathaway, the parent – the federal tax rate is
effectively 101⁄2 cents per $1 of dividends received. Furthermore, a non-insurance company that owns more than 20% of an investee owes taxes of only 7 cents per $1 of dividends. That rate applies, for example, to the substantial dividends we receive from our 27% ownership of Kraft Heinz, all of it held by the parent company.”

Buffett compared results of HFs vs. S&P 500 over the past 9 years. On average S&P 500 won.

[Reading Buffett] 2015

Berkshire added the sixth “powerhouse”, which is Precision Castparts Corp for manufacturer aerospace components.

Haha I liked this quote – “utility was the only business that would automatically earn more money by redecorating the boss’s office”.

When technology changes “destroyed” some industries, what to do? Buffett suggested a better safety net for those “who are willing to work but find their specific talents judged of small value because of market forces. “. Well said I think.

 

[Reading Buffett] 2014

Buffett added a new column for the “market” value of Berkshire’s share. This is important as “cost-based carrying value” was never revalued up. Thus, over time “the gap between Berkshire’s intrinsic value and its book value has materially widened”.

“a business with terrific economics can be a bad investment if it is bought for too high a price”.

Buffett recognized the investment failure in Tesco, and said he should have exited earlier.

[Reading Buffett] 2013

Berkshire purchased both preferred shares and common shares of Heinz, partnering with 3G Capital. Buffett touted the partnership as a new model of investing, and says the difference between Berkshire and private equity firms is that “Berkshire never intends to sell a share of the company”.

“Games are won by players who focus on the playing field – not by those
whose eyes are glued to the scoreboard.” – focus less on current prices.

Buffett also sent a warning to the pension systems/policies of public entities.

[Reading Buffett] 2012

Future or revolving liabilities are less “costly” to Berkshire – “the true value of this liability is dramatically less than the accounting liability”. Thus, the book value is more valuable than it seems.

However, this is not the norm for the insurance industry –

There is very little “Berkshire-quality” float existing in the insurance world. In 37 of the 45 years ending in 2011, the industry’s premiums have been inadequate to cover claims plus expenses.

Hurricane Sandy cost GEICO 3 times more than Katrina. Isn’t climate change the biggest long-term threat to insurance companies? And we may influence nature, but it’s a threat we can’t directly control now.

“As long as a newspaper was the only one in its community, its profits were certain to be extraordinary; whether it was managed well or poorly made little difference.”

How amazing is (incremental) profitability at Meta?

For the past 8 quarters (2023 & 2024), incremental gross profit margin is well above 80%, more like 90%.

This is easy to understand, e.g. one more successful ads sale (click etc.) on Instagram won’t cost Meta more.

What’s even more amazing is the incremental operating profit conversion, which on average is like 100% for the past 6 quarters!

What does 100% mean? It means one dollar of additional gross profit earned by Meta was converted into one dollar of operating profit – how amazing is that!

The operating profit margin increased from 20% in 2022 Q4 to 48% in 2024 Q4, growing at 91% CAGR.

Although there were some one-off opex optimization efforts, thus incremental operating margin should definitely fall, it’s still a very very powerful business franchise, demonstrated by this amazing incremental earnings power.